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Abstract
From Psychoanalysis to Schizoanalysis 
Chaos and Complexity in Therapeutic Practice
Scott William Gremmels
Human life is engaged in a continual process of mapping and modeling the external uni­
verse. From the immediate level of sensation to more abstract forms of emotional and 
cognitive mapping, the human organism builds a web of inner experience which forms 
the basis for the construction/perception of “reality.” This act of learning forms the genet­
ic, neural, linguistic, and social programing by which individual and collective subjectivi­
ty is constructed. Theories in philosophy and science are simply more abstract higher- 
level models of reality akin to our neuro-semantic mappings. They are similiar to cultur­
al, artistic, and religious stories in that their modeling includes not only process but the 
organized gestalt of content which endows the model with meaning in inner experience.
If we move to a higher level of modeling by metamodeling we can understand how vari­
ous theories of human life have mapped reality. The transversal linking of various theo­
ries or models allows us to create clearer maps about process and to transcend the differ­
ences resulting from content which supply meaning to inner subjectivity and which orga­
nize theories, disciplines, and practices like religious belief systems. Schizoanalytic 
metamodeling engages this transversal process of communication by which two or more 
different perspectives of the real - two or more subjectivities or realities - are transcended 
by moving to the next higher logical level in a nested hierachy of organization. 
Schizoanalysis was one of the names Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze gave to their life­
long project of reinventing psychoanalysis and therapeutic practice and extending it into 
the material and social field. By giving a name to this practice and outlining its essence 
they began to gather together the work of various clinicians, artists, philosophers, and sci­
entists who - though isolated - were already engaged in such a project of transforming 
human experience and whose history has just begun to be told. The present work contin­
ues the development of schizoanalysis as a clinical and cultural practice.
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Book I
The Construction of Subjectivity 
Psychobiology
4
1. The Human Being and Becoming - A Conscious Organism
Human life is engaged in a continual process of mapping and modeling the external uni­
verse. From the immediate level of sensation to more abstract forms of emotional and 
cognitive mapping, the human organism builds a web of inner experience which forms 
the basis for the construction/perception of “reality.” This act of learning forms the genet­
ic, neural, linguistic, and social programing by which individual and collective subjectivi­
ty is constructed. The objective perception of the real which is not fully accessible to 
human subjective perception is something which we can strive for, but we are never 
finally free of the limitations of the subjective position from which any one of us experi­
ences this real as our “reality”. Further, this reality - or subjectivity or inner experience - 
forms a world of its own which - while it may be unconscious - is not only a part of the 
real but perhaps is more determinant in our lives than the conscious or objective experi­
ence of the real.
Theories in philosophy and science are simply more abstract higher-level models of reali­
ty akin to our neuro-semantic mappings. They are similiar to cultural, artistic, and reli­
gious stories in that their modeling includes not only objective process but the organized 
gestalt of subjective content which endows the model with meaning in inner experience. 
If we move to a higher level of modeling by metamodeling we can understand how vari­
ous theories of human life have mapped reality. The transversal linking of various theo­
ries or models allows us to create clearer maps about process and to transcend the differ­
ences resulting from content which supply meaning to inner subjectivity and which orga­
nize theories, disciplines, and practices like religious belief systems. At the same time 
however we must not seek to ignore meaning in subjectivity, but to explore it in all its 
irreducible multiplicity as the essential end of all human existence. Practical means of 
survival as well as communication across disparate forms of individual and collective 
subjectivity depend on the ability to transcend subjective inner experience and to per­
ceive from the point of view of the other in the act of finding a common transversal map 
between maps. Schizoanalytic metamodeling engages this transversal process of commu­
nication by which two or more different perspectives of the real - two or more subjectivi­
ties or realities - are transcended by moving to the next higher logical level in a nested
hierachy of organization.
Schizoanalysis was one of the names Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze (1972, 1980) 
gave to their life-long project of reinventing psychoanalysis and therapeutic practice and 
extending it into the material and social field. By giving a name to this practice and out­
lining its essence they began to gather together the work of various analysts, artists, 
philosophers, and scientists who - though isolated - were already engaged in such a pro­
ject of transforming human experience and whose history has hardly begun to be told.
A line stretches from Nietzsche to Deleuze and Guattari which sidesteps a century of 
impoverished work in the field of psychology, psychotherapy, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, 
and related disciplines. Nietzsche was already a master clinician/physician of the bio-psy­
cho-social whom Freud stated had known more about himself than any single human 
being, and yet whom he admitted he could not read. The work of Deleuze and Guattari 
provides an answer to Nietzsche’s vision of the therapeutic enfolded into everyday prac­
tice. The conclusion of their last book What Is Philosophy - “From Chaos to the Brain” - 
offers a model of the human biopsychic organism as a nexus continually organizing ener- 
gy-matter into somatic-emotional-cognitive events which could be called “sovereign 
states”. Perhaps the only weakness in their approach is the over-reliance on the brain as 
opposed to the complex embodiment of subjectivity which involves multiple psychobio- 
logical flows of the body encluding endocrine, immune, meridian, and other energetic- 
information systems.
Considering the human organism caught in this flux, the idea of ego or consciousness 
must be seen as relative, and work in psychoanalysis, hypnosis, psychopharmacology, 
and phenomenology has only sketched out how transference and trance are ubiquitous in 
everyday life and unresolvable. Existing models of therapy are antiquated. Schizoanalytic 
practices of speculative and concrete cartography borrow from all of these models - but 
also from art and literature - in developing ways to seize hold of and communicate with 
expressive moments and sovereign states of existence. The complexity of schizoanalytic 
metamodeling allows it to grasp the volatile and chaotic nature of human subjectivity 
where simplistic models which seek to define it fall short. It differs profoundly from cur­
rent theories and practices of the psyche in several ways:
1. Schizoanalysis develops its modeling of the human psyche on those who worked inti­
mately with “psychotic” or “schizophrenic” experience such as Reich, Laing, Lacan, and 
Guattari - who saw in the painful condition of these people the truth of their experience. 
The shaman and mystic prepare to enter such states of mystical ecstasy and the reorgani­
zation of normal perception for personal, cultural, and therapeutic reasons. The schizo­
phrenic is plunged into such states unwillingly with no choice and no map to guide him.
2. Schizoanalysis replaces scientific-therapeutic paradigms with ethico-aesthetic para­
digms within a mental and material ecology. The ultimate aim of schizoanalysis as a 
practice of life is the human being in continual creation and expression of his essence as 
an event in time interacting with other such events in the form of human beings, living 
nature, cultural ideas, social rituals, and machines of creation. It looks not just to thera­
pists but to artists and scientists of all types to remodel psycho-social experience.
3. Schizoanalysis does not focus on the trap but on the escape or reinvention of the possi­
ble. Its point of departure is not the past of familial and biological development, but the 
present moment as it is lived toward the unknown future. Each session, seminar, work­
shop, perfomance, happening, intervention, project - including the meal and the work of 
survival becomes the analytic space in which the emotional investment of “transference,” 
or “desire,” or “love” plays itself out against a background of conscious thought reinte­
grating the divided experience of psyche and soma.
4. Schizoanalysis tracks the image as it organizes inner experience within the individual 
isolated from the abstracted social symbolic forms of “morality” and “truth.” The best 
therapy has offered so far is to restore some form of acceptance of the social symbolic 
order as an alternative to isolated individual symptoms of “madness” or “disease.” But 
every symptom is an opportunity - desire knocking at the window seeking to escape its 
rigid confinement. The imag-inary world of the individual creates a speculative car- 
tograpy of life which frees itself from stagnation and abstraction, yet it longs to be real­
ized materially through a concrete cartography of collective action. Artistic creation is the
link between the speculative cartography of the imaginary and the concrete cartography 
of collective action or communication. To speak, to write, to paint is to express the imagi­
nary into the real where it can form the the symbolic truth of the moment in everyday life 
among a community of those who agree to share for that moment that “truth.” The com­
munity of lovers - the community of those who have nothing in common - does not resort 
to castration before the law but preserves the sovereignty of each moment and the integri­
ty of the story in time of each individual made up of such moments - each community 
made up of such individuals. The client who speaks in the therapeutic setting and the 
artist who creates for a community of listeners each invent their symbolic individually 
and collectively by making concrete or real the imaginary formation of their “drive” or 
“unconscious.” They produce their desire. They enjoy their symptom.
5. Schizoanalysis operates equally in the individual session, the group workshop, or the 
institutional project through the “four” essential components of analytic experience. 
Containment provides the space to dissolve rigidities and reinvent against the fear of los­
ing oneself. Interventions break the patterns which hold imaginary routines in place. The 
transference engages the desire, attraction, or cathexis which binds living entities togeth­
er in a common project. And the dialectic of consciousness brings self-reflection into 
awarenes of how one’s unconscious and chaotic desire persists beyond any attempts to 
finally “know” it or pin it down.
6. Schizoanalysis is not one more model of the psyche, but a practice of metamodeling 
the complexity of human experience. As such it does not claim to know the truth about 
life or to institute a way of thinking, feeling, and living, but offers a practice by which 
exerience itself is continually reinvented as the expression of each moment of each indi­
vidual life within the event of humanity.
Theories are linguistic models which trigger semantic and even physical reactions within 
the one who perceives them. Metamodeling is the art and science of subjectivity in that it 
models the ways in which inner experience or psyche operates. By juxtaposing and link­
ing various models from various areas including neuroscience, cybernetics, psychobiolo­
gy, psychophysics, psychoanalysis and ethnology (cultural, religious, artistic, and linguis-
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tic practices) a more complete understanding of human subjectivity and its transforma­
tion can be formulated. Recent research by Robert Langs (1996) suggests that human 
communication and the fomulation of linguistic models follow a mathematical pattern 
whether in the monologic construction of theories and stories or in the dialogic construc­
tion of the communicational or therapeutic setting. Human communication follows a pat­
tern of moving back and forth between redundancy and complexity - between the stabili­
ty of conscious theoretical language and the transformations of unconsciously encoded 
narrative language. Within a dyad one communicant always moves to rebalance the dia­
logue according to the language of the other in a pattern that mimics a monologue. In 
order for the optimum level of communication and transformation to take place in a ther­
apeutic or dialogical setting both participants must be allowed to develop their stories or 
models of reality fully through sufficient periods of time to experience the fullness of 
each model without preconceived ways of judging or framing such stories. Similarly in 
our research, each model - each discourse - must be allowed to develop itself and to be 
juxtaposed and linked with others in a multiple dialogue or conversation (Blanchot 
1969). Rather than trying to fit theoretical and linguistic models into a pre-existing argu­
ments for support, metamodelling of the psyche emerges from the transversal communi­
cation of various models in dialogue.
Any organism or event always functions in relation to the general economy or ecology of 
forces in which it is embedded. An organic or cybernetic approach recognizes the com­
plexity of integrated systems mutually interacting. Therapeutics is not a question of erad­
icating disease or restoring normality, but a functional pragmatics of ecological balancing 
which must grasp not only the movement of interacting processes, but the spirit, mean­
ing, and will which drive such processes. All therapeutic practices - whether physical, 
psychic, or social - must work within the parameters of the the organism itself rather than 
applying theories based on preconceived concepts and judgements. What George 
Vithoulkas calls “the fundamental law of cure” is based on this dynamic and cybernetic 
approach.
Modem concepts o f cybernetics demonstrate a fundamental principle which applies to 
the human organism as well as to other systems: any highly organized system reacts to
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stress always by producing the best possible response o f  which it is capable in the 
moment. In the human being this means that the defense mechanism makes the best pos­
sible response to the morbific stimulus given the state o f health in the moment and the
intensity o f the stress___
For any therapy to be effective, it is obvious that the practitioner must cooperate 
with this process and must not deviate from it at all. Since the defense mechanism is 
already responding with the best possible response, any deviation from the direction o f its 
action must inevitably be o f a lesser degree o f effectiveness. This is why therapies which 
are based upon intellectual theories and partial comprehension o f the totality can only 
inhibit the process o f cure, and often produce actual harm to the organism through sup­
pression (Vithoulkas 1980, p. 87-9).
Whether at inorganic, organic, or psychic levels, information consists of the organization 
of forms between the cycles of redundancy and the differentiation of complexity. Moving 
too far in either the direction of redundancy or that of complexity leads to entropy - the 
absence of organization or information and the return to chaos. But the ongoing organiza­
tional process described by Felix Guattari (1992) as “chaosmosis” allows systems includ­
ing human subjectivity or psyche to pass through chaos in the deconstruction of rigid 
forms and their reconstruction as new forms of organization thus eluding entropy through 
transformation. Through the process of transformation a memory is kept in the movement 
from one form to another. Organization is transformation - the patterned refrain of redun­
dancy against difference. The human psyche is a volatile system balanced precariously 
between order and chaos - stability and change. While it is vulnerable to entropy or 
death, it is rich with organization, information, and meaning: its subjectivity is deep and 
complex. Ecstasy forms the horizon of meaning in inner experience whether in the col­
lective subjectivity of cultural rituals described by George Bataille’s (1973) notion of the 
“sacred” or in the individual subjectivity of personal rituals, beliefs, and symptoms 
described by Jacques Lacan’s (1966) notion of “jouissance”. Ecstasy, jouissance, and the 
sacred in their myriad forms lead to a return to disorder which plunges stable - and often 
stagnant - forms into chaos. Subjective desire and meaning - and the drive to return to 
immanence in the sovereign moment which denies the delay of gratification - are incom­
patible with the objective processes of knowledge and the mastery of survival. The ecolo-
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gy of ecstasy allows this return of sacred immanence without it necessarily leading to 
absolute entropy, chaos, and death, but rather to transformation and reorganization. 
Where education, religion, therapy, and science today fail to provide this ecology of 
ecstasy which once was managed by collective cultural rituals, we must introduce a 
broader understanding of what they seek in the form of psychoanalytic metamodeling, 
spiritual science, and transdisciplinary practices for the transformation of subjectivity.
The human being is also in a state of becoming. Theories of evolution and adaptation 
only sketch out a part of the general economy of mutation, change, and transformation 
which characterizes all complex systems and organisms which live at the border between 
order and chaos. What unfolds and actualizes itself out of the virtual totality of possibili­
ties sometimes appears immutable from our human subjective perspective, but stability 
and permanence are only relative. Everything is in a state of flux. Nevertheless, the sub­
jective factors within which we exist affect us as if they were objective parameters. We 
do exist in a state of being in which quasi-stability “satisfices” to provide us with the 
order we need to exist - “to be.” It is this tension between order and chaos - between 
being and becoming - between subject and object - between the tendency to affirm limit­
ed beliefs and unique moments above all and the ability to reach across these specific 
events and communicate - which makes human subjectivity rich, robust, and complex, 
and gives it its unique sovereign and sacred character.
As opposed to grasping the general economy of integrated systems and the sovereignty of 
singular events which make up this complex web, contemporary humanity appears to be 
heading toward an increasingly mechanistic existence dominated by an objectifying per­
spective which seeks not only to eradicate the subjective sovereignty of the internal hori­
zon of singular forms and replace it with objects devoid of any meaning to be used and 
consumed, but to install the objectifying organization of our experience of the world into 
human subjectivity once and for all through the use of modem technology.
As you can see, the conversion is complete. Under the guise of “extraterrestrial” libera­
tion, the technosciences are getting their teeth into a weightless man-planet whom noth­
ing can now really protect, neither ethics nor biopolitical morality. Instead o f escaping
from our natural biosphere, we will colonize an infinitely more accessible planet - as so 
often in the past - that of a body-without-a-soul, a profane body, on behalf o f a science- 
without-a-conscience that has never ceased to profane the space o f the body of animals 
and slaves, the colonized o f former empires. We have never, in fact, dominated geophysi­
cal expanse without controlling, increasingly tightly, the substsance, the microphysical 
core o f the subject being: from the domestication of other species to the rhythmic training 
o f the soldier or servant, the alienation o f the production worker, force-feeding sports 
champions anabolic steroids. All o f these examples illustrate this latest project, o f which 
our Australian [Stelarc] is clearly not the instigator, but rather a victim, a willing victim, 
as so often the case with the servant corrupted by the master. At a time when there is talk 
o f ethnic cleansing in Europe, the auditing o f the evacuated living being's viscera is a 
timely reminder o f the dangers o f neuroscience’s endogenous tyranny, o f a cogntive 
ergonomics already at work on the latest in Human Design, the training o f conditioned 
reflexes, the Metadesign o f our conceptual and perceptual faculties. With the latter, the 
reign o f the computer will at last catch up with the patient's body, underneath his clothes, 
his uniform, thereby achieving a new type o f “underclothing" in which the smartening up 
o f our nervous system will supersede the Design o f the consumer object o f the waning 
industrial age (Virilio 1993, p. 113-4).
Paul Virlio’s analysis of contemporary life is a lucid treatise on the increasing objectifica­
tion of life and the erasure of the subjective through bio-technology and virtual reality. 
Technology in its production of beautiful objects and a seemingly easier life is seductive, 
but we rarely see what it takes away. Georges Bataille (1949,1973,1976) elucidated how 
an excessive appetite for knowledge - whether in science, technology, or philosophy - 
leads to an impasse. It is an objectifying enterprise which steals the “sovereignty” of sub­
jectivity - the quality of a moment which stands alone and is not transferable by any gen­
eral equivalent - not quantifiable - not exchangeable. Humanity today may have reached 
a fear so great that it would seek to snuff out its dearest experience - its foundation - its 
raison d’etre. It is difficult to accomplish this feat - which is why attempts at expunging 
the subject(ive) for the reign of the object(ive) are still sabotaged by the return of the 
repressed - symptoms which are still our “sacred” subjectivity - or were until recently. 
Now murder, perversion, and mutilation no longer affect us. Bataille was prescient in his
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elucidation of the emerging state of the world, yet few have understood his message even 
today.
By speaking from within the depths of science in favor of “ethical-aesthetic” paradigms, 
Bataille, Virilio, and Guattari have attempted to understand complex processes and sys­
tems in light of the unfolding of the universe without losing sight of what is most essen­
tial to humanity - and without succumbing to this sovereignty through which we experi­
ence being. And who could blame those who do succumb since the point is to live. If one 
seeks to avert one’s sovereign or sacred moment partially like Bataille or Guattari, is it to 
sacrifice a little for others - or to temper the heat of one’s own?
In recent years there has been increasing interest in consciousness and cognitive process­
es, but in reality, the mental can never be separated from the realm of sensation, emotion, 
and desire. Mind and body are in constant interaction - psyche and brain are intertwined. 
Subjectivity refers to an organism’s total experience in which questions of sensation, 
emotion, and desire cannot be separated from those of cognition and consciousness. 
Spinoza’s (1903) pragmatics of events attempts to escape from any preconceived map by 
which to divide up or judge and instead posits the subject as the sum total of possible 
affects it might experience. This subject or subjectivity may be individual, social, person­
al, collective, momentary, or otherwise. The subject is the organization of the “actual” 
mapped and divided from the totality of the “possible.” Subjective experience takes 
account of what Whitehead (1969) calls the internal horizon of an organism which is 
always different from what can be known about an organism, entity, process, or event 
from the outside - from the objective viewpoint.
In the process of searching for new subjectivities, one cannot help being led into an 
objectifying experience. This is what happens when we “look upon the world with dead 
eyes.” This is science: to reach the objectivity which sees from outside of its own internal 
horizon. This is to escape the subject. Of course, objectivity is just as essential to our 
condition - events, processes, and subjects die, and the eternal transformation of matter 
through mutatation/evolution is essential to the universe. Equilibrium is nothing. 
Perturbation, dis-ease, seduction, destruction: this too is required of existence. Sade,
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Nietzsche, and Hegel were able to see this - to see “objectively” - and paradoxically this 
true objectivity only places our subjectivity more firmly where it belongs while augment­
ing it. Sade’s and Nietzsche’s “beyond good and evil” ethics is a tribute to the relations of 
subject and object - whereas “morality” is always bio-morality - the limited life-centered 
view which avoids change and mutation (including death) and seeks to control transfor­
mation. We fear death, loss, mutation, and change - but they are inescapable. The com­
plement of mutation is reproduction - replication, survival, and tradition. We preserve 
through communication: the replication of species and the communication of psyche - 
through art, literature, culture - across the death and birth of new forms. The interplay of 
objective and subjective is that of mutation (death) and communication (life).
So how do we face up to the movement of the universe in the process of transformation? 
How do we maintain the courage to live change? Virilio’s position - like that of Bataille - 
is a “vitalist” or “gnostic” approach which recognizes that in the heart of Judeo-Christian 
consciousness - as opposed to “Christianity” as a decaying form (as Nietzsche mapped 
out) - is the grasping of sovereign subjectivity which squares completely with Alfred 
North Whitehead’s theory of process, Henri Bergson’s (1896) theory of the composition 
of events, and Rudolph Steiner’s (1911) “spiritual science.” The analytic or organic 
approach to thought and being espouses a view of the the universe - different from the 
Newtonian mechanistic view which still prevails today.
Whether through scientific research, philosophical introspection or other means, we seek 
to communicate. “You” communicate with yourself through the other. “It” communicates 
through you. You remind yourself how everything mutates into everything else - how it 
individuates and fractalizes back into what it was which is still different - how it happens. 
The universe is constructed ontologically. Religious practices, psychoanalysis, political 
struggle, and psychoactive chemicals only point the way to the most rudimentary maps of 
organization. We know nothing. But that does not necessarily stop us from experiencing 
all there is.
Within the province o f the mind, what I believe to be true is true or becomes true, within 
the limits to be found experientially and experimentally. These limits are further truths to
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be transcended (Lilly 1972).
The symbolic, noetic, and ontic world of language, rituals, rules, and meanings forms the 
essence of the human experience. To search for a cause - an origin - for the birth of 
human consciousness would already be to approach the question from the objectifying 
perspective that we are seeking to remedy. Instead, we must take the world of thought 
and the symbolic as that which has evolved in relation to the biological needs of living 
bodies. We cannot answer a badly posed question. We must step back, deconstruct the 
very models through which we have come to perceive and think the world of human 
experience, and try to remake and remodel our experience. In this way, rigor and com­
mon sense will merge in a pragmatics.
The need to survive and to adapt to a given environment is perceived by us to be pro­
gramed in animals, and this is what we call instinct. But from birth (and even before) 
what would be considered pure instinct in the human is always already linked to the sym­
bolic world of meaning. Without a doubt, as bodies we are subject to biological needs, 
but these immediate needs are always confused with what exceeds them and toward 
which we are driven as much as our needs - sometimes even at the expense of our needs 
or our very survival. Psychoanalysts have come to call this human experience desire. 
Freud’s “life” instinct approximates the need to survive, and the pleasure principle 
extends this to the reduction of tension towards balance and equilibrium. The positing of 
an opposing “death” drive may be the first clear or “scientific” understanding of the dif­
ference between humans and animals from a non-religious standpoint - that is, an under­
standing not assumed through faith but observed and described through scientific reason 
and empiricism. Unfortunately, the concept of the death drive - which has aroused so 
much resistance - is perhaps poorly named in that what exceeds need in human experi­
ence - desire - is not so much a drive toward death but a “need” which is more than bio­
logical preservation - a drive which is directed toward something other than survival and 
which may run counter to it - transformation.
Our needs are, then, so many searchlights which, directed upon the continuity o f sensible 
qualities, single out in it distinct bodies. They cannot satisfy themselves except upon the
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condition that they carve out, within this continuity, a body which is to be their own and 
then delimit other bodies with which the first can enter into relation, as if  with persons. 
To establish these special relations among portions thus carved out from sensible reality 
is just what we call living (Bergson 1896, p. 198).
Bergson poses the question: what if there were no definite answers - only well chosen 
questions? In scientific research, results are but the confirmation of the hypothesis. In 
quantum physics the observer affects his measurements. It is not that science is not valid, 
but that we are and always have been engaged in the scientific - or philosophical, or prag­
matic - process of dividing, modeling, and mapping which includes interdependent com­
posites of perceiving, observing, remembering, thinking, and sketching in forms and lan­
guages which are communicable to others. This process is what Bergson calls “intuition,” 
what Thomas Sebeok calls “the play of musement,” and what Charles Peirce (1935-66) 
calls “abduction” - as opposed to logical deduction and empirical induction which are 
processes which follow abduction. Abduction is the hypothesising in which we are con­
stantly engaged as we perceive the world. Deduction and induction are more mediated 
logical and experimental procedures by which we trace the consequences of our hypothe­
ses. But as Peirce makes clear, without the initial hypothesis or abduction there can be 
nothing new in understanding or science. In fact abduction is akin to the art of the psy­
choanalyst, the psychic, and the detective who read signs with an open mind - an unprej­
udiced perception. Abduction lies somewhere between the immediacy of perception and 
the mediated forms of conception, and it organizes our subjectivity through affect and 
emotion - ever attentive to the subconscious messages of our perception which can pro­
duce a flash of insight.
Hypothesis substitutes, for a complicated tangle o f predicates attached to one subject, a 
single conception. Now, there is a peculiar sensation belonging to the act o f thinking that 
each o f these predicates inheres in the subject. In hypothetic inference this complicated 
feeling so produced is replaced by a single feeling o f greater intensity, that belonging to 
the act o f thinking the hypothetic conclusion. Now, when our nervous system is excited in 
a complicated way, there being a relation between the elements o f the excitation, the 
result is a single harmonious disturbance which I call an emotion. Thus, the various
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sounds made by the instruments o f an orchestra strike upon the ear, and the result is a 
peculiar musical emotion, quite distinct from the sounds themselves. This emotion is 
essentially the same thing as in hypothetic inference, and every hypothetic inference 
involves the formation o f such an emotion. We may say, thefore, the hypothesis produces 
the sensuous element o f thought, and induction the habitual element. (Sebeok 1981, p.27)
This pragmatic process is no doubt determined by our needs for survival at its founda­
tion, but what in fact does a human need? Beyond basic subsistence - or what would 
appear to correspond to need and instinct in animals - human beings develop an infinite 
number of forms which already make “needs” impossible to identify as they are eclipsed 
by “desire.” Desire is not what is beyond need - nor is it a mystical province. Rather it is 
a name for what determines human beings, just as “need” or “instinct” determine animals 
in a parallel fashion. It is our “attractor” (Prigogine & Stengers 1984).
For Bergson (1896) the problems resulting from badly posed questions can be solved by 
dividing an event into different composites. The root of the word science - “scio” - means 
to divide or to split. Both Bergson and Whitehead (1967,1969) suggest that our problem 
in formulating questions and in understanding experience has been the misapprehension 
of time. We objectify or spatialise time. We ignore it. We act as if objects or matter were 
given - and time were something to be added to that. For Whitehead there exist only 
processes or events. The process of a human being for example cannot be understood at 
any one instant, but only through its dynamic change over the course of its life history. 
And this is equally true of an amoeba, a molecule, a city, or a culture. Identity is then not 
determined by static matter or substance but by the dynamic process or event over time.
Similarly Bergson says that we spatialize time. What Whitehead calls a process, Bergson 
calls a duration. With this he claims that our idea of movement is false. Rather than think­
ing of an object which remains the same and moves from one spatial location to another, 
we must see the event as a change of state: from the event with object here to the event 
with object there. Any event which takes on its own self-consistency or organization has 
a duration appropriate to it. While the change of state and the event which is a molecule 
in our body has its duration, so does our body which contains the molecule simultaneous-
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ly have its own duration. Time is both subjective and objective, as each organism experi­
ences its own different duration which nevertheless coincides with the duration of others. 
Further, each organism is simultaneously made up of other organisms - which are embed­
ded in it - and also a part of a larger organism in which it is embedded or nested. This 
understanding of embedded processes or events enables us to grasp the essential interde­
pendence of the nested hierarchies of organisms without the necessity of control hierar­
chies determined by power relations.
Thus an electron within a living body is different from an electron outside it, by reason of 
the plan o f the body; the electron blindly runs either within or without the body; but it 
runs within the body in accordance with its character within the body; that is to say, in 
accordance with the general plan of the body, and this plan includes the mental state 
(Whitehead 1967, p. 79).
The message of these thinkers is conceptual, scientific, and ethical: divide things - or ana­
lyze - appropriately. For Whitehead, the process or epoch - duration in Bergson’s terms - 
is what gives any organism its consistency - its right to be considered an entity or com­
posite separable from totality. Out of the chaos of the possible emerges the organism or 
what Whitehead calls concrescence. Each concrescence is an event in time-space which 
can never be known or determined completely but only probabilistically. But this proba­
bility does not pose a problem. We do not need to know whether we are right or whether 
“it” is true. We need an understanding which “satisfices” - which works. Despite the fact 
that everything - including ourselves - is in a state of change and we can never finally 
know it, nevertheless we can know it well enough to live, to act, to function. This func­
tional approach forms the basis for a pragmatics - the art and science of living as an 
organism.
Bergson’s and Whitehead’s maps give rich and complex background to what has come to 
be accepted empirically through quantum physics. Of course one could say that every­
thing sketched out in the work of these philosophers and in the empirical findings of sci­
entists was already communicated long ago through the works of Eastern and Western 
mysticism - and that each map or system is circular in any case - a tautology - but the
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point is how well the system works. Does it provide a convincing map? Does it produce 
the desired results? Does it satisfy the need for meaning and the desire for survival? And 
in that sense, the continual creation of maps of existence and experience is always pro­
ducing new subjectivities - new ways of experiencing the world.
In fact, this process of mapmaking - of creating new ways of experiencing the world is 
nothing less than what each one of us is continually doing. Recent biological and psycho­
logical research in the areas of perception and cognition have given evidence to the 
Bergsonian idea that human beings are embedded in the world and that cognition is enac- 
tive - we create our experience of the world as much as it creates us. In recent decades, a 
number of scientists have begun to approach the biological world of organisms from a 
broader perspective, and research is increasingly demonstrating the complex process of 
organization involved in evolution (Maturana & Varela 1987, Varela 1991, Eigen 1987, 
Kauffman 1993, 1995, Goodwin 1994, Sheldrake 1988, Gell-Mann 1994). Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela have developed an approach to living organisms as 
autopoetic or self-organising. While the autonomy or autopoesis of each organism is 
maintained by it producing itself and its own process or concrescence, it does this in con­
stant interaction with other autopoetic entities. Furthermore, this “structural coupling” by 
which organisms are embedded in and interact with other organisms is not only inevitable 
but essential. For it is the confrontation with what is other than or outside of an entity that 
causes the perturbations necessary for an entity to change or evolve through its process. 
These organisms exist at the edge of order and chaos. While a destructive change would 
cause the death of the organism and put an end to its event or process, the absolute stasis 
of the organism without stimulation and interaction from the outside results in this very 
same death.
According to Maturana and Varela, while the structure of an autopoetic organism can be 
altered, its organization or concrescence cannot. In a human being for example the struc­
ture of matter in the form of cells, organs, or limbs can be eliminated or changed - and in 
fact they constantly are changing - but the organization - what gives us our particular 
concrescence or autopoesis - cannot: we cannot for example exchange the placement of 
our heart and our head. This would be a destructive change: one which destroys the
19
organism, the event, the process, the concrescence which was that human being. And 
since time is a part of our organization in the form of metabolism, changing that metabo­
lism too much in any direction can be destructive too - whether it is a matter of the rapid­
ity of traumatic change or the freezing of time toward stasis.
Our relations to others determine us from the beginning of life and in fact we could not 
survive without others - this is our lot as human beings. We are social beings as much as 
we are biological beings, and it is in relation to others that we enact or “bring forth” our 
experience of the world. Although we are determined by our autopoetic and structurally 
coupled process, there is something else which differentiates our event from that of other 
animals. Mind, spirit, or consciousness are those words which have come to indicate that 
which seems most defining about us - and most difficult to define. And it is through lan­
guage that human beings have developed such a rich and complex structurally coupled 
enacting of their experience of the world. Acknowledging this brings ethics in line with 
consciousness, as every human thought and action has already to an extent been predeter­
mined by others, just as that thought or action will in turn participate in the construction 
of others’ experience of the world.
Every human act takes place in language. Every act in language brings forth a world 
created with others in the act o f coexistence which gives rise to what is human. Thus 
every human act has an ethical meaning because it is an act o f constitution o f the human 
world. This linkage o f human to human is, in the final analysis, the groundwork o f all 
ethics as a reflection on the legitimacy o f the presence o f others (Maturana & Varela 
1987).
Psyche, geist, esprit: this is what philosophers, poets, and psychoanalysts have attempted 
to map out throughout humanity’s epoch. For Hegel the phenomenology of mind or spirit 
is the coming to consciousness of the species with respect to its concrescence. Marx only 
grasped a part of this when he labored to bring to consciousness the history of social rela­
tions of mastery and slavery. Similarly, Freud mapped out the coming to consciousness of 
the formation of the individual subject through the familial relations which determined 
him. But spiritual sages had already practiced and taught this for centuries: if one hears
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the call, one must go away and empty oneself of what the world has programed - only 
then will one reach enlightenment or (self)consciousness.
In recent times, questions of emotion, cognition, and consciousness have inspired psy­
chobiologists and neuroscientists in an attempt to close the gap between the physical 
processes of body and brain and the seemingly elusive experience of mind and psyche 
(Edelman 1992, Damasio 1994, Pribram 1971, 1991, McKenna & McKenna 1993, 
Kauffman 1993, Hameroff 1986, Penrose 1994, Scott 1995, Eccles 1994, Stapp 1993, 
Harth 1993), and this has increasingly brought scientific research in line with the clinical 
work of psychoanalysis and the speculation of organic philosophers and spiritual scien­
tists such as Bergson, Whitehead, Nietzsche, Steiner, Bataille, and Deleuze.
According to neuroscientists, the nervous system began as an awareness system at the 
basic level of attraction/repulsion and has evolved in human beings to a brain infinitely 
more complex than any computer imaginable, let alone constructible. DNA specifies the 
production of cells but in each human being cells including neurons are “selected” or 
organized through their own unpredictable drift into groups and networks through 
processes described as topobiology (Edelman 1992), self-organization (Maturana & 
Varela 1987), morphogenesis (Kauffman 1993, Sheldrake 1987), or formative forces 
(Steiner 1920).
In the development of an organism such as a human being, through physical and social 
environmental interaction the mapping of neural networks and groups are formed or 
“selected” still further through the long-term potentiation of specific synapses in the gen­
eration of recurrent maps of perception and sensation. Some neurons are activated - oth­
ers are not. These neural maps represent or mimic external experience but not linearly. 
Similarly, these information maps are integrated with sensational or emotional states 
(Edelman 1992, Damasio 1994, Pribram 1991, LeDoux 1996).
Different groups of networks map different events, and they communicate transversally. 
A multidimensional event-concrescence is formed and stored in dispositional micro- 
quanta, rather than bits of information, which include the constant linking of abstract per-
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ceptual facts (time-space) with bodily sensation (energy-momentum). Emotions and feel­
ings partake of the same process as cognition and consciousness. All that exists is dispo­
sition or tendency or possibility or virtuality which becomes actualized or realized out of 
the the possible - out of entropy or chaos - by the resonance of external evocation inter­
acting with internal predetermination. At the biological level of organisms, mutation rides 
a fine line between the destruction of an organism’s “organization” and adaptation to a 
more optimal evolved form - whether in that particular organism’s ontogeny or in the 
phylogeny of the species.
This has implications at the level of human psyche or mind, for we can experience only 
what we already “know” unless we “know” how to be open or surprised or to look for the 
other - or unless an other or an event knows how to break the will to perceive what is 
already in us: the image - or imaginary realm - of the Other which determines our “symp­
toms” in Jacques Lacan’s (1966) language. This “seduction” by the other is constantly 
constructing our subjectivity, but the older we get, the rarer it is that we remain open to 
change. In this sense Felix Guattari (1992) learned Lacan’s lesson so well that he has car­
ried it forward where Lacan himself - and even more so his followers - may have failed - 
for Guattari has mapped out an understanding of human subjectivity and psyche in its 
complex and vulnerable state between order and chaos.
The human system appears to be extremely rich and complex at perceiving multiple 
dimensions such as color, form, and rhythm, but recent research and theory asserts that 
things such as sound and light are broken down into microphysical quanta and reassem­
bled into wholes ad hoc according to the above variable conditions which include 
“desire” - the history of perceptual experience mapped over a lifetime with respect to 
“drives” - appetitive, gustataory, sensational, sexual, and those relating to such things as 
safety, containment, rest, and diversity. Henry Stapp (1993) compares perception to the 
Heisenberg cut in quantum physical theory in which the moment of measurement is the 
moment of the creation/manifestation of an ordered whole out of the uncertain chaos of 
flux. Here the difference between active and passive disappear. Perception-action is one 
as Bergson describes. Similarly, Karl Pribram (1992), Ilya Prigogine(1984), and Stuart 
Kauffman (1993) theorize that the self-organizing wholes (concrescences in Whitehead’s
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sense) may be formed in our brain - and our subjectivity - as momentarily stable events 
based on “attractors”. Perturbations from within or without break the ongoing and uncon­
scious patterns of our brain’s experience in the world and attract us to a new event, mak­
ing us conscious or attentive and generating new maps which then move toward stability 
and habituated pattern until the next moment of innovation. The perturbations also make 
previously accumulated dispositional maps radiate with conscious novelty as they sud­
denly take on a new light. Again, as Deleuze and Guattari (1972) have described, desire 
is as active as it is passive. “Desiring production” is the manifestation of order out of 
chaos by human beings - which is a particular moment in the chaosmic movement 
between chaos and complexity in the universe.
The emerging ecosophic paradigm of complex interactive systems operating at the edge 
of order and chaos has profound implications for our understanding of mental, emotional, 
psychic, and social experience. Apart from understanding, how is it possible to get people 
to live practically or pragmatically what these philosopher-scientists elucidate? In a 
sense, all therapy, teaching, and activism hitherto has been only a prolegomena. 
Nietzsche said he was a bridge to a new type of human - to new modes of subjectivity. If 
humanity is to survive through its continual transformation and encounter with chaos, we 
must cross that bridge through the transdisciplinary development of transformative prac­
tices which reconstruct our ways of organizing our experience of the universe and create 
ever new subjectivities within the complex ecology of systems.
2. The Matter of Mind - Transversal Mappings
The “attack ” o f the neurosciences is not making psychoanalysis defunct, but it is encour­
aging us to reconsider the Freudian concept o f the drive. The drive is a pivot between 
usoma,, and “psyche,” between biology and representation - the highest level o f organi­
zation and permanency to which Freudian listening and theory can aspire - that is, to 
which analytic construction (or imagination) can aspire. For what we understand by 
biology is - drives and energy, if you wish, but always already a “carrier o f meaning” 
and a relation to another person, even though this person may be yourself (Kristeva
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1993, p. 30).
“Desire at the limits of thought” defines the complementary, contradictory, and dialectical 
nature of our experience. Basic organisms are subject to attraction and repulsion, but can 
this be called desire? Even inorganic forms and events move toward quasi-stable states 
far from equilibrium toward “strange attractors,” and explanations such as “self-organiza­
tion” and “morphic resonance” indicate a “drive” even at this level. Animals are said to 
be subject to instinct. Through increasing levels of consciousness these drives become 
more mediated. It is through the increasing levels of consciousness or learning that drive 
is transformed into desire. Desire is in fact increasingly fleshed out by the questioning 
nature of “learning to learn” which frees man from immediately conditioned responses - 
whether conditioned by biology or by social learning. By grasping the contexts of situa­
tions whereby conditions can be reframed and certainty and immediacy anulled, desire 
itself - in the form of drive - becomes threatened. The subject free to choose is confronted 
with the oceanic desert of the possible which can lead easily to psychotic or mystical 
experience. At this point what saves him or anchors him is desire itself which is no longer 
akin to instinct or drive, but is closer to faith. Desire becomes consciously chosen enact­
ment.
Consciousness increases to higher and higher levels through continual reframing and the 
infinite questioning of the contexts of any situation. Desire always constitutes the limits 
of thought in any one organism’s subjectivity - or in any subject-moment. Gregory 
Bateson (1972) terms the immediate response of attraction/repulsion “zero learning” 
whereas the first order of learning is characterized by that which arises from condition­
ing: learning to correct an immediate response from a set of alternatives. Second-order 
learning occurs when an organism is able to learn to learn by transfering the process of 
basic conditioned learning to another situation. This higher order learning or conscious­
ness - of which certain animals can partake - is brought to an extreme in human beings in 
which the strategy of learning games and playing them out for one’s own end comes to 
constitute the history of one’s character or self. Third order learning begins when the con­
text of any situation may be questioned from outside its own implicit set of rules and 
assumptions. Psychoanalysis, dialectical and phenomenological introspection, and vari-
24
ous “mystical” practices of enlightenment (Zen, Sufism, Gnosticism, Alchemy . . . )  have 
all sought to bring about and teach this third order learning. Bateson’s conjectured fourth 
order of learning simply continues the infinite questioning of reframing contexts still fur­
ther, and this process can be performed infinitely as there is always an implicit context 
from which one questions the current context. Confronted with the chaos of the infinite, 
desire is what remains of instinct or drive mediated through thought or consciousness. 
Desire is the Heisenberg or Lacanian cut which produces the event through an act of 
faith. Desire is the horizon against which consciouness plays itself out.
Ritual, magic, violence, hypnosis, transference, seduction, desire, love, and faith form 
limits to consciousness. Evolving to higher and higher levels of consciousness through 
Bateson’s Learning I, n , HI, and IV - which is simply the lucidly stated fulfillment of Zen 
and Sufi practices - is founded on continually questioning oneself out of the implicit 
beliefs/rules/contexts of the moment. The practice of consciousness puts you in touch 
with the infinite chaos of the possible to which the individuated actualization of the 
seizure of the event in ritual, magic, and belief puts an end through arbitrary assent. 
Consciousness is nothing - the anullment of something - pure negation - but a negation 
which clears the way for further positing lest there be stagnation, which is truly illusion.
Practices of consciousness can constitute a politics of decontextualization and reframing 
which serve to mediate amongst the irreconcilable differences of various manifestations 
of meaning expressed as desire or faith. The practice of consciousness can also become 
an end in itself. Sade’s practice of “apathy” as a negative theology attempts to achieve 
ataraxy through pure negation by anulling the reflecting, judging, conscious mind 
through the immediate enacting of drive, but Bataille claims that this leads to its own 
impasse, and he instead insists on pitting this immediacy against the always possible 
recapture of belief. True objectivity is difficult to achieve, but objectivity within subjec­
tivity is even more difficult.
Finally, human experience is dependent on ethical, aesthetic, and noetic paradigms. The 
question, for example, is not what is violent or nonviolent, or right or wrong, but how 
energy or drive is transformed, translated, and mutated. Turning the other cheek, surren-
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dering, fleeing, retaliating, transforming “violent” attack into its own downfall through 
martial arts - all of these are possibilities with respect to the most obvious example of 
physical assault, but this multiplicity of possible responses applies to all situations of 
human experience. With respect to the different methods of containing-expressing-chan- 
neling drive, rituals of sacrifice, representational religions, art, philosophy, law, and 
games of various types all present possibilities. The choice one makes is one of 
desire/faith whether individual or collective. No single approach can claim to judge or 
assert the correct way to another. We can however offer our different modes to be under­
stood, admired, rejected, and even taken up in favor of forever different and/or “better” 
modes - though this is again a question of arbitrary assent or desire/faith. We could call 
this seduction or communication. We act, think, feel, and believe according to a set of 
implicit modes of belief which we do not question. On the other hand if we know what is 
happening to us - that we are programmed or seduced - that our subjectivity is construct­
ed for us - and we know that the only way out is to become conscious of the ways in 
which we are programed - then we might have the ability to enjoy what we are and/or to 
continually transform these ways of being. We can consciously throw ourselves into the 
game of seductions where we let ourselves be seduced by new ways.
For Emannuel Levinas (1961) the only ethical relation is to take the position of the 
addressee - the “you” to the other’s “I.” A true ethnographer does the same - passing over 
into another’s way of being so much that one is lost in it for that moment and then return­
ing to one’s own way changed. There is always the risk that one will be transformed or 
become another through seduction into other beliefs, faiths, or maps of existence, but this 
is the essential destiny of the human organism poised as it is on the border between order 
and chaos. Consciousness of the fact that seduction-transference-hypnosis is all there is at 
least affords the possibility of communication - the ethical-aesthetic-ecological mainte­
nance of a modicum of order and balance within chaos. Meanwhile each subject-event 
will find his own reason for being - and to another that might appear “violent” or 
“wrong.”
One of the most interesting facets of Gregory Bateson’s work is that he found a way out 
of the dead end of specific psychotherapeutic and pedagogical approaches - beyond the
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content to the context. Formally, double bind situations can lead to creativity, humor, 
mysticism, or schizophrenia. Unconsciously applied double binds tend to create “mad­
ness,” whereas consciously applied double binds in Zen and similar contexts lead to high­
er levels of learning, consciousness, and decontextualization. Bateson listened to schizo­
phrenics’ language and put them in double binds with respect to their own systems of 
symbolic and noetic rules which formed the basis of their experience in order to break 
them out of their impasses.
Double bind theory asserts that there is an experiential component in the determination 
or etiology o f schizophrenic symptoms and related behavioral patterns, such as humor, 
art, poetry, etc. Notably the theory does not distinguish between these subspecies. Within 
systems there is nothing to determine whether a given individual shall become a clown, a 
poet, a schizophrenic, or some combination o f these. We deal not with a single syndrome 
but with a genus o f syndromes, most of which are not conventionally regarded as patho­
logical.
Let me coin the word “transcontextual ” as a general term for this genus of syn­
dromes.
It seems that both those whose life is enriched by transcontextual gifts and those 
who are impoverished by transcontextual confusions are alike in one respect: for them 
there is always or often a tfdouble take. " A falling leaf, the greeting o f a friend, or a 
uprimrose by the river’s brim” is not “just that and nothing more. “ Exogenous experi­
ence may be framed in the contexts o f dream, and internal thought may be projected into 
the contexts o f the external world. And so on. For all this, we seek a partial explanation 
in learning and experience (Bateson 1972, p. 272-3).
In terms of process, functional therapy and teaching would follow a basic form: provide a 
containing or holding environment and break the subject out of the modes which possess 
him, and continue until he can do it for himself (rejecting the master - not identifying 
with the ideal ego of the therapist/teacher). Finally, there is still the question of meaning 
in the face of consciousness or “desire at the limits of thought.” Embracing/enacting 
one’s desire comes to constitute the faith of each moment - which is a “difference that 
makes a difference” in the ecosophic flow of energy-matter. For Bataille and Sade the
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ultimately decentered and radically objective ecosophic grasp of existence only served to 
increase their own personal subjective moments injecting them with an impossible rich­
ness due to their absolute sovereignty. This points out the limited nature of attempting to 
confine the psyche to what is contained within the skin of the individual subject. 
Bateson’s “steps to an ecology of mind” and Bataille’s “general economy” form a move­
ment toward a broader and more complex grasp of the nested hierarchy of levels of expe­
rience from bio-physics to socio-cultural phenomena.
Based on an increasing amount of research, neuroscientists currently account for the feel­
ing or quality of our experience through the continual linking of perceptual information 
and bodily sensation - a view put forth by Henri Bergson (1896) a century ago. From the 
beginning of an infant’s life the process of learning takes place through this linking. A 
human being is programed from birth through what begins as conditioned learning and 
finally reaches higher levels of learning to learn. The fact that each learned behavior, 
strategy, or perception is affected by the sensations accompanying it is not incidental. In 
fact it is increasingly understood that cognition depends on the body’s kinesthetic pecep- 
tual experience in the world. The mind is “embodied” and embedded in its environment 
(Varela 1993). According to Gerald Edelman, if a brain could exist outside of a body - or 
if one could be artificially constructed - not only would its subjective experience of the 
world be different, but it would not even be able to perform the complex cognitive opera­
tions which an insect - let alone a human being - performs without having had the long­
term bodily learning of experience in the world.
Qualia, individual to each of us, are recategorizations by higher-order consciousness of 
value-laden perceptual relations in each sensory modality or their conceptual combina­
tions with each other. We report them crudely to others; they are more directly reportable 
to ourselves. This set o f relationships is usually but not always connected to value. 
Freedom from time allows the location in time of phenomenal states by a suffering or 
joyous self. And the presence o f appropriate language improves discrimination enor­
mously; skill in wine tasting, for example may be considered the result o f a passion based 
on qualia that are increasingly refined by language (Edelman 1992, p. 136).
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While the informational aspect of perception-action is mapped in primary sensory cor­
tices of the brain, value-based internal state sensations are simultaneously registered in 
the hippocampal area of the brain which is directly linked to the body’s complete central 
nervous system. Conceptual categorization based on value-linked perception is stored 
through neural maps generated in the frontal, parietal, and temporal cortices. For 
Edelman, primary consciousness occurs as a result of communication between long-term 
potentiated maps of categorizations stored in memory and immediate short-term maps at 
the moment of present on-going perception-action. Attention to life is continually linking 
interaction in the world with the psyche of memory and learning. Even very primitive life 
forms experience this kind of consciousness or learning. Higher-order consciousness aris­
es in human beings when stored maps begin to communicate and generate their own new 
learning and feeling experiences without interaction from external conditioning. It is with 
human beings that the depth of mind or psyche expands beyond what appears to be 
mechanical interaction with the world and that this higher order consciousness builds an 
inner experience which forms the basis of thoughts, feelings, memories, hopes, plans, 
desires, and dreams - and the sense that we are as a self.
Higher order consciousness depends on building a self through affective intersubjective 
exchanges. These interactions - with parental figures, with grooming conspecifics, and 
with sexual partners - are o f the same kind as those guiding semiotic exchange and lan­
guage building. Affectively colored exchanges through symbols initiate semantic boot­
strapping. The result is a model o f a world rather than of an econiche, along with models 
of the past, present, and future. At the same time that higher-order consciousness frees us 
from the tyranny o f the remembered present, however, primary consciousness coexists 
and interacts with the mechanism of higher-order consciousness. Indeed, primary con­
sciousness provides a strong driving force for higher-order processes. We live on several 
levels at once (Edelman 1992, p. 150).
The richness of interacting with other human beings - each of whom has his own inner 
world of mind or psyche - expands the complexity of human experience many-fold, and 
although this higher-order consciousness begins to take place through a pre-linguistic 
form of categorization, language serves to facillitate this increasing complexity. In the
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human activity which we take for granted, so many layers of meaning are at work - 
reaching all the way back to primitive sensational and perceptual states - that we are 
never aware of this richness and complexity. In truth, emotion and cognition are never 
separate, and even the most seemingly rational of thoughts and actions are driven by 
affect.
Meaning takes shape in terms o f concepts that depend on categorizations based on value. 
It grows with the history o f remembered body sensations and mental images. The mixture 
of events is individual and, in large measure, unpredictable. When, in society, linguistic 
and semantic capabilities arise and sentences involving metaphor are linked to thought, 
the capability to create new models o f the world grows at an explosive rate. But one must 
remember that, because o f its linkage to value and to the concept o f self, this system of 
meaning is almost never free o f affect; it is charged with emotions (Edelman 1992, p. 
170).
The efforts of neuroscientists to understand the working of the brain in the interaction of 
mind and body has only served to elucidate the irreducible level of experience which 
takes place within human life. Although the social is based on the individual which is 
based on the biological, the chemical, and the physical, no one level can ever serve to 
fully explain another. Examining phenomena or events at any level is always related to - 
never reducible to - another level higher or lower. While psychoanalysis and psychology 
are informed by the sciences of brain and body, in the end human experience can only be 
understood by grasping what is essential to it.
At a certain practical point, therefore, attempts to reduce psychology to neuroscience 
must fail. Given that the pursuit o f thought as a skill depends on social and cultural inter­
action, convention, and logic, as well as on metaphor, purely biological methods as they 
presently exist are insufficient. In part, this is because thought at its highest levels is 
recursive and symbolic. Because we are each idiosyncratic sources o f semantic interpre­
tation, and because intersubjective communication is essential for thought (whether with 
a real or imaginary interlocutor), we must use and study these capacities in their own 
right (Edelman 1992, p. 175).
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In examining the development of human emotion, Antonio Damasio goes even further 
than Edelman to eludicate the basis of cognition by claiming that attention to life - to per­
ception, cognition, and action - is constantly dependent on desire or drive. This is similar 
to Bergson’s claim that perception itself is formed by needs or drive. What is selected 
from the totality of existence for perception - what will be seen, heard, and felt by any 
entity - is formed by instinct, need, and drive, which in human beings increasingly refines 
itself into desire. This is obvious in the case of conditioned learning in which one is 
rewarded for behaving a certain way, but also in more advanced forms of motivated and 
creative learning - in which one is encouraged to explore and motivated to learn and 
transform oneself based on immediate desire rather than a delayed reward - or worse yet, 
freedom from punishment.
In the full somatic-marker hypothesis, I propose that a somatic state, negative or positive, 
caused by the appearance o f a given representation, operates not only as a marker for 
the value of what is represented, but also as a booster for continued working memory and 
attention. The proceedings are “energized” by signs that the process is actually being 
evaluated, positively or negatively, in terms o f the individual’s preferences and goals. The 
allocation and maintenance o f attention and working memory do not happen by miracle. 
They are first motivated by preferences inherent in the organism, and then by preferences 
and goals acquired on the basis o f the inherent ones (Damasio 1994, p. 197-8).
In elucidating the formation of subjectivity and the concept of the self in human beings, 
Damasio claims that the ability to detach the psyche or mind from immediate states of 
narrow episodic consciousness found in animals and to experience memories and plans is 
not enough. In addition there must be a constant set of representations of bodily states 
both past and present in one’s interaction with the world in the form of other or object.
Finally consider that all ingredients I have described above - an object that is being rep­
resented, an organism responding to the object of representation, and a state o f the self in 
the process o f changing because o f the organism’s response to the object - are held simul­
taneously in working memory and attended, side-by-side or in rapid interpolation, in
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early sensory cortices. I  propose that subjectivity emerges during the latter step when the 
brain is producing not just images o f an object, not just images o f organism responses to 
the object, but a third kind o f image, that o f an organism in the act o f perceiving and 
responding to an object. I  believe the subjective perspective arises out o f the constant of 
the third kind o f image (Damasio 1994, p. 242-3).
In this theory, subjectivity itself depends on the initial distinction of objects out there in 
the world which differentiates it from an autistic total immersion in existence. This is 
similar to Melanie Klein’s (1932) phases of development in which primitive object rela­
tions and the splitting of events into good and bad objects precedes the formation of the 
subject in the depressive position who differentiates himself from other objects and inte­
grates himself as a continuous being with a history of interactions with these others or 
objects. Just as Klein believes that the formation of object relations which remain with us 
our whole lives and form a significant part of our subjective human experience and inter­
action with others precedes language, so to does Damasio assert from a neurological 
position that the construction of subjectivity and the self is not solely dependent on 
human language.
This basic neural device does not require language. The metaself construction I envision 
is purely nonverbal, a schematic view of the main protagonists from a perspective exter­
nal to both. In effect, the third-party view constitutes, moment-by-moment, a nonverbal 
narrative document o f what is happening to those protagonists. The narrative can be 
accomplished without language, using the elementary representational tools o f the senso­
ry and motor systems in space and time. I  see no reason why animals without language 
would not makes such narratives (Damasio 1994, p. 243).
The Lacanian notion that language determines our subjectivity from even before birth 
appears to be at odds with this view. In fact Lacan’s whole project was based on redress­
ing the mistake in psychoanalytic work which was to strengthen the ego or self, as he 
believed that the self was a part of the falsely constructed fantasy which caused suffering 
by not allowing the subject to be determined by his own desire or destiny but rather caus­
ing him to be trapped into patterns of behavior and experience formed by the determina-
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tion of the other. Similarly, Michel Foucault (1976) traced the genealogy of the experi­
ence of the self as a form of subjectivity and found it to be very peculiar to recent 
Western Civilization whose discourse came to form this subjective experience of self in 
individuals and societies. What Damasio calls self is simply a preverbal form of self 
which is more primitive than the more complex experience of the “I” or ego which mod­
em human beings develop.
Humans have available second order narrative capacities, provided by language, which 
can engender verbal narratives out o f nonverbal ones. The refined form o f subjectivity 
that is ours would emerge from the latter process. Language may not be the source of the 
self, but it certainly is the source o f the (Damasio 1994, p. 243).
On the other hand, for Lacan this preverbal construction of the “I” and the self is always- 
already being formed by the symbolic which may or may not be spoken and elaborated 
by human lingistic communication. The human being is bom into an elaborate symbolic 
and noetic world of myths, laws, rituals, and games, and even as the most primitive split­
ting and object relations are transforming the infant’s subjectivity from one of oceanic 
autism to one of differentiation, the more complex symbolic world has situated him in its 
own way. Perhaps Daniel Stem’s (1985) mapping of phases in the construction of subjec­
tivity based on his ethological research unites the above theories by showing how the 
most primitive psychic states remain with us even as we gain access to the intersubjec- 
tive, symbolic, and verbal worlds. Indeed, if we take Stem a step further we could agree 
with Lacan that even before these later intersubjective and verbal phases of development 
are triggered and reach their moment of optimum influence, they are nevertheless operat­
ing undergound from the beginning.
It appears, then, that from the vulnerable state at the moment of birth, human life is an 
extensive and complex journey of learning in which not only does the subject learn to 
survive, but the very way in which he comes to experience the world is constructed. 
Bateson’s increasing levels of learning may function similarly to Stem’s model of how 
subjectivity is formed. The human being is bom with a certain set of programed respons­
es, and basic conditioned learning begins to take place at birth or even before, but even as
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higher levels of learning to learn and transcontextualization are initiated, these basic lev­
els still operate underneath, forming a complex emotional-cognitive experience.
In analyzing the neuropsychological system, Karl Pribram has elucidated the formation 
of subjectivity and learning through its interaction with other systems internal and exter­
nal. Borrowing from Ilya Prigogine’s (1984) theoretical physics, Pribram describes the 
human experience as a complex dialectical or cybernetic circuit with a continual and 
unpredictable fluctuation between stability and novelty. Safety in the form of order, sta­
bility, and familiarity is a basic drive toward which human learning progresses. Once 
someone has been conditioned to perceive/act in a certain way, it is more likely that he 
will continue in the same direction based on the conditioned learning associated with 
bodily sensation related to basic needs.
The thermodynamic considerations put forward by Prigogine regarding stabilities far 
from equilibrium are intringuing: Stabilities far from equilibrium are attractive; they 
operate as attractors toward which the process tends. Thus the episode, characterized by 
its temporary stability far from equilibrium, can act as an attractor during learning - in 
experimental psychology terms, it values the act by means o f a reinforcing process. In the 
holonomic brain theory, this process is mediated by the protocritic (pain and tempera­
ture) system (Pribram 1991, p. 218-9).
As much as possible any organism, including a human being, will seek to incorporate any 
change into its already operating system of rules. Nevertheless, perturbation from the 
internal and external environments eventually produces a situation in which a breakdown 
of stability occurs. In attempting to find a new stability, an organism may become stuck 
in the resulting confusion or turbulence.
Often the neuropsychological system is actually operating close to equilibrium and per­
turbation is handled by a return to equilibrium: the distraction o f an orienting reaction is 
either ignored or incorporated into the ongoing process through repetition and familiar­
ization. However if the perturbation is great, a reaction we ordinarily call emotionally 
upsetting can result in turbulence and a new stability has to be achieved. When, as in the
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holonomic brain theory, the process is conceived to be composed o f continuous function, 
fo r example, as manifolds described by the Lie algebra, vortices can develop in the tur­
bulent system. Thus, an often realized possibility is to be “hung up” in the turbulence. 
But, because this is a state far from equilibrium, one can deliberately seek alternate con­
straints in order to change the state (Pribram 1991, p. 219).
Borrowing from Ross Ashby’s work on computer systems, Pribram describes a method 
for preventing the stagnation of a breakdown and turning it into a breakthrough. The 
injection of randomicity acts as a continual perturbation which prevents a system - or 
subjectivity - from stagnation within any relatively stable state. On the human level this 
method can serve to avoid fixation, stagnation, and disease.
Ashby described an interesting and powerful method for dealing with turbulence, a 
method which leads to “catastrophic” restabilizations ( “step functions”). In his compu­
tational model, stability was achieved by adding to the computation, numbers taken from 
a list o f random numbers. Randomicity provides maximum variance, the widest spread o f 
possible consequences. In a system with such a probability distribution there is also max­
imum possibility (potentiality) for new organizations to develop. As in Prigogines’s model 
one cannot predict just how the system will restabilize because o f the randomness inject­
ed into the turbulent system.
Ashby’s and Prigogine’s models have many things in common with the more 
recently developed thermodynamic models. Effective processing is achieved by a heuris­
tic in which the addition of noise is important to preclude premature closure onto an 
overriding attractor (Pribram 1991, p. 219).
This is amazingly close to Bateson’s methods, and to Zen and Sufi practices of con­
sciousness as well as various forms of shamanism and mysticism in which physical, 
chemical, and symbolic means are used in order to prevent stagnation and increase emo­
tional and cognitive transformation. In these realms teaching, healing, and sacred experi­
ence are an inseparable part of transformative practices.
Even apart from specific practices designed to transform an individual or collective sys-
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tem which is at an impasse through pedagogical or therapeutic methods, Pribram 
describes the ongoing experience of being human as a fluctuating process in which 
change, difference, and confrontation itself is immanent. No matter how much human 
beings are driven by their need for stability, it is nevertheless the intrusion of change 
from the systems with which we are interlinked that gives meaning to our lives. Much of 
our existence must take place at the unconsious level, yet it is perturbation which brings 
conscious purpose and awareness to our lives.
Perturbation, internally or externally generated, produces an orienting reaction which 
interrupts ongoing behavior and demarcates an episode. As the orienting reaction habit­
uates, the weightings (values) o f polarizations o f the junctional microprocess become 
(re)structured on the basis o f protocritic processing. Temporary stability characterizes 
the new structure which acts as a reinfocing attractor for the duration o f the episode i. e., 
until dishabituation (another orienting reaction) occurs (Pribram 1991, p. 220).
In addition to meaning, our basic cognitive functions depend on this difference. As 
Bergson elaborated, the way in which any organism comes to experience its environment 
will depend on need, drive, and desire. Basic perception/action and attention to life is dri­
ven by continual perturbation from outside.
Whenever a situation changes, an orienting reaction occurs, previously habituated per­
ceptions become dishabituated. The orienting reaction signals the perception o f novelty, 
the perceived change in the situation. Perceived changes can be generated internally - as 
when an organism becomes hungry. In such instances, “novel” perception - restaurant 
signs begin to populate the landscape - make relevant what had become irrelevant. Effort 
is expended, attention is “paid, ” and the familiar is experienced innovatively (Pribram 
1994, p. 221).
Difference in itself is nothing however, as there is an infinite amount of difference sur­
rounding any system. What matters - as Bateson says - is the difference that makes a dif­
ference, or novelty. Absolute difference tends toward chaos and entropy, whereas the con­
tinual reorganization of the familiar into the new strikes a balance between the interplay
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of stability and novelty which characterizes the basic movement of human experience, if 
not all self-organizing systems. It is through this method of reorganization of the play 
between order and chaos and the maintenance of a state of quasi-stability at a point far 
from equilibrium that certain (low-temperature) systems are sometimes able to mutate 
into higher-level organisms rather than going over into entropy, dying, or completing 
their concrescence.
There is a great deal of confusion regarding the perception o f novelty. In scientific cir­
cles, much o f this confusion stems from the confounding o f novelty with information.. . .  
However, as will be detailed shortly, novelty in the sense used here, neither increases nor 
reduces the amount o f uncertainty; rather it is due to a rearrangement o f what is familiar. 
The skill in writing a novel resides not in providing information in the sense o f reducing 
the amount o f uncertainty in communication. Rather, the skill lies in portraying the famil­
iar in novel ways, that is in new combinations (Pribram 1994, p. 222).
Novelty is akin to the randomicity Ashby injected into computer systems in order to guar­
antee that they did not stagnate in quasi-stability far from equilibrium. If equilibrium 
approximates the entropy or chaos persisting in the absence of difference, and informa­
tion is a point of relative stability far from equilibrium - a certain attractor - then ran­
domicity is what keeps these attractors from themselves becoming stagnant information. 
Perhaps this is the role of art. Books, films, and music challenge and reorganize our per­
ceptual, cognitive, and emotional experience of daily life even as they provide us with a 
sense of meaning. Further, we could describe any act which undertakes this task as an art 
of life - a transformative practice. Finally, the contemporary breakdown of grand narra­
tives within philosophy, science, religion, and art may have opened the way for a more 
immediate experience of meaning in the world in which the continual influx of novelty 
becomes the art of life itself. No longer will meaning, or majesty, or truth be outside of us 
within specific gods, leaders, or great works which capture our desire, faith, or adher­
ence. In modernity, art, science, and philosophy have lead the way to the reconstruction 
of our subjectivity in which percept, affect, and concept become the act of faith of each 
moment in our existence.
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In order to grasp human experience at any level it is necessary to take account of one’s 
position. In progressing toward the goal of research we sometimes know without know­
ing - we follow what is guiding us without being able to fully explain it. According to 
Thomas Sebeok’s (1981) reading of Peirce, this method of “abduction” or “the play of 
musement” is probably how most science and philosophy progresses, yet it is never pre­
sented this way after the fact, and it takes a great amount of faith and courage with 
respect to oneself and others to progress without certainty.
The project of formulating steps toward an art and science of human existence concerns 
the formation of subjectivity: how the ways in which human beings experience the world 
become constructed - how these subjectivities can be reconstructed with respect to 
“pathology” and “optimization” - and what the political and ethical implications of this 
are. In the course of our work, we must seek to understand as many maps of experience 
as possible from both within and without - both “emically” and “etically” - as does the 
ethnographer who immerses himself in another culture - another way of organizing his 
experience. This includes scientific, philosophical, psychoanalytic, and religious maps of 
various levels, intensities, and purposes. But the ways in which people experience, under­
stand, and describe the world are irreconcilable, and not only does no single map hold the 
answer, but even the degree to which one is better or more true than another depends on 
implicit values, desires, and needs of the moment. Instead of seeking for the right map, 
we could seek to communicate - to translate across maps. This “transversality” (Guattari 
1992) not only facilitates communication (in every respect from information processing 
to love to ecology) but it increases the multi-dimensionality of immediate experience and 
human subjectivity.
Seeing how maps translate does not give us the answer - it shows us “how it happens.” 
Not what but how. Which is why the mapping of existence scientifically does not destroy 
faith, meaning, or ecstasy - unless that faith was only a fundamental fantasy in the first 
place. No matter how many maps we construct Bataille’s (1954) question will remain: 
“why must there be what I know?”
Understanding systems as nested hierarchies is another way of grasping transversality
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provided that what Pribram calls “transfer functions” are sought - the ways to translate 
from one map to another. This is not simply understanding the leap from quantum 
physics to classical physics to neural networks to desire, but the leap from one person’s 
subjectivity to another’s or from the subjectivity of one moment to that of another. Most 
“systems theory” does not concern itself with this transversality so “systems” for these 
thinkers are just another single way of seeing - and a mechanistic one. Cybernetic, psy­
choanalytic, ecological, and organic approaches do not in any way guarantee that one will 
not get caught in the same mechanistic impasses, but they do hold promise for a more 
complex understanding of human experience.
3. Chaos and Complexity - Beyond the Brain
The brain or nervous system of the body of individual subjectivity may be conceived of 
as an extremely sensitive net for the organization of events. What is called mind, psyche, 
spirit, or information may be conceived of as the momentarily organized event itself - in 
an infinite variety of forms - which is always unique and irreducible to the matter or ener­
gy through which it comes to exist. Rather than speaking of perception, cognition, emo­
tion, or consciousness, we would do better to speak of subjectivity as the total experience 
of any irreducible event which partakes of all of these. The “feel” of our self, our history, 
our memory, or any particular moment is always a part of one’s internal horizon as a sub­
jective being which can only be re-presented by being described “objectively” at which 
time that descripition, translation, or communication becomes another - different though 
related - event in itself.
Felix Guattari (1992) characterizes the essential movement of human subjectivity and the 
universe itself as one of chaosmosis - an eternal fluctuation between the individuation of 
order out of chaos and its eventual dissolution and plunge back into uncertainty and 
chaos in the process of further mutation - a process which is at once linear, circular, and 
eternal. Karl Pribram has discovered a similar process within the working of the brain 
and its role in learning and the development of human mind and subjectivity.
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Thus, one way o f looking at the relationship between space-time and spectrum involves 
the least action principle, which mediates between two orders. On the one hand there are 
potential orders provided by an oscillation between change (measured as energy) and 
inertia (measured as momentum). On the other, are evolving space-time configurations. 
Information repeatedly actualizes potential into space-time configurations thus account­
ing for their evolution. One sort of evolving configuation is experienced by us as percep­
tual experience (Pribram 1991, p. 271-2).
What is called information in cybernetics is another name for the quantum coherence or 
self-organized event that gives any entity its unique existence. What we think are things 
out there in the world which we passively perceive are rather manifested or created by 
the organizing of human perception - they are organized in the interaction between 
human perception and the external world. Space-time configurations are actualized or 
created by our perception - our unique manner of interacting with energy and matter 
which is experienced differently by other entities. One way of grasping this is to experi­
ence how certain chemical substances or physical acts alter the perception of what others 
are experiencing “normally.” Pribram describes mystical practices and psychoactive 
drugs as altering the body-brain’s interaction with the universe and its organization of 
events as it moves from the temporo-spatial to the to the spectral dimension dissolving 
the usual boundaries between mind and matter which we normally maintain. These 
boundaries which we normally maintain are none other than what Bergson (1896) calls 
“attention to life” or the mode of subjectivity which applies itself to the external environ­
ment in satisfaction of basic needs - pragmatic perception. Mystical practices, psychoac­
tive chemicals, or even the mind altering effects of art, love, or trauma can plunge us into 
the depth of an inner experience cut off from pragmatic perception and reorganize our 
subjectivity in other ways.
Frontolimbic excitation can be induced by internal neurochemical stimulation or by 
external methods such as concentrating on ambiguous (or otherwise meaningless) stimuli 
provided by a mantra, for example. When the spectral dimension dominates the produc­
tion o f a perception, space and time become enfolded in the experienced episode. Time 
evolution ceases and spatial boundaries disappear. An infinity o f envisioned covariations
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characterizes the episode. There fore, the episode is often referred to as spiritual in the 
sense that, as a consequence of practiced inference, an effective union is envisioned 
between perceiver and perceived. The boundary between mind and matter, as all other 
boundaries, becomes dissolved. More on this at a future occasion (Pribram 1991, p. 272- 
3).
Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have sought to find an explanatory map for the work­
ing of the human brain and the manner in which it organizes mind by applying complex 
mathematical modeling and quantum theory to research in neuroscience. According to 
Penrose the neural networks responsible for mapping and processing human experience 
in the world have been found to be infinitely more complex than previously thought, 
making it clear that artificial intelligence is nowhere near being able to construct any­
thing close to the richness of the human nervous system. The cytoskeleton which forms 
the basic structural, circulatory, and information processing “nervous system” of single 
cell organisms such as an amoeba is thought by Penrose and Hameroff to form a complex 
information processing system within individual brain cells or neurons themselves. 
Rather than accepting the simplistic idea of neurons either firing or not, they conjecture 
that the large number of microtubules present on each neuron operate in a large scale 
quantum coherent manner within and across neurons and neural networks.
Here we envisage that not only must single microtubules be invoved in a relatively large- 
scale quantum-coherent state, but that such a state must extend from one microtubule to 
the next. Thus, not only must this quantum coherence stretch to the length o f an entire 
microtubule (and we recall that microtubules can extend to considerable length), but a 
good many o f the different microtubules in the cytoskeleton within a neuron, if  not all o f 
them, must together take part in this same quantum-coherent state. Not only this, but the 
quantum coherence must leap the synaptic barrier between neuron and neuron. It is not 
much o f a globality if it involves only individual cells! The unity o f a single mind can 
arise, in such a description only if there is some form o f quantum coherence extending 
across at least an appreciable part o f the entire brain (Penrose 1994, p. 375).
Microtubules are involved in transmitting the macromolecules that form neurotransmitter
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chemicals which fire across neural networks mapping the complex experience of external 
perception, bodily sensation, and their recategorization into higher order memory, learn­
ing, and consciousness. Research and speculation in the realm of quantum physical 
events has suggested ways in which the complex human neural system might similarly 
organize events by mapping our experience of being in the world.
Our picture, then, is o f some kind o f global quantum state which coherently couples the 
activities taking place within the tubes, concerning microtubules collectively right across 
large areas o f the brain. There is some influence that this state (which may not be simply 
a “quantum state”, in the conventional sense o f the standard quantum formalism) exerts 
on the computations taking place along the microtubules - an influence which takes deli­
cate and precise account o f the putative, missing, non-computational OR [objective 
reduction] physics that I  have been strongly arguing for. The “computational ” activity o f 
conformational changes in the tubulins controls the way that the tubes transport materi­
als along their outsides, and ultimately influences the synapse strengths at pre- and post- 
synaptic endings. In this way, a little o f this coherent quantum organization within the 
microtubules is “tapped o f f ' to influence changes in the synaptic connections o f the 
neural computer o f the moment (Penrose 1994, p. 375-6).
One prevalent theory within quantum physics holds that the superposition of possible 
states of location for a particle of matter in the form of a wave is reduced to its actual 
place in the moment of measurement by the act of measuring itself. This “subjective 
reduction” of the real is unavoidable. Although we as subjective human beings engaged 
in the act of observation are not able to escape from this blind spot, Penrose and 
Hameroff nevertheless seek to put forward a theory of “objective reduction” (OR) or 
“objectively orchestrated reduction” (OOR) in which they conjecture that although sub­
jective perception or measurement actualizes the multiplicity of the possible into a single 
event, this process of the organization of events or wholes (or concrescences in 
Whitehead’s term) takes place without our measurement - and that our experience of the 
world or subjectivity may be the result of ongoing successive moments of perceptual 
reduction organized into higher level wholes across time similar to the way in which our 
cinematic perception according to Deleuze (1983) captures and transmits 24 images - or
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percepts - per second. In order to demonstrate the effect of the organizational activity of 
the human nervous system and its relation to our experience, subjects have been given 
extremely mild electrical pulses through their brain - enough simply to disrupt the organi­
zation of events within their neural networks - while trying to complete a perceptual task 
and compared with a control group doing the same task. It was indeed found that those 
without the pulse performed better (Hameroff & Penrose 1996).
In focusing on consciousness and free will, Penrose has shown that the true conscious act 
which intervenes and alters the programed pattern of responses to events is rare indeed. 
Recent research by Penrose’s (1994) colleagues has shown that cortical activity is altered 
by the conscious decision to act, and that this willing appears in the brain some time 
before the actual act and even before the subject is aware of his intention. Primary con­
sciousness or subjectivity may sit above our virtually programed behavior giving us the 
feel of our experience (as Edelman and Damasio have argued), but the ability to continu­
ally mediate between conscious reflection and actual changes of behavior in relation to 
that reflection is a rare ability of higher-level consciousness. This is similar to Bateson’s 
third order learning and to the “enlightened” self-consciousness sought after by Zen and 
Sufi practices and by various methods of psychotherapy.
John Eccles has similarly attempted to account for the interaction between mind and 
brain and specifically the ability of psychic or mental events to organize the physical 
events of the brain. As previously pointed out, it is now known that neurons do not sim­
ply fire or not, but are engaged in a complex process in which various factors decide 
whether they will continue to fire and which neural maps will be linked up. The probabil­
ity of exocytosis in which a neuron releases its neurotransmitter molecules across the 
synapse to another neuron is actually quite low and the inhibition of firing is as important 
as the firing itself. Eccles theorizes that psyche or mind itself is the quantum organization 
of multiplicity or possibility into events through information which is beyond the classi­
cal laws of thermodynamics.
Combining these observations with our quantum mechanical analysis o f bouton exocyto­
sis, we present now the hypothesis that the mental intention (the volition) becomes neu-
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rally effective by momentarily increasing the probability o f exocytosis in selected corti­
cal areas such as the supplementary motor area neurons. In the language o f quantum 
mechanics this means a selection o f events (the event that the trigger mechanism has 
functioned, which is already prepared with a certain probability). This act o f selection is 
related to Wigner's selection process o f the mind on quantal states, and its mechanism 
clearly lies beyond ordinary quantum mechanics. This selection mechanism effectively 
increases the probability for exocytosis, and in this way generates increased EPSPs 
[excitatory post-synaptic potentials] without violation o f  the conservation laws. . . . 
[QJuantum selection is the only possible way o f producing different final states from 
identical initial conditions in identical dynamical situation, and thus with the same val­
ues of the conserved quantities. Such a situation could not prevail in a purely classical 
process, where a change in the final state necessarily implies a change either o f the ini­
tial conditions or o f the dynamics. Even in the recently extensively discussed processes 
governed by classical 4deterministic chaos \  the final outcome is predetermind by the ini­
tial conditions, though in an extremly sensitive manner. Classical chaotic motion is char­
acterized by extreme instabilities with respect to small changes and cannot therefore 
account for regular brain processes such as exocytosis (Eccles 1994, p. 160).
Without the conscious ability of mind to intervene in the organization of events through 
behavioral patterns - without the low probability of exocytosis which offers unknown 
possibilities and the intervention of free will, human beings would not hold their privi­
leged place in the universe between mind and matter - between energy and information - 
which gives them a certain - though limited - freedom to act in a world of relatively sta­
ble determined boundary conditions. Stuart Kauffman (1993) describes how deeply 
ordered “solid” systems are unable to communicate across other systems and unable to 
make major adaptations to interacting systems, whereas extremely chaotic “gaseous” sys­
tems are so sensitive to slight changes that they are unable to hold on to any order or con­
crescence. The human neural system, however, is an example of a more liquid system - or 
a solid system close to liquidity - in which order and chaos are balanced in a unique way 
to allow for maximum adaptation and interaction with other concrescent systems and 
events - ever mutating to higher forms of complexity without going over into entropy. 
Eccles’s model elegantly provides a map of the way in which these implicated and inte-
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grated systems of physical matter and energy interact with those of mind, psyche, spirit 
or culture - all of which human beings take part in.
There is an extraordinary consequence o f the hypothesis that mental events (psychons) 
effectively act on the dendrons by increasing the probability o f the exocytoses generated 
by invasion o f a bouton by presynaptic impulses. Fortunately the quantal probability is 
low (0.3-0.4) for the cerebral cortex, the hippocampus. I f  the probability were as high as 
1.0, mental experiences could have no effective action on neural events o f the dendrons. 
The evolutionary development of the mammalian neocortex would not have redeemed the 
mindlessness o f the brain. . . . There would be no ‘HOW* o f conscious experiences com­
ing to exist as an eventual outcome of the biological evolution o f the mammalian brain. 
All depends on the neural design of the ultramicrosite operations with the low exocytotic 
probability o f the millions ofboutons in the mammalian neocortex and in the coming-to- 
be o f some primitive conscious experiences that achieve expression because o f the low 
exocytotic probability (Eccles 1994, p. 182).
The unique position of the human nervous system depends on its sensitivity which acts as 
a bridge between the “classical” physical world and the as-yet-unmeasurable “quantum” 
or “psychic” world. The human neural network is not simply programed for permanent 
connections, but rather the exocytosis which links synapses into complex networks and 
organizes subjectivity is delicately balanced between potentiation and inhibition - per­
haps providing a perceptual or communicational device sensitive to subtle quantum ener­
gy which we are just beginning to understand.
Richard Gerber’s (1996) description of the Tiller-Einstein model of positive and negative 
space-time and energy poses a possible explanation for this relationship as well as a map 
to explain the empirical effects of homeopathy, accupuncture, meditation, psychic heal­
ing, and other forms of “vibrational medicine.” Einstein’s famous equation (E=mc2) 
demonstrates that all matter is actually an energy packet or light frozen into a stable con­
figuration which our experience of classical physical matter takes for granted. According 
to Gerber, Einstein’s full equation is that energy equals the mass of a particle of matter 
multiplied by the speed of light constant (E=mc2) divided by the square root of one
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minus the velocity of the particle divided by the speed of light (V(l-v2/c2)). This part of 
the equation is usually ignored since the velocity of the particle is usually assumed to be 
so small as to render the denominator equal to 1 for practical purposes. In reality, as the 
velocity of the energy packet of matter is increased toward the speed of light, the energy 
is increased to infinity as the denominator in the equation decreases, but beyond the 
speed of light, the equation would reveal the square root of (-1) - an “imaginary” num­
ber. Although the energy to accelerate matter beyond the speed of light is beyond our 
classical capabilities, it is here that Tiller claims the existence of the quantum or psychic 
world of negative space-time begins. He believes that this negative space-time operates 
through a kind of subtle “magneto-electric” energy beyond light-speed and different from 
the electromagnetism of sub-luminal speeds. Further, this energy is negatively entropic 
which accounts for the formative forces or self-organizing principles of mind, psyche, 
and life and also for why measuring this type of effect is difficult through classical tech­
niques as it is affected by subtle energy factors such as will, belief, and unseen vibra­
tional elements.
Henry Stapp has similarly conjectured that the brain-mind organization of experience 
works in a quantum coherent manner. In likening the brain to an extremely sensitive non­
linear system he claims that each brain itself is implicated in the quantum universe as a 
set of superposed possibilities even on a macroscopic level. At the level of subjective 
conscious experience this superposition of possibilities must be reduced by an actual 
event. Stapp asks how and where this event occurs. It is difficult for us to grasp this situa­
tion for the very reason that we misconceive the idea that there are patterns or events or 
things out there in the world to be perceived. It is rather our “quantum” brain which orga­
nizes a pattern such as a triangle from the chaos of matter and motion. Other entities - 
insects for example - do not see a triangle - or a chair - or a sun.
In the quantum ontology a brain attending to an external triangle is not performing the 
retrograde act o f transforming an actual external triangle into some conguent structure 
o f particle motions, which must then be deciphered to be perceived as a triangle. Rather 
it is transforming the external triangle, which exists only as a pattern o f disjoint events 
and tendencies, into a single event that actualizes, in integrated form, an image o f the
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structural connections that inhere in the perceived triangle. The brain, therefore, does not 
convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set o f particle motions; rather it con­
verts a concatenation o f separate external events into the actualization o f some single 
integrated pattern o f neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle. 
The central question is then: Why is the actualizing o f this integrated pattern of activity 
felt as the perceiving o f the triangle? More generally: Why do brain events feel the way 
they do (Stapp 1993, p. 155)?
For Stapp human conscious experience is the feel or subjectivity or total experience of an 
event at the level of mind and irreducible to the neural system through which this experi­
ence comes to be known. For Stapp, Penrose’s question of where the reduction or 
Heisenberg cut which produces an event occurs is irrelevant: we can make it anywhere 
and it is in fact made at many levels - and differently - by each subjectivity.
The present theory asserts that each human conscious experience is the feel o f an event in 
the top-level process occurring in a human brain. This brain process is asserted to con­
sist o f a sequence o f Heisenberg actual events called the top-level events. Each such 
event actualizes some macroscopic quasi-stable pattern o f neural activity. The pattern 
actualized by a top-level event is called a symbol. It normally consists o f a set of other 
symbols, called its components, linked together by a superposed neural activity.
Actualizing a symbol S engenders enduring physical changes in the synapses 
(facilitation) that cause any subsequent actualization o f any component o f S to create a 
pattern o f dispositions for the activations o f the other components o f S (association) 
(Stapp 1993, p. 155).
It is here at the level of human subjective events that we find the symbol. In fact what 
Stapp calls a symbol is the way in which we begin to further organize and recategorize 
events into more complex higher order events of our own invention by naming, translat­
ing, communicating, and combining - a conclusion which Edelman and Damasio have 
come to through extensive research into the neurology of the human brain. Here we are 
reminded of the pychoanalytic world of the infant beginning to experience events and to 
differentiate them through primitive symbol formation. Initially the symbols are barely
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distinguishable from the immediacy of experience in relating to matter and energy or 
from primitive basic drives and bodily sensations. Eventually through a long process in 
which each individual subject’s ontogeny benefits from the phylogenetics of the species, 
the subject will come to organize his experience in a more complex, empowered, and 
mediated way - through the reorganization of his subjectivity in the world by rituals, 
games, intersubjective communication, and language. The constant mapping of psychic 
or mental experience by the brain through symbols provides an ongoing sense of self 
which Stapp calls the “generalized body-world schema” in which - much like Stem’s 
concept of subjectivity - complex and integrated systems of symbols make up human 
experience.
A component o f a thought, so far as it is apprehended, is itself a possible thought. Thus 
each thought has a compositional structure: it has components that are entities o f the 
same kind as itself Our basic principle is that the compositional structure o f the feel o f a 
top-level event is isomorphic to the compositional structure o f the symbol actualized by 
that event: there is a one-to-one mapping of symbols to feels, and this mapping preserves 
compositional structure (Stapp 1993, p. 156).
Stapp takes a position similar to Whitehead’s organic or process-oriented philosophy of 
existence in which what is real is the symbol or the event which is actualized or orga­
nized out of chaos. Stapp calls this an analytic ontology as opposed to a synthetic ontol­
ogy which perceives that events are reducible to fundamental parts which can be divided 
at will.
In the quantum ontology the only genuine physical facts are the actual events. Hence 
some actual event must “serve as the objectively real counterpart to [each] psychic 
state”. But in this case the essential unity o f the psychic state - so incomprehensible with­
in reductionist classical thought - mirrors the essential unity o f its physical counterpart. 
In both cases the ontological progression is from the ontologically fundamental wholes to 
their ontologically subordinate components, rather than from presumed ontologically 
fundamental elements to assemblies thereof. This shift from synthetic ontology to analytic 
ontology is the foundation o f the present work (Stapp 1993, p. 157).
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According to an analytic or organic understanding, subjectivity and objectivity are two 
different - and united - ways of experiencing the universe, both of which each event par­
takes of. To perceive objectively is to see from outside - freed from subjective feel as 
much as possible though this is ultimately not completely possible - the unfolding of 
totality or chaos into actual events. Whether this is considered chance or determinism is a 
matter of choice. To perceive subjectively is to grasp the feel of any event from within as 
unique to itself - an experience in which human free will participates in the active cre­
ation of events.
According to the theory advanced here each actual event has two aspects; a feel, and a 
physical representation within the quantum formalism. The feel is asserted to be a veridi­
cal image o f the effect o f the action o f the physically described event.
At the purely physical level the Heisenberg actual event is passive: it is simply the 
coming into being o f a new set o f tendencies. However, in the context o f the present ontol­
ogy the actual event must be constructed actively: the event actualizes the shift in tenden­
cies. I f  the feel is identified as the active aspect o f the event, then the feel is the veridical 
feel o f actively actualizing the new state o f affairs, and consciousness becomes the effica­
cious agent that it veridically feels itself to be (Stapp 1993, p. 168).
This takes us again to Bergson: perception is action. Perception/action is creation/mani­
festation simultaneously passive and active depending on one’s point of view. The human 
organism which is an event unfolding and evolving objectively in the universe from the 
totality of the possible (all of which “exists” in the sense of being virtual) and interacting 
with other events through perception/action has unfolded or evolved to the point of being 
able to organize events through maximum complexity and conscious choice. To subjec­
tively act with free will within objective boundary conditions. To create.
The question arises: What determines which of the alternative possible brain activities is 
actualized by an acutal event?
According to contemporary quantum theory, two factors contribute to this quan­
tum choice. The first is the local deterministic evolution o f tendencies governed by the
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Heisenberg equations o f motion. This factor brings in all o f the local historical influences 
such as heredity, learning, reflective contemplation on priorities and values, etc., that 
contribute to the formation o f the current state o f the brain. These factors determine, 
however only the tendencies, or weights, associated with the various possible distinct 
courses of action. Then an actual event occurs. This event actualizes one o f the distinct 
top-level patterns o f brain activity, and hence selects one o f these distinct possible cours­
es o f action. This selection is, according to contemporary quantum theory, made by the 
second factor: pure chance.
Pure brute stochasticity, with no ontological substrate, is in my opinion an absur­
dity: the statistical regularities must have some basis. On the other hand, the answer pro­
vided by contemporary quantum theory is probably correct in the sense that the basis for 
the quantum choices cannot be conceptualized in terms o f the ideas that it employs. 
Within that framework these choices must therefore appear to come out o f nowhere; they 
must be, in the word used by Pauli and by Bohr, “irrational ” (Stapp 1993, p. 168-9).
Finally, the question is what determines how events will be organized - what measure of 
freedom and determinism operate in our existence. In grasping the complexity of - and 
mutually implicated interaction of - systems and events, scientists have developed more 
and more complex and accurate maps of existence. Nevertheless, in the final moment, the 
actualization will always be indeterminable from our limited subjective position. What 
looks like a certainty depends on few enough factors that we may be able to measure or 
predict the event nearly always, but this is in fact no more certain than events of greater 
complexity in which we cannot begin to bring into account all the factors. It may be that 
everything unfolds in an objective manner, but to be a human being is to be within the 
universe as a partial subjective event unable to know the totality of which it is a part. 
Nevertheless human subjectivity is of such rich and complex “consciousness” that it can 
know, feel, think, act, and experience with great freedom. Simultaneously, our lack sup­
plies us with unnending mystery. We perhaps know much less than we think and much 
more than we know. While any map of experience provides us with necessary meaning 
and the practical means of survival and enjoyment through the immanent capture of the 
event from chaos, it simultaneously closes us off to ever further layers of possible experi­
ence to which we must somehow try to remain open. Dennis and Terence McKenna have
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speculated on the possible biochemical and electromagnetic elements of our body-brain’s 
organization of mind, psyche, and subjectivity and our ability to experience conscious 
events such as thoughts.
I f  the constant intercalation o f 5HT [serotonin] into bond sites between codons, now a 
recognized part o f 5HT metabolism, does significantly alter ESR [electron spin reso­
nance] patterns in DNA, then it seemed likely to us that interference patterns that such a 
shifting o f ESR signatures would generate might provide the mechanism for the hologra- 
matic standing wave that the living system has developed to model within itself the world 
it encounters beyond itself Only 10 percent o f DNA is involved in protein synthesis. The 
functions o f the other 90 percent are uncertain, but we suggest that an organism's entire 
internal horizon o f experience is created and maintained in the energy continuum, which 
neural DNA regulates and maintains. Thought and reflection may be holographic func­
tions that take place against the background o f the energy flow o f metabolism that DNA 
controls. It is this flow o f energy that is experienced by organisms as the phenomenon of 
time itself. Organisms evolved in and became patterned in reponse to this flow (McKenna 
& McKenna 1993, p. 151).
Catastrophe theory, thermodynamics, and non-linear metamodeling track the movement 
of complex phenomena, but the event itself is still beyond any map of certainty from our 
limited subjective point of view. Autopoesis (Maturana & Varela 1987), formative forces 
(Steiner 1924), morphic resonance (Sheldrake 1987), and holonymy (Pribraml971,1991, 
Grof 1985) explore the territory further and point toward an understanding of process, 
event, and organization in being and becoming. Nevertheless the actualization of any 
event will always appear “irrational” or “chance” or “fate” from a certain point of view. 
In developing an art and science of subjectivity which would be a pragmatics of life, the 
contradictory ideas of chance and determinism - fate and free - will dissolve into the faith 
of each moment in which the event is organized by perception/action but driven by the 
embracing/enacting of desire - or what Castaneda (1987) says the Yaqi shaman calls 
“intent.” By this token, we can see that the implicated ecosophic approach to understand­
ing the universe as composed of the holistic and complex systems within systems which 
is being increasingly mapped out by philosophers and scientists leads directly to ethical-
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aesthetic practices which form an art and science of human life as developed by psycho­
analysts, teachers, activists, and explorers of the further reaches of human existence.
Humankind is not, however, free to choose the when o f its completion. The actual moment 
of concrescence is a property o f the most inclusive epoch. In the modular hierarchy of 
time, it is an imposed fact. Time must be well used; this is a basis for a possible theory of 
ethics. But even time well used still hurries us and all beings to its own conclusion. To 
preserve this perception and the idea o f a matter- and history-conditioning atemporal 
interspecies bio-electronic hologram with a temporally expressed and mathematically 
describable unfolding, it is necessary to take the following view o f humankind’s freedom 
to act and the immutability o f the order and rate o f novel ingressions. Such ingressions 
only define boundary conditions. In the unfolding o f novel ingressions, there are moments 
o f maximum propitiousness. As the probability o f a time o f renewal intensifies, who can 
doubt the possibility that humanity, through an act o f free will, may anticipate the new 
epoch? All philosophy springs from the idea that the human mind is the measure and 
leading edge o f all things. And it is with poetry and philosophy that we must take that 
measure (McKenna & McKenna 1993, p. 205).
At this point in history, we have reached a new understanding of human experience in its 
interaction with the whole of existence. Scientists move ever closer to grasping the sub­
jective element of their objectivity, while philosophers, psychoanalysts, and social scien­
tists move ever closer to an objective understanding of subjectivity. By seeking a trans­
versal communication which reaches across a variety of practices, disciplines, and per­
spectives - each of which nevertheless maintains its own essential singularity - we could 
perhaps begin to draw together a series of steps toward a human science, art, and practice 
of subjectivity which moves beyond the limitations of separate fields of symbolic knowl­
edge and succeeds in analyzing the ever-changing multiplicity of aesthetic and ethical 
practices and beliefs at stake in the variety of human experience.
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4. Desire at the Limits of Thought - The Sacred
This unequal situation finally poses the problem in clear terms. The intimate order is not 
reached if it is not elevated to the authenticity and authority o f the real world and real 
humanity. This implies, as a matter o f fact, the replacement o f compromises by a bringing 
o f its contents to light in the domain o f clear and autonomous consciousness that science 
has organized. It implies SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS taking up the lamp that science has 
made to illuminate objects and directing it toward intimacy.. . .
What is required by self-consciousness is not really the destruction o f the order of 
things. The intimate order cannot truly destroy the order o f things (just as the order of 
things has never completely destroyed the intimate order). But this real world having 
reached the apex o f its development can be destroyed, in the sense that it can be reduced 
to intimacy. Strictly speaking, consciousness cannot make intimacy reducible to it, but it 
can reclaim its own operations, recapitulating them in reverse, so that they ultimately 
cancel out and consciousness itself is strictly reduced to intimacy. Of course this counter 
operation is not in any way opposed to the movement o f consciousness reduced to that 
which it essentially is - to that which, from the start, each one o f us always knew it was. 
But this will be clear consciousness only in one sense. It will regain intimacy only in 
darkness. In so doing, it will have reached the highest degree o f distinct clarity, but it will 
so fully realize the possibility o f man, or o f being, that it will rediscover the night o f the 
animal intimate with the world - into which it w ill enter (Bataille 1973, p. 97-100).
If existence actualizes itself from the possible in a variety of ways, then human subjectiv­
ity in its self-conscious state holds a privileged position between mind and nature through 
which it comes to organize events. The objective point of view is synonymous with ratio­
nal thought - the coming to consciousness which increasingly has allowed man to look 
upon the world from the outside and to distance himself from his immediate experience. 
Full self-consciousness entails grasping the subjective nature of one’s self from an objec­
tive point of view - and realizing the limits of objectivity from within one’s subjectivity. 
The history and variety of sacred experience within humanity revolves around this meet­
ing point of subject and object - or consciousness and immanence. Pantheistic or Eastern 
forms of the sacred have sought the immanence of immediacy at the height of self-con-
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sciousness, whereas a variety of primitive, pagan, and modem rituals more common to 
the West have relied on an extreme dialectical movement between rational lucidity and 
the transcendent moment. For us, the sacred is the realization of the moment in which the 
event becomes actualized from the chaos of the possible - to the extent that we are con­
scious of its temporal nature.
If subjectivity was at one time submerged in the social, then collective religious rituals 
were the expression of the return to sacred immanence denied by the rational means of 
increasing survival. As Bataille has pointed out, during the long process of evolution in 
which man gained consciousness, he nevertheless did not lose sight of the end of his exis­
tence in the sacred experience of the immanent moment. The location of the sacred sim­
ply changed, and subjectivity itself “imploded” as it were into the individual being, tak­
ing precedence over the social. This further step in the coming to consciousness of 
humanity as a whole unfortunately brought with it an increasing objectification of life in 
which the sacred “end” of life was forsaken for the means. Bataille’s project was to 
redress this situation, by developing a human science in which the general economy of 
rational consciousness and sacred immediacy would be restored, reorganized, and multi­
plied toward an unknown future for humanity. Bataille’s ultimate solution of sovereign 
subjectivity within a general economy of existence is consonant with an ecosophic grasp 
of the movement of information and energy within current scientific thinking in the 
approaches of quantum physics, chaos theory, cybernetics, self-organizing evolution, and 
organic neuroscience, and with the embracing-enacting of one’s jouissance or desire in 
post-Lacanian psychoanalysis.
A science of the human is none other than a science of subjectivity in which perception, 
action, cognition, and emotion organize the event. Through our research we propose to 
develop a basic theory of human experience which will provide a framework for a gener­
al human science and practice. The problem immediately arises as to what a science or a 
knowledge of the human could be, given that we are investigating that which is perform­
ing the investigation. Quantum physicists have discovered that this fact applies even to 
the seemingly most objective sciences of inorganic matter. Similarly, Godel's undecid­
ability theorem states the problem clearly: there is no system of principles attempting to
54
define or know which can ground itself except from outside of its own system - its own 
discourse. When we turn to the human sciences the aporias of uncertainty and undecid­
ability become even more complex. But this does not mean we must give up - rather we 
must find an approach to knowing which differs from the one which has dominated 
Western thought for so long.
In fact it appears that this is exactly what has been taking place throughout the past cen­
turies within philosophy and the human sciences though often on the margins. According 
to Spinoza, no right can ever found a power or an ethic, but rather each subject only acts 
“sovereignly” to the limits of its power which has been conditioned by the subjectivities - 
or systems - with which it is interlocked. Every act or concept rests on an “arbitrary 
assent,” though the sage can attempt to withhold his arbitrary assent and to place himself 
on the level of all parallel possible subjectivities. This is the “objective” pole of which 
the “subjective” pole of sovereign assent is the complement. With Kant and Hegel we 
find thought attempting to systematize that which it begins to see is unsystematizable. 
For what remains throughout all of Hegel's attempts to bring closure to thought and spec­
ulation through a complete knowledge is the irreconcilable tension of substance and idea 
- of reality and concept - of fact and principle - of the real and the symbolic - of desire 
and thought. But this is an opening through which the unknown - the unthinkable - begins 
to be thought. Heidegger's ontology attempts to focus not on an idea of what is but on the 
very possibility of (human) thought thinking what is. Through empirical clinical experi­
ence, Freud stumbles upon the same thing: the fact that in human experience conscious 
thought is in the habit of concealing itself from its thinker.
And so slowly speculative or reflective thought has been unseated from its place as a 
self-evident and unquestioned method for knowing what is. Instead we see that thought is 
a part of what is - an experience that we as human beings undergo. It is the experience of 
thought as reflection, speculation, consciousness, logic, knowledge, science, language, 
and discourse which divides us from our immediacy and allows us to see from outside 
what is happening to us, but it is this same experience which guarantees that this knowl­
edge will always escape us - that we will be unable to bring a final closure to complete 
knowledge in the form of objective truth or fact.
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Through our investigation into the theorization of human experience in philosophy and 
the human sciences as well as work produced in psychoanalytic practice, religious expe­
rience, and artistic and poetic practice, we seek to present a theory of the human which 
will serve to guide a general investigation into all facets of existence as well as the devel­
opment of various practices. This theory elucidates the experience of the human being as 
radically divided from within by the tension produced by conscious thought endlessly 
attempting to speculate and define through language its own desire which - in its insuffi­
ciency or inability to find closure in the self - is driven toward what is unknown or other.
Throughout our work we will be haunted by one concern. If a rigorous science attempt­
ing to know what we are must remain open to what is always new, different, other, 
unconscious, as-yet-unknown and must continue to develop new subjectivities, new lan­
guages, new discourses, new modes of knowing and communicating our experience, does 
this bring us closer to anything like a practical knowlege of effects in the real or does it 
simply implicate us further in delirium, fantasy, and madness? Apart from the practical 
means of our survival, what is it that could be taken as the end of this human existence?
Human experience is characterized by an essential movement. On the one hand we have 
desire - the drive which sustains us - our reason for being. On the other we have con­
sciousness - lucidity - the never-ending process by which we think, organize, categorize, 
and attempt to know what is happening to us through symbols. There is a blind spot or 
vanishing point between these two facets of our lives. As long as we live, neither one 
ceases to exist for a moment, and never can one eclipse the other. It is at their point of 
intersection - in the impossible meeting ground that forms our experiences - where we 
find what is most essential to our being.
How can we communicate our experience? We would like to include everything, yet we 
can only begin from inside the symbolic. But in the end, we will find ourselves outside. 
We are haunted by that which is outside of ourselves - the unknown - the unintended 
which can take on so many names. Whether it is a question of the other who befalls us, 
the unconcious thing which speaks through us, the impossible that we are inexplicably
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driven to but can never reach, or the sublime experience of the divinity, it is this ekstasis - 
this beyond which is outside the confines of knowing and thinking - which defines the 
human.
We are human. We are played through by our drives no less than animals. But - gift or 
curse - we experience our movements through language - through what is called thinking. 
To think about "what is" without thinking about what it is to be a human being thinking 
about "what is" has been the impoverished task of philosophy and the sciences of the 
past. But proponents of existential ontology and quantum theory have proposed a self- 
consciousness which betrays the human experience no less. For while they recognize that 
the very act of thinking, of measuring, of formulating in language is affected by the 
uncertainty of the human being itself, where does this leave them: with a new certainty of 
uncertainty - with one more form of "knowledge" - thinking they are one step closer to 
knowing and waiting patiently for the coming revelation - for the step backward beyond 
metaphysics. Freud's psychoanalytic exploration opened up another perspective on the 
crack in the universal by calling this uncertainty the unconscious - or desire - only to see 
the majority of his followers develop another rigid dogma.
We must pick up where these others have left off - to take these discourses and put them 
into dialogue rather than refining them into perfect systems which can be applied to the 
whole of life. We can never know what is, for although there is a "real" - whose effects 
we experience - we as human beings do not have direct access to this real - including 
what we ourselves are. We can only formulate or translate or communicate through semi- 
otic and symbolic means.
What then can we know? Nothing in the traditional sense of knowing as truth or fact, but 
anything if we can say it. For "knowledge" is produced by that part of us which thinks 
and formulates in symbols, and the truth of the real is that this thing of knowing and 
speaking happens in us, which means that it is not a question of what we can know but of 
the fact that this knowing in us is an imperative. As a universal we can know nothing, but 
each one of us can and must know what it is that affects us: that is, we must be able to 
navigate the constant human movement whereby we are fated to translate the reality of
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our body, our soul, our desire, our drive, into a story which will satisfy our thought. 
Caught between that which affects us inside in the reality of our body and outside in the 
world on the one hand and our mind's attempt to know, to understand, to formulate in lan­
guage what is happening to us on the other, we live the impossible human experience.
Then what must we do? Again, nothing in the universal sense, for - as Lacan has pointed 
out - an ethics is relative to a discourse. But a discourse is the well-spoken of our desire, 
and in another sense each of us is riveted by the same imperative which might be called 
not ethical but real: we must formulate our real experience into a symbolic discourse and 
act in accordance with that discourse. In fact in the end it does not even matter which dis­
course we formulate - as if each of us had a desire that was there to be discovered - but 
only that we embrace/enact our desire in the symbolic order which escapes us. Any 
attempt to discover and define the core of our being once and for all will suspend us for­
ever in the imaginary fantasy between the "real" experience of our drive and the fictional 
story of symbolic "reality". Of course, what people call “the real world" is doubly false in 
that (1) it is the necessary yet fictional enacting of the unknown inside us and in that (2) it 
is only that for the one who is speaking or defining this “real world.” Nevertheless in 
order to exist, to live, to stay sane, human beings are required to subjectivize themselves - 
to narrativize themselves - to create a coherent symbolic story of their enigmatic experi­
ence - even if only for a moment.
In the past these stories were handed down to the majority of humanity in the form of rit­
uals, laws, mores, beliefs, and myths. But as conscious thought continues to contest every 
given, the crisis of human existence becomes how to believe - how to make this leap of 
faith. Lucid thought has made it increasingly difficult for us to receive our symbolic nar­
ratives from outside, but instead we must each learn to translate our experience into sym­
bolic language. This is not knowing but "unknowing" - the gaya scienza of the troubadors 
- the magnum opus of the alchemists - the poetic science of translating our experience of 
the real into language. Yet it is not exactly this subjectivization itself which is the human 
subject as Foucault (1976) claims, and neither is it the inevitable fall into subjective des­
titution described by Lacan (1966) and Zizek (1989). Rather we are caught between this 
inevitable double movement of the human experience - between the organization of our
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self through the telling of our story and the inevitable return of the real which punctures 
holes in our perfect system.
Lacan defined psychoanalysis as the repeated encounter with the impossible real. This is 
why psychoanalysis is both terminable and interminable. Psychoanalysis is terminable in 
the sense that at the end of the analytic relationship, the analysand has learned how to 
navigate the waters of this human experience - he has come to recognize, embrace, and 
enact his desire in the face of the empty void which opens up with the fact that there is no 
truth or meaning given from above. He has come to enact his desire in the face of his fall 
into nothingness - his subjective destitution. This passage to the act is the leap of faith. 
Even more, it is the dissolution of the difference between fate and free will. Before, the 
subject may have suffered at the deepest level from the anguish that everything occured 
by chance, but in translating his real experience into symbolic language and acting, he 
accepts and takes responsibility for his "desire" while simultaneously choosing to act 
upon exactly what he "desires". The very word "desire" does away with the false distinc­
tion between fate and free will and becomes what it really is - "faith" - at the moment of 
this passage to the act at the end of the analytic encounter.
Yet psychoanalysis is interminable in the sense that the navigation of this movement 
between the inevitable return of the unknown real which causes us to fall into subjective 
destitution and the subjectivization of this destitution into another symbolic narrative 
never ends. It is here where the psychoanalyst - and the poet - dwells. Like the alchemists 
of old, the psychoanalyst of today lives in the dangerous imaginary space of the human - 
between the void of the real and the fiction of symbolic realities. It is here that we as 
human beings are fated to live - between two deaths - between two unreachable asymp­
totic encounters: an encounter with the real - which does exist though we can never mas­
ter it - and an encounter with reality - which does not exist though we must always create 
it. When Lautreamont claimed that poetry must be created by everyone, he did not know 
to what extent he was right. At the time, the call for individual subjectivity to enact its 
own symbolic faith was but a dream. In a time when social structures and beliefs col­
lapse, it becomes a necessesity.
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Yet if each man must formulate his discourse of and act in accordance with his own spe­
cific encounter with the real, where does this leave us. What then is to become of our 
desires and myths in the presence of others? What kind of rituals can we share in? How 
can humanity even survive under the weight of this ethic? Where does it leave love, 
friendship, family, meaning, myth, and the social fabric? It is to this point that the work 
of poets, artists, philosophers, psychoanalysts, scientists, and mystics have led us. It is 
here that we will begin by putting into dialogue those who have followed their desire res­
olutely to confront these questions.
How else might we pursue our future if not through language - if not through the cre­
ation, presentation, communication, reception, and seduction of our discourses - our 
maps of the world. Lacan once formulated what he considered to be the four discourses 
under which at different times each one of us must operate. In the discourse of the univer­
sity (or truth or knowledge) and the discourse of the master he presented two of the most 
pervasive of discourses that have dominated human history - discourses that we have 
been trying to throw off throughout modernity. In the discourse of the hysteric (or neurot­
ic or analysand) and the discourse of the analyst he presented his own subjectivization - 
he spoke from his desire - and he gave us something invaluable. But there are a multiplic­
ity of discourses - and for each discourse an ethical-aesthetic foundation. How are these 
discourses which speak the same, and how are they different? Who or what speaks in us, 
for us, to us, with us?
5. Psychoanalysis - A Spiritual Science
Certainly, it is dangerous, in extending the frigid research o f the sciences, to come to a 
point where one's object no longer leaves one unaffected, where, on the contrary, it is 
what inflames. Indeed, the ebullition I  consider, which animates the globe, is also my 
ebullition. Thus, the object of my research cannot be distinguished from the subject at its 
boiling point. In this way, even before finding a difficulty in receiving its place in the 
common movement o f ideas, my enterprise came up against the most personal obstacle,
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which moreover gives the book its fundamental meaning.
As I considered the object o f my study, I  could not personally resist the efferves­
cence in which I  discovered the unavoidable purpose, the value o f the cold and calculat­
ed operation. My research aimed at the acquisition o f a knowledge; it demanded coldness 
and calculation, but the knowledge acquired was that o f an error, an error implied in the 
coldness that is inherent in all calculation. In other words, my work tended first o f all to 
increase the sum o f human resources, but its findings showed me that this accumulation 
was only a delay, a shrinking back from the inevitable term, where the accumulated 
wealth has value only in the instant. Writing this book in which I  was saying that energy 
finally can only be wasted, I  myself was using my energy, my time, working; my research 
answered in a fundamental way the desire to add to the amount o f wealth acquired for  
mankind. Should I say that under these conditions I  sometimes could only respond to the 
truth o f my book and could not go on writing it (Bataille 1967, p. 10-11)?
In these times another metalanguage has arrived to tell us that “there is no metalanguage” 
- no way of standing outside of the speaking subject’s position in time and space in order 
to grasp or express the “truth” from above. This metalanguage is at once the dissolution 
of all metalanguages - that is, of all attempts to categorize, define, and posit a true repre­
sentation of experience without acknowledging the relative position from which one 
speaks - and also the supreme metalanguage which can - as is evidenced in dogmatic ver­
sions of Cynicism or Buddhism - become a metalanguage in itself. For following its own 
lucidity to the letter, the metalanguage of no metalanguages must recognize that its con­
sciousness - its ekstasis - is different from - albeit no better or truer than - any (metalan­
guage or discourse which remains within - bound to - its own belief and desire.
Practices of consciousness within Zen, Sufism, and other forms of mysticism have 
offered a few individuals throughout history this experience of standing outside of the 
beliefs and truths through which they had come to be defined, but what often results from 
this experience is a cognitively-dominated state which proclaims all desires - along with 
all beliefs - to be illusions, and which survives on a combination of unconsciously denied 
belief in the superiority of this conscious “freedom from illusions” and unconsciously 
denied participation in one’s own practices of desire. On the other hand, shamanistic
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healing methods have operated on the fact that human beings function through belief - 
through desire - and that this belief affects the body. Whether conscious of what they are 
doing or not, most psychotherapists rely on this belief or hypnotic suggestion.
The true problem of our time is this collapse of “Belief* - of the “death of God” - of the 
relativism and cynicism of dis-”Belief’ which splits cognitive thought from the “belief’ 
of immediate experience or desire. Those for whom the fictions of accepted truth and 
morality no longer hold, find their own responses. For example, the obsessional who 
avoids confronting how he believes and desires through obsessive activity - or the hys­
teric who faced with his inability to acknowledge his desire deconstructs everyone else’s 
in an attempt to make himself the object of desire - or the pervert who repudiates the 
question of desire or belief by positing an act or object of denial while remaining igno­
rant of its foundations - or the psychotic who has no choice in the matter but is saturated 
by belief. It would even seem that the so-called normal person is not served so well by 
the given social fantasy - or that in fact he does not even “Believe” in what he proclaims - 
as he so often ends up with an increasingly common array of physical symptoms or mal­
adies.
Throughout history, cultures, communities, societies, and civilizations have formulated 
different versions of what they have taken to be the truth of existence - although it was a 
long time before this concept of true or false even entered into the picture - things simply 
were. In each collection of individuals in each place and time, a certain set of rituals, 
rules, and beliefs prevailed which guaranteed stability and order and determined what 
was “true” and who held power - without being questioned for quite some time. Until 
some outsider, some mystic, some heretic, some revolutionary challenged the “order of 
things” thus opening the community to destabilization. Inevitably this new order of 
things - rejected at first - would become the basis for a new order - a new set of practices 
and beliefs.
Wilfred Bion (1970) described this relationship within individuals and communities as 
the tension between container and contained. Henry Bergson (1932) called this circular 
movement of humanity “the two sources of morality and religion,” and Georges Dumezil
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(1940) described a variety of these practices which provided a social form of psychic 
health. Georges Bataille (1973, 1976) traced this social version of psychic balance 
through the ages - primitive to modem - in the unconscious practices of the sacred which 
would give space to - and thus manage - this double movement of humanity which tend­
ed on the one hand to generate stories and rituals of stability in order to lower tension and 
preserve life, and on the other hand to challenge, to risk, to destroy the very order which 
had been set up. Bataille also spelled out the dangers toward which humanity was head­
ing in the absence of any such general economy or ecology of the psyche.
In proclaiming the death of God, Nietzsche (1882) was not simply one more philosopher, 
mystic, or revolutionary challenging the prevailing discourse or metalanguage of his day. 
Through tracing the genealogy of truths and moralities - as a philologist - he had become 
aware of the fact that “there is no metalanguage,” and he prophesied the dangers, diag­
nosing the increasing resentiment of the petty man whose unconscious individual fan­
tasies remained below the surface of a growing cynical detachment. Trying desperately to 
find a solution for humanity’s new found inability to believe and wavering between the 
manic ecstasy of too-much meaning and the depressive isolation of too-little meaning, 
Nietzsche sought a way out simultaneously for his own and the world’s approaching psy­
chosis.
Meanwhile, what Sigmund Freud was encountering through the psychotherapists of his 
day was that hypnotic suggestion - affecting beliefs through suggestion or seduction - 
could affect the body and convert physical symptoms. What Freud discovered was that 
this only resulted in a new symptom and that by refusing to rely on hypnosis - by work­
ing with seduction and belief in another way - a subject could be transformed if not 
“cured.”
What exactly is the psychoanalytic approach to working with the human experience of 
belief which Freud practiced? If a subject suffers from what he unconsciously desires and 
believes, then seduce him - hypnotize him into believing in something else - the analyst - 
through the inevitable transference of love or affect which ensues. But - and this is where 
Freud took psychoanalytic practice in a direction different from other healing and teach-
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ing - do not use this power of suggestion to cause the subject to believe and desire some­
thing else predetermined. Instead, disillusion him - like the Zen master. Cure him of this 
“transference neurosis.” Show him that he believes and desires - something - though nei­
ther the subject nor the analyst knows yet what that is. And help him discover what and 
how he believes. Unlike the Zen master, then, the psychoanalyst does not (de)negate 
desire as an illusion, but preserves it and works with it as the essential characteristic of 
the human being. In fact it could be said that the psychoanalyst accepts only two empiri­
cal facts which he experiences daily - desire and thought. The psychoanalyst has no 
intention of defining what desire and thought are - they are two experiences which take 
place in human beings, and the practice of psychoanalysis is one of translating, manag­
ing, redistributing, and reworking the web or knot made up of these experiences.
Freud (1938) formulated this knot as the relation between the unconscious drives and 
desires and the consciousness of thought and language. He also mapped this schema in 
terms of an unknown “it” (id) of animal forces, the introjection of human law and morali­
ty (superego), and a self (ego) trying to stabilize the subject through will and reason. 
Jacques Lacan (1966) reworked the topology of human experience into a knot consisting 
of the Real - the fact of “what is” including the body and the universe and not accessible 
to human knowing; the Imaginary - the pre-symbolic experience of self and other and the 
translation of drives and forces into human relations and affects of attraction and repul­
sion - love and imitation; and the Symbolic - the codified rituals and languages of 
thought which create distance individually and socially from the im-mediacy of drives.
The human experiences of desire, love, and faith correspond to both Freud’s and Lacan’s 
topologies, but rather than being objects (it, self, superego) or realms (real, imaginary, 
symbolic) they are closer to expressing action, relation, and experience. Moving from 
Freud to Lacan and beyond, it becomes more and more clear that within the psyche the 
distinction between the individual and the social - between self and other - is impossible 
to make. The experience of desire is one of absolute otherness - the desire for absolute 
difference and the drive toward the unknown which puts the familiar and stable at stake 
again and again even at the risk of death (hence the “death drive”). The experience of 
love is a counterforce closer to the pleasure principle that seeks to resolve and reduce ten-
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sion - to assimilate the other and the object - to overcome the gap of difference - to find 
containment and return to the comfort and protection of the womb. The experience of 
faith is that of enacting one’s desire or jouissance - translating one’s unconscious funda­
mental fantasy into the symbolic act of language and ritual - simultaneously accepting 
one’s individual fate and willing one choice. It is this experience of faith which is at stake 
in the analytic process - so difficult to grasp for modem man, but something akin to the 
Kierkegaardian leap of faith translated into our times and disseminated into the continu­
ous experience of the enactment of each moment (Deleuze 1983,1984).
There are many ways of carving up and (re)presenting this experience of the human psy­
che. Lacan called this knot one of jouissance - indicating that every human being was 
close to mysticism in his being prey to an experience of desire which was mediated by 
consciousness - yet nevertheless beyond rational thought - beyond good and evil. It is this 
experience of jouissance that each individual undergoes differently which is both the 
source of all suffering and the source of everything which sustains humanity. 
Psychoanalysis does not cure with knowledge, nor with pedagogy, nor with drugs, nor 
with hypnosis. It does not teach or train or adapt behavior. It does not eradicate desire, 
and it does not proclaim a truth. Psychoanalysis cures by untying the knot of the psyche. 
It allows a subject to become conscious of how he experiences desire, seduction, belief, 
and meaning and how they are translated into thought, language, knowledge, and expres­
sion. It allows the subject to rework this experience of jouissance and/or to accept and 
enjoy his particular desire - to enact his desire as faith - as the truth of himself as a sub­
ject in the the face of the absence of pre-given truths from outside.
Freud often called his psychoanalytic project a metapsychology. This metapsychology 
would be a psychology of psychologies - a discourse or language or theory of how we 
think (of) the psyche. Even though there is no metalanguage in the sense of an overarch­
ing truth, it is possible to juxtapose various perspectives and fields of knowledge and 
experience in order to obtain a broader and deeper picture. Following this transversal 
approach of Guattari, psychoanalytic work must be a metapsychoanalysis - a deconstruc­
tion or psychoanalysis of psychoanalysis itself which takes into account not only the his­
tory of the formulation of theory and practice within the movement, but its unrecognized
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antecedents and influences from outside and its dissemination into the culture in general. 
As Lacan pointed out, each analyst must reinvent psychoanalysis anew.
The importance of Lacan’s work to the psychoanalytic enterprise cannot be overstated. In 
addition to clinical work, Lacan was steeped in the influence of the intellectual and cul­
tural milieu of his time which enabled him to elucidate the practice and theory of psycho­
analysis from outside (Borch-Jacobsen 1991). The influence of Hegel, Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, Marx, surrealism, and mysticism through his collaboration with philosophers 
and social scientists of his time allowed Lacan to formulate an approach to a human sci­
ence and a clinical practice unprecedented in its scope and depth. And yet Lacan himself 
is already in danger of engendering nothing but disciples and detractors. The seduction of 
Lacan and his legacy attracts theorists and practitioners who have no notion of Lacan’s 
extensive lineage in philosophical, theological, and cultural research or in his clinical 
practice. Psychoanalysis has long suffered the schisms of a church. What is needed is a 
return to the spirit of Lacan rather than to the letter. As Lacan himself said: “He who 
interrogates me also knows how to read me.” This spirit of Lacan is one that knows how 
to study him rigorously, to learn his lessons, to see his contradictions and transforma­
tions, and to extend his work without abandoning or negating him out of narrowness. 
This is the open spirit which knows how to listen and to learn from everything - theory 
and practice, clinical cases and literature, cultural and social events and individuals.
Beyond the realm of the clinical setting and the individual’s practice of jouissance, there 
is the question of the social and the political. How are we to manage the interaction 
between conflicting practices of jouissance if, for example, one person’s desire to enjoy 
himself in a certain way intrudes on another’s enjoyment. These questions of social psy­
choanalysis have been taken up by Freud himself as well as by thinkers such as Jacques 
Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Slavoj Zizek in an attempt to analyze the underlying fun­
damental social fantasies of various civilizations and to disclose how a set of laws and 
mores based on an unconsciously denied exclusion of certain practices comes to organize 
power relations between subjects.
Similarly, the cultural psychoanalysis of Georges Bataille and Jean Baudrillard focusses
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on the seduction of individuals by the creation of new practices of jouissance in art, liter­
ature, ideology, and ritual. This extrapolated psychoanalytic research examines the poet­
ics of expression and communication as an alternative or supplement to clinical psycho­
analysis. Drawing upon the experiences of social and collective beliefs and practices 
which sustained human beings for thousands of years before the advent of psychoanalysis 
and translating them into the present may provide an approach to managing the psyche 
that clinical work alone cannot satisfy.
Finally, there is a theoretical psychoanalysis which is concerned with elaborating an 
understanding of human experience in all its facets - with developing a true human sci­
ence which would take into account the indeterminacy of the human subject under inves­
tigation. Although the real exists, we have no direct access to it. Still we find various 
means of translating the unknown - of (re)presenting the unpresentable. In this sense, the 
art of science and of theory is that of poetics. It is also the art of practice in that theory is 
a challenge to the real - a challenge to it to exist - to match our desires and fantasies of 
what it is through our conjuring of truth from the unknown or - as Hegel described life 
and thought beyond absolute knowledge - our “tarrying with the negative.”
6. Jouissance - Desire in Knowledge
For the clinician, the human subject is forever trying to overcome the loss of the object - 
the separation from complete jouissance in the unification with the other - the mother - 
the womb - the pre-life oneness. And as a result, the subject unconsciously engages in 
practices - fantasies, thoughts, relationships, routines - which return him to the moment 
when he was whole - even if these experiences lead to suffering or death. The aim of the 
clinic, then, would be to listen to the subject’s stories - his signification of what has 
meaning for him - through free association - and to try to decipher exactly what these 
unconscious practices of jouissance are. When the subject is made conscious of these 
fundamental fantasies, he should then be able to alter them - to become strong enough to 
follow his desire for what is new and unknown rather than remaining trapped in the repe­
tition which causes symptoms of suffering.
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This story of psychoanalytic practice, however, retains vestiges of a moralism - of an 
unconscious fundamental fantasy which places pleasure, health, and balance as the goal 
and conjures away the “death drive” bom out of the complexity of human experience 
lived at the edge of order and chaos. Certainly if someone comes to an analyst to be 
helped with his suffering he is asking for something, but for what? The ethics of psycho­
analysis for Lacan meant “do not give up your desire” - but this ethics is complex.
Do not cede your desire to the Other, make no mistake - complete jouissance is already 
gone as you have been bom into the human world where one is dependent on sustenance, 
on work, on others, on consciousness - but do not avoid what remainder of jouissance 
you have left - the chance you have to move beyond the rational - the proscribed - toward 
your own absurd and unjustifiable enjoyment. Cross over your fantasy - identify (with) 
your symptom - and live your unknown drive as a practice of jouissance. This is the 
ethics of the mystic - of St John of the Cross.
Lacan (1973) moved toward this explication of the ethics and aims of the analytic act at 
the end of his life, thus purifying his thought of what he perceived to be the remainder of 
an unanalyzed moralism and unconscious fantasy. He even stated in his seminars that he 
hoped someone would follow who could live up to such an ethic because he, perhaps, 
had failed to make it. Failed what?
In the first formulation we have the “masculine” ethics of the hero (despite the female 
example of Antigone) who sacrifices his jouissance in the name of duty - in the name of a 
perceived higher order which nevertheless remains bound by the discourse of the Other. 
In this case, the hero remains determined by the fantasy of the sacrifice itself - remaining 
in control of - and controlled by - the strength and force of the phallus - of order - of 
logos. The sacrifice of jouissance becomes another way to avoid the real of jouissance.
What we have in the second formulation is the “feminine” ethics of the mystic (despite 
the male example of St John). Lacan stated that women - excluded throughout history 
from social control and “phallic” patriarchal order - were already more open to experi-
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encing this jouissance of the “not-all” - of the impossible real - of the unknown beyond 
rational thought and knowledge. What is at stake in this second formulation is the sacri­
fice of the sacrifice - die Versagung as Freud calls it. This is not the return to the petty 
jouissance of unconscious symptoms, but the traversing of this unconscious fantasy and 
the acceptance of - and identification with - one’s own ineradicable practice of jouissance 
which exists - which insists - beyond stability, health, and rationality.
So everyone is a failed mystic. Everyone experiences jouissance - but a debased jouis­
sance. Neurotic, psychotic, and somatic symptoms are but (the signs of) a blocked jouis­
sance. The aim of the psychoanalytic experience is to enable one to practice one’s jouis­
sance. To accept and enact it, to maintain it, to alter it, to sacrifice it, to dampen it, to 
inflame it. This is why psychoanalysis is able to dissolve somatic and neurotic symptoms 
which have arisen from an unconscious and misdirected jouissance, to transform depres­
sion into a renewed meaning in life, to redirect uncontrollable and unwanted obsessions 
and fetishes, and to transform the overstimulation of psychotic confusion. But beyond 
this, the psychoanalytic process gives one the tools to practice one’s own jouissance. This 
is why for Lacan there is no such thing as a training analysis. Every analysis is a training 
analysis, and every analysis - whether the request is to be trained or to have a symptom 
relieved - should uncover the movement of jouissance.
This is also why analysis is both terminable and interminable. There is no end to analysis, 
there will only ever be an end to each analysis - to each event or process - and this will be 
determined only by the circumstances. For most psychotherapists, the termination comes 
with the dissolution of the original symptoms, but what remains? Psychoanalysts have 
sought to completely transform the subject and free him from all symptoms. Freud him­
self recognized this to be impossible as he witnessed the inevitable malaise of civiliza­
tion’s cultural neuroses within the repression and sublimation of “normality” and the 
individual ego. The best one could hope for (through analysis) Freud believed was the 
substitution of painful symptoms with the generally ironic awareness of the vanity of life.
While the details of the theories and techniques of psychoanalysis appear complex, there 
is a continuous line of development from Freud to Lacan and beyond. The empirical dis-
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covery - evidenced daily - and its theoretical elucidation amount to the fact that human 
beings are affected by a real drive and desire which attempts to find a place through 
thought and language, and in the gap there results a whole range of painful psychic and 
physical symptoms in addition to an undefinable experience of jouissance - including 
memory, dreams, hope, fantasy, love, belief, ecstasy, eroticism, narrative, laughter, tears, 
joy, sadness . . . .  Psychoanalysis attempts to make the unconscious conscious and the 
impossible possible. Psychoanalysis works to redistribute this jouissance between desire 
and thought, and it produces analysts able to guide themselves and others through a dis­
covery of how they desire - toward the practice of their jouissance.
But human beings do not want to know what is happening to them. Along with a will to 
jouissance there persists a stubborn will to ignorance. The psychoanalytic experience is 
then nothing other than a heroic attempt to face the real. But we cannot help resisting. It 
is in our nature. Who is it that can bear being disillusioned of his fantasies, for they are 
the only thing sustaining us? It is one thing to face up to the collapse of the Other of 
truth, law, God, morality, and reason. It is another to face up to the other in each of us - 
that fundamental fantasy - which sustains us.
It must be acknowledged that Freud was not simply constructing another story or theory 
or representation of human existence like previous prophets, philosophers, and scientists. 
He was deriving this theory and practice from observing the radically empirical truth of 
the lives of his subjects and of himself - supplemented by the assimilation of a history of 
art, literature, science, and myth. It is only this radically scientific approach itself - 
stripped from the prejudices of reason and morality - that when turned to the desires, feel­
ings, thoughts, actions, and physical and mental experiences of human beings themselves 
could reveal to us the real of our existence.
Research begins as a desire to know - in the form of a search for knowledge “out there” 
in the world. No one can hope to present a theory of human experience without the com­
plete assimilation - both broad and deep - of the work done so far to collect, preserve, 
understand, and (re)present the many ways of being - the many practices of jouissance 
hitherto. But disciplines are staked out like dogmatic sects, and in order to avoid these
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dead ends requires an almost insane curiosity - even more a perverse refusal to rest - a 
stubborn desire to continually take up another opposing point of view - another perspec­
tive forgotten, rejected, and refused by that which is given. This is the true nature of the 
dialectic - beyond its misapprehension as an attempt to synthesize or bring into harmony 
different points of view. This is the simultaneous maintenance of opposing perspectives - 
the extension of the dialectic into the multiplicities of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
(1972, 1980), the “differance” of Jacques Derrida (1967,1973), and the “heterology” of 
Georges Bataille (1986) as the unending search for knowledge of what is unknown or 
other.
As opposed to the forms of reason and rationality that have dominated Western 
Civilization for so long, all of these approaches to knowledge are based on the experience 
of empathy or ethnography. The ethnographic experience does not seek to know, deter­
mine, or control what is outside in the form of other individuals, cultures, objects, or 
ideas. It seeks to pass over into another way of believing - to leave behind one’s own way 
of thinking, acting, desiring, and believing and to be seduced into another’s - and then to 
return to one’s own way with a true grasp of another way, if not a transformation of one’s 
own. Of course this experience always entails the risk of losing one’s way, but what 
choice is there other than to live in the realm of the same, seeking only to remain ignorant 
of what is different or other or to force others to conform to one’s own prejudice. 
Ethnological research has proceeded this way, and thus set an example for the possibility 
of a human science. But this approach must take place everywhere: in reading, in critical 
interpretation, in psychoanalysis, in legal judgment. Levinas (1961) described this as 
putting ethics before epistemology, ontology, or phenomenology, and he traced it through 
the Judeo-Christian tradition as care for the other and the willingness to accept the posi­
tion of being the “you” addressed by the other’s “I” - to hear the other before judging.
But even this ethnographic experience of knowledge - focused as it is on what is outside - 
can guide one into a search for an absolute knowledge. Absolute knowledge must even­
tually dissolve into a search for self-knowledge. And how is it that anyone could really 
present a version of human experience without having turned the lamp of science which 
is focused outwards upon himself? How could one attain any form of objectivity without
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analyzing, unveiling, and presenting the subjective position which inevitably affects his 
experience and his expression as objectively as possible? Even within the realms of 
physics and mathematics - the most “objective” of sciences - this is now accepted as evi­
dent. Within the human sciences - in which the subject is also the object - this is even 
more essential.
Throughout history, the search for self-knowledge has taken the form of a journey 
through various Eastern and Western practices of consciousness and mysticism. But prac­
tices of consciousness are often based on the mind and body as controllable entities. 
Beyond nirvana as complete consciousness and freedom from the illusions of desire there 
lies only the inorganic state of death. The experience of enlightenment often leads one to 
the state of the living dead in deification, perfection, and totality. On the other hand, what 
it can lead to is the understanding of what is essentially human: belief, desire, illusion, 
fantasy, dream . . . .  The boddhisattva does not refrain from entering nirvana only in order 
to lead others to it. Having experienced the truth of his being, he lives the human experi­
ence to its fullest, and if he leads others to this place, it is so they too can live it.
It is through the mystics and saints - the poets, philosophers, and artists of modernity - 
that this experience of desire has come to be presented. But it is only with psychoanalysis 
- with the objective clarity and empiricism of scientific consciousness focussing on this 
desire - that this experience has come to be known. Freud himself said that the poets had 
already known what he presented without “knowing” it. Through the symptoms of his 
patients, Freud discovered that a bodily and emotional experience unsuccessfully 
repressed could lead to new forms of suffering, and he set out to listen to a neglected 
aspect of human experience. Psychoanalysis not only reopened the repressed aspects of 
our divided nature as human subjects, but inaugurated a new field of investigation which 
continues to map the trajectory of this uncertain human experience.
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Book II
Mapping the Psyche 
Psychoanalysis
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l.The Unconscious and the Conscious - Sigmund Freud
Any attempt to define the analytic experience is doomed to failure. To the extent that the 
analytic setting is characterized by the impossible, it can only be evoked or suggested. 
Like ethnography, immersing oneself in the realm of another’s organization of jouissance 
requires openness, credulity, and the courage to risk oneself. The faith or resolution of 
one’s own desire is paramount in entering this territory. It is only the resolution of one’s 
own desire coupled with the distance of consciousness of the other that allows one to be 
used by another and to reveal the meaning in this usage. Psychoanalysis is not something 
to be applied - it is the response to a request from another to help relieve symptoms. The 
response is not simply to relieve them - which would deny their message if not bring on 
other symptoms - but to make the other conscious of his symptoms as a message about 
the unconscious expression of desire.
At a time when Newtonian mechanical conceptions of man dominated science, Freud’s 
metapsychology moved in the direction of an energetic approach which in fact owed 
more to earlier forms of spiritual healing, shamanism, and animal magnetism than he 
realized. Rather than seeking the cause of human behavior in determinant biology, Freud 
focused on the environmental pragmatics of the individual’s life history of social interac­
tion. The kernel of Freud’s discovery and invention relied on the conscious and willful 
ego’s ability to transform the drives that came from within and from without. Repression, 
denial, disavowal, sublimation are all forms of metabolizing - psychic digestion. The 
reality of the external world which appears obvious to us, but which remains as unknow­
able as inner experience, must find a way to be digested by the human being. Life is a 
continual act of translation: from the metonymy and metaphor of language to behavioral 
acting out - from the usage of objects to the hallucination of fantasy.
While rituals, myths, and religions were once able to give form to human desire on a 
grand scale, it was Freud who discovered the “individual myth of the neurotic” bom from 
the family romance. If human experience took a turn such that individual subjectivity was 
able to dramatize the seriousness of its own life on the level that was once reserved for 
gods and kings, then it fell upon each individual to find rituals and myths which would
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satisfy his drives. If one was not able to do this consciously - through the ego - then the 
job would be done nevertheless. Unsuccessful attempts to metabolize emotional experi­
ence revealed themselves through slips, accidents, dreams, and jokes - through perverse 
and obsessional actions, hysterical relations, physical illness, and even the complete 
inability to function.
In the past, those unable to translate emotional experience through the acceptable social 
forms of the community were perceived as ill or possessed. Perhaps we have hardly come 
any further, as the dominance of the psychiatric categorization of symptoms through the 
DSM-IV threatens to eclipse Freud’s radical challenge that psychological and physical 
symptoms are not mysteriously acquired from outside the organism but result from the 
inability to find a way of accomodating biological, social, and environmental experience 
through thought and language.
Freud’s first topography posited a conscious and an unconscious - emotional experience 
which had and which had not been accomodated fully by rational thought and language. 
As a supplement to this, he added the preconscious - something like the known but 
unthought forms of object relations later mapped by the British school of psychoanalysts 
(Bollas 1987). Paradoxically, the simplicity of this early model may be a better model 
than the second structural mapping of id, ego, and superego. Freud had discovered the 
essential elements of translation in the movement of human experience, but in his hunger 
to formulate an objective science, he began to lose it. Not that the mapping of symptoms 
and techniques is not useful, but the dangers of turning maps into rigid truths is always 
imminent.
Freud’s work served his own self-analysis well. Not finding enough in the traditions of 
his day, he fashioned a scientific myth which became a mythological science. In the end 
he could not see any way out of the symptoms of suffering deriving from a failure to 
symbolize other than through the domination of rational thought and will. The ego was 
the whole individual - the steersman in control of the self which would navigate among 
the dangerous biological impulses of the id and the impingement of trauma from the real 
outside world and from the introjected versions of others’ imperatives in the form of the
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superego. Of course to the extent that an individual or culture believes in reason and will, 
the ego will serve each person well as a structural support, but even Freud at the end of 
his life recognized the insufficiency of the ego as a means of translating desire.
Whatever the ego does in its efforts o f defence, whether it seeks to disavow a portion of 
the real external world or whether it seeks to reject an instinctual demand from the inter­
nal world, its success is never complete and unqualified. The outcome always lies in two 
contrary attitudes, o f which the defeated, weaker one, no less than the other, leads to psy­
chical complications. In conclusion, it is only necessary to point out how little o f all these 
processes becomes known to us through our conscious perception (Freud 1938,61).
In the splitting of the ego, Freud found the neurotic foundations of the self which would 
later inspire Lacan to move in a completely different direction than that of the reliance on 
the ego which came to dominate so many of Freud’s followers. Despite the success of the 
ego in maintaining the rational coherence and strength not to disintegrate, nevertheless 
this move only succeeds in dividing the subject between the demands of the other - of 
drive or instinct - and those of the Other - of conscious rationality and the integrated self 
and of deferment to truth and morality. For Lacan, the demands of the superego in the 
form of law and morality are in the end inseparable from the ego or self which comes to 
be constructed by and for the individual subject. The self becomes the fictional story of 
one’s supposed unchanging and undivided role in the world. As opposed to this, Lacan 
posited the “je” or “I” as that relative sense of self-consciousness maintained at each 
moment as one’s shifting subjectivity navigates the chaosmic flux of id impulses - or 
desires of the other - and the symbolic narratives of self and Other - ego and superego - 
which form the quasi-stable truths and rituals of our modem socio-psychic experience.
In mapping out the modem psyche and in developing a practice of organizing this psyche 
which would free the subject of neurotic and physical symptoms, Freud eventually ran up 
against the inseparable integration of the social and psychic world which forms human 
experience. In the end there was no position from which to judge the “healthy” or optimal 
forms of character. Indeed he came to see the possibility that whole collective subjectivi­
ties of human civilization could be considered neurotic.
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I f  the development of civilization has such afar-reaching similarity to the development of 
the individual and if  it employs the same methods, may we not be justified in reaching the 
diagnosis that, under the influence o f cultural urges, some civilizations, or some epochs 
o f civilization - possibly the whole o f mankind - have become “neurotic ”? An analytic 
dissection o f such neruroses might lead to therapeutic recommendations which could lay 
claim to great practical interest. . . . And as regards the therapeutic application o f our 
knowledge, what would be the use o f the most correct analysis o f social neuroses, since 
no one possesses authority to impose such a therapy upon the group? But in spite o f all 
these difficulties, we may expect that one day someone will venture to embark upon a 
pathology o f cultural communities (Freud 1930,102-3).
Nietzsche had already undertaken such a socio-cultural psychoanalysis some years earli­
er, and he too was left with nothing but his own desire or judgment by which to measure 
modem man against those cultures of the past and those possibilities of the future which 
he felt offered human subjectivity its richest experience. Perhaps Nietzsche’s ego or self 
was not strong enough to hold out against such a lonely position. Perhaps falling outside 
the boundaries of the unquestioned social symbolic myths and rituals which hold the psy­
che together plunged Nietzsche into a psychotic realm for which he was not prepared. Or 
perhaps he sought his schizoid disintegration willingly in order to find new forms - new 
maps of the psyche - new subjectivities - which he could bring back. The shaman and the 
mystic risk themselves by journeying to a chaotic realm in order to provoke the mutation 
of the species maintained delicately between order and chaos (Bergson 1932, Bion 1970, 
Castaneda 1987, McKenna & McKenna 1993). In the end the containment of society 
could not hold Nietzsche as it could Freud, and in destroying the container, he too was 
destroyed - he was lost in the chaos of madness. Freud’s challenge to the structures of his 
day remained just this side of destruction and saturated the modem psyche in slow 
motion until it was no longer certain to what degree Freud had discovered the new sub­
jectivities of modernity and to what degree he had participated in their creation.
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2. The Schizoid and the Depressive - Melanie Klein
Melanie Klein’s extensive work with children added another chapter to the understanding 
of modem human subjectivity which Freud had developed. Before birth the infant exists 
in an undifferentiated subjectivity of immediate experience. Enclosed in the womb, 
plugged in, submerged, and unified with the totality of existence, the infant knows noth­
ing of differentiation. Upon birth, he is ejected from his security and immediately 
plunged into a world of bizzare objects and forces. From the beginning, the infant in the 
first moments of life is challenged by the “buzzing confusion” (James 1890) which stim­
ulates and provokes the proto-forms of individual subjectivity which constitute what 
Daniel Stem (1985) calls the “emergent self.” For Klein the first six months of life are 
characterized by a schizoid phase of development which forms the movement toward dif­
ferentiation. The subjective experience of the human infant is submerged in a chaotic 
state in which its first steps toward learning to oiganize its experience come through pri­
mary splitting of objects, forces, and events into good and bad, love and hate, safe and 
dangerous - based on the most rudimentary needs of survival and security. Thus it is 
through environmental and social interaction with the biological system of the human 
organism - through learning - that one’s perception comes to be organized and one’s sub­
jectivity comes to be constructed. Primary splitting introduces the infant to Gregory 
Bateson’s (1972) first order of learning in which responses and ways of experiencing the 
world are conditioned by satisfying basic needs and avoiding threats.
From the beginning, however, the infant is already involved in a symbolic net which 
turns immediate sensation into emotion which in turn becomes intertwined with cogni­
tion. Primal learning through differentiation and recategorization causes the subject to 
adapt and to transform his cognitive apparatus into a highly complex organizing and 
functioning machine through learning to map the world. Simultaneously, however, the 
emotional residue left by desire, love, and affect deepens, leaving a rich - and to a large 
part unconscious - psychic world which provides meaning to the sacred subjectivity of 
existence, prevents practical functioning, and/or leaves the subject emotionally and cog­
nitively divided.
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It is part o f my theory that during earliest infancy the splitting between love and hate, 
and correspondingly between good and bad - and in some measure between idealized 
and very dangerous - objects, is the method by which the very young infant maintains a 
relative stability. In my Envy and Gratitude I  have laid particular emphasis on the 
importance o f the earliest splitting processes. I f  love and hate, and the good and bad 
objects, can be split in a successful way (which means not so deeply as to inhibit integra­
tion, and yet enough to counteract sufficiently the infant's anxiety) the foundation is laid 
for a growing capacity to distinguish between good and bad. This enables him during the 
period o f the depressive position to synthesize in some measure the various aspects o f the 
object. I  suggested that the capacity for such successful primal splitting depends largely 
on initial persecutory anxiety not being excessive (which in turn depends on internal fac­
tors and to some extent on external ones) (Klein 1961, p. 249).
According to Klein, the paranoid-schizoid phase is followed by a depressive phase in 
which the multiplicity of dualities set up by primal splitting can begin to be integrated. 
For the infant, primary forces of good and bad, love and hate, can come from within or 
from without his own subjectivity and body, but in order to maintain a relative stability, 
all “badness,” “danger,” and “hate” is projected outward. When the infant comes to rec­
ognize that the split dualities are contained together within himself, within the other, and 
within the world, he is confronted with the task of reintegrating these opposites. 
Organizing this ambivalence is one of highest achievements of the human system and 
continues to challenge the subject throughout his life. The introjection of external objects 
and others plays an important role in forming our emotional and ethical relation to other 
human beings and to various parts of ourselves, as well as in forming our ability to cogni­
tively map abstract levels of our being in the world. Splitting and reorganization provide 
the foundations for the higher-level consciousness of cognition as well for the complex 
web of emotional experience, character, desire, jouissance, and the variety of psychic 
symptoms manifested by human beings.
Exploration of the outside world and the organization of subjectivity depends on a rela­
tively stable environment if the infant is to be able to reorganize his splitting and projec­
tion into a coherent and complex order. Lacking this security, his world - his subjectivity
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- may come to be populated by primal forces and bizarre objects. This schizo phase 
through which we all pass may come to dominate the subjectivity of the “schizophrenic” 
leaving him unable to cope with the intersubjective social world of rituals and codes of 
behavior. Persecution, fantasy, paranoia, and confusion form the chaos which - when rei­
fied beyond their reintegration with order and resolution - can provide an impossible 
experience. Even barring this extreme state, the schizoid phase which forms the foudation 
of the psyche for all of us can give way to a plunge into psychic chaos at any time which
- although it can provide the fruits of our adaptation, mutation, and transformation - 
always holds the threat of absorbing us beyond the point of no return.
The paranoid position is the stage when destructive impulses and persecutory anxieties 
predominate and extends from birth until about three, four or even five months o f life. 
This necessitates an alteration in dating the phase when sadism is at its height but does 
not involve a change o f view regarding the close interaction between sadism and perse­
cutory anxiety at their height.
The depressive position, which follows on this stage and is bound up with impor­
tant steps in ego development, is established about the middle o f the first year o f life. At 
this stage sadistic impulses and phantasies, as well as persecutory anxiety, diminish in 
power. The infant introjects the objects as a whole, and simultaneously he becomes in 
some measure able to synthesize the various aspects o f the object as well as his emotions 
towards it. Love and hatred come closer together in his mind, and this leads to anxiety 
lest the object, internal and external, be harmed or destroyed. Depressive feelings and 
guilt give rise to the urge to preserve or revive the loved object and thus to make repara­
tion for destructive impulses and phantasies (Klein 1948, p xiii-xiv).
Klein’s understanding of phases rather than the Freudian stages of development allows us 
to grasp the complex map of layers of the human psyche living across time. This “field” 
theory is more attuned to the organizing principles of complex systems operating 
between order and chaos which characterize body, brain, and subjectivity in all their indi­
vidual, collective, cultural, and mythical forms. The Kleinian notion of the part or partial 
object which is experienced by the primal infant and the adult lost on a schizophrenic line 
of development gives form to the bizarre and persecutory nature of such fragments -
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divorced as they are from any concrescence or wholeness. As Whitehead and Bergson 
have elucidated, an event possesses its own unique sovereignty - its total subjectivity and 
character - which can never be divided artificially into parts. Perhaps our development in 
the world constitutes our learning - as Bergson recommends - to divide things appropri­
ately into organic components and events each with its own self-organizing order. If so, 
then our contemporary culture is itself falling further and further into a schizoid crisis in 
which we are unable to return from the increasing destruction of meaningful forms of 
subjectivity and the accompanying disintegration into chaos which is answered only by 
the reification, objectification, and mechanistic thinking of forms which try desperately 
to maintain order in the face of such chaos.
3. Containment and Mysticism - Wilfred Bion
Influenced by Klein’s revision of Freudian metapsychology and metaphysics, Wilfred 
Bion initiated a journey into psychic realms which has transformed our way of thinking 
about the relationship between emotional and cognitive processes. Bion’s concept of 
mental space enlarges the scope of psychoanalytic theory and practice beyond the specif­
ic content of developmental stages and structural forms of human history into the 
unknown territory of the psyche. In Bion the division between emotion and cognition dis­
solves in the experience of containment. The notion of container and contained applies 
across various levels of subjectivity including the individual’s relationship with himself, 
the face-to-face relationships of love and psychoanalysis, and the intersubjective relations 
of the individual to the group and the group to the society.
Ability to use points, lines, and space becomes important for understanding “emotional 
space, ” for the continuance o f the work and avoidance o f a situation in which two inar­
ticulate personalities are unable to release themselves from the bondage o f inarticulation. 
This mutually sterile relationship provides a model for some relationships o f the self with 
itself. When the relationship o f the self with itself is o f this kind, either the container or 
the contained must be destroyed. Finally, the individual cannot contain the impulses 
proper to a pair and the pair cannot contain the impulses proper to a group. The psycho-
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analytic problem is the problem of growth and its harmonious resolution in the relation­
ship between the container and the contained, repeated in individual, pair and finally 
group (intra and extra psychically) (Bion 1970, p. 15-16).
At birth the infant is ejected from the container of the womb. From this point begins a 
journey through containment in the mother, the family, and the community, and eventual­
ly through the semiotic and symbolic forms of meaning present in both the society and 
the individual’s formation of character, symptoms, and self. The psychoanalytic relation­
ship is similarly a journey through containment which has in some way broken down or 
proven unsuccessful for the subject. But containment is never simple - rather than being 
an achievable essence or state, it is a movement in which that which is contained seeks to 
break the bounds of its containment. This is similar to the relation between order and 
chaos which characterizes all complex systems. Bion’s mapping of the human psyche is 
in fact remarkably similar to the mapping of brain, cognition, and consciousness by con­
temporary neuroscientists. Bion’s critique of the psychoanalytic community is that it has 
missed the essential complexity of mind and psyche by attempting to grasp its objective 
truth rather than recognizing the therapeutic function to map out and contain that which 
always escapes “knowing,” while simultaneously challenging it to reveal itself and move 
beyond sterile or stagnant containers.
This is a characteristic o f the mental domain: it cannot be contained within the frame­
work o f psychoanalytic theory. Is this a sign o f defective theory, or a sign that psychoana­
lysts do not understand that psychoanalysis cannot be contained permanently within the 
definitions they use? It would be a valid observation to say that psychoanalysis cannot 
“contain” the mental domain because it is not a “container” but a probe. . .  (Bion 1970, 
p. 72-73).
The practice of psychoanalysis both in and out of the clinical domain amounts to dislodg­
ing containers which no longer serve their purpose and developing the fluid process of 
containment itself. In a psychoanalytic relationship, it is the mind or psyche of the analyst 
which provides a safety net of containment during the deconstruction of subjectivity and 
entry into chaos which will eventually be reconstructed. This practice is similar to what
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takes place in various settings of mystical practice, and in fact Bion compares the devel­
opment of psychoanalysis to the eternal relationship between the individual mystic and 
the established group across various civilizations.
My object is to show that certain elements in the development o f psychoanalysis are not 
new or peculiar to analysis, but have in fact a history that suggests that they transcend 
barriers o f race, time and discipline, and are inherent in the relationship of the mystic to 
the group. The Establishment cannot be dispensed with (though this may appear to be 
approximately achieved in Sufism and in the theory o f Marxism) because the institution­
alized group, the Work group, is as essential to the development o f the individual, includ­
ing the mystic, as he is to it (Bion 1970, p. 75).
The purpose of the container or the group is to supply the order which will eventually 
lead to the emergence of the mystic or momentary flash of genius which will transform 
individual and collective forms of subjectivity into higher forms. The same story is relat­
ed by Bergson, Nietzsche, and Bataille, and within the mystical practices of Zen and 
Sufism which strive to remain conscious of the eternal and inevitable process by which 
the individual mystic or genius is eventually mistaken for the truth and his words reified 
into an order of dogma and morality which misses the point of their function as transla­
tion, containment, and quasi-stability. It is in the tension between such order and chaos 
that human civilization, individual subjects, group relations, and multiple subjectivities 
come to form themselves in continual emergence, creation, and transformation.
A Freud can discover and establish psychoanalysis, but it must be maintained by a con­
tinued supply o f “genius”. This cannot be ordered; but i f  it comes the Establishment must 
be able to stand the shock. Failing genius, and clearly it may not materialize for a very 
long period, the group must have its rules and a structure to preserve them. Thus an envi­
ronment exists ready, as Nietzsche said o f the nation, to fulfill its proper function, namely, 
to produce a genius. Similarly, it may be said of the individual that he should be ready to 
produce a “flash o f genius” (Bion 1970, p. 74).
The “flash of genius” which produces the sovereign subject or the sovereign moment
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which Bataille (1976) describes as essential to human experience emerges in the analytic 
environment through the “evenly hovering attention” of the analyst which is akin to the 
abductive method of the detective, the psychic, and the semiotician described by Thomas 
Sebeok (1981). The “play of musement” allows the subconscious facts which are before 
our eyes yet hidden to reveal themselves. In this process, any preconceived theory can be 
a hindrance. Similarly, the processes of deduction and induction hinder the emergence of 
such insights and revelations. Bion adds that “memory and desire” disturb the psychoana­
lytic process in which the working of the psyche reveals itself through the unpreoccupied 
containment of the analyst. For Bion, the act of faith is this “being there” for the other 
and is the closest one can come to absolute objectivity with respect to human subjectivity.
The more the psychoanalyst occupies himself with memory and desire the more his facili­
ty for harboring them increases and the nearer he comes to undermining his capacity for  
F [the act o f faith]. For consider: if his mind is preocccupied with what is or is not said, 
or with what he does or does not hope, it must mean that he cannot allow the experience 
to obtrude, particularly that aspect o f it which is more than the sound o f the patient’s 
voice or the sight o f his postures (Bion 1970, p. 41).
Bion’s analytic method recalls Steiner’s (1920) spiritual scientific method, Bergson’s 
(1896) method of intuition and the pragmatic method of James (1890) and Peirce (1903). 
But rather than this method being used as a probe and as a translating container for 
knowledge in the link between subject and world, it is used to maintain the link between 
two subjects - analyst and analysand - in the hopes of revealing that which operates for 
the analysand through his psychic universe. The link established by the act of faith - 
Bion’s “F ’ - in the analytic relationship produces its own revelations free from overt 
interpreations or constructions predetermined by the mental apparatus of the analyst prej­
udiced by theory or by memory and desire. Bion’s “Grid” which maps out the psyche in a 
multi-dimensional form is - like all maps - a pragmatic tool for understanding the fluctu­
ating terrain of the psyche. Its use in psychoanalytic practice is to be absorbed and fade 
into the background providing a modicum of containment - a safety net - which should 
not intrude on the immediacy of the psychoanalytic act of faith.
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The interpretation or construction produced by the psychoanalyst depends on the intu­
itive link between analysand and analyst. As it is constantly imperilled by deliberate 
attacks, its essential frailty and ordinary fatigue, it needs to be protected and maintained. 
The object o f the Grid is to provide a mental gymnastic tool. It can be used in relative 
isolation from attack and cannot do harm so long as it is not allowed to intrude into the 
relationship between analysand and the analyst as by the elaboration o f some theory 
about the patient which is then stored up and used as something which can be discharged 
like a missile in a battle (Bion 1977, p. 26-27)
The psychoanalytic act lets the psyche speak. What is unkown or unconscious is so as a 
result of ways of seeing - subjectivities which are bound by their perceptual organization 
of the physical and socio-symbolic universe. The benefit of “understanding” or “explain­
ing” one’s symptoms is useless apart from the practice which unfolds and reveals to the 
subject the workings of his psychic or mental space - a practice which elucidates the 
increasingly objective consciousness of one’s experience, including the limits of this 
objective consciousness in the subjective horizon of desire or jouissance - the act of faith 
which organizes individual, collective, and momentary subjectivities upon which all 
thought, knowledge, and consciousness rest.
4. Symmetry and Unfolding - Ignacio Matte-Bianco
According to Ignacio Matte-Bianco, we have never understood emotion and its link to 
cognition. Emotion thinks and thinking feels. Drawing on Freud, Klein, and Bion, Matte- 
Blanco turns to complex theories of logic and mathematics in an attempt to grasp the 
working of the human psyche. Everything that goes under the name of thought or logic is 
only one kind of logic - one mapping of existence. Though an essential one, it is not even 
what predominates in human experience. The logical thinking which we have inherited 
from Aristotle is what Matte-Bianco calls logico-bivalent thinking - a cognitive operation 
which allows us to individuate and separate. But through an “unconscious” or “emotion­
al” level we think differently, and this thinking can be understood by reference to differ­
ent logics.
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Emotion in so far as it is emotion, does not know individuals but only classes or proposi- 
tional functions, and therefore, when confronted with an individual, tends to identify 
these individuals with the class to which it belongs (or the propositional function applied 
to it).
Once we arrive at this simple formulation, the mysteries o f emotion begin to 
become understandable and can be seen in a clear fashion. To start with a very general 
question, if propositional activity is a constitutive aspect o f emotion then we are immedi­
ately freed from the tremendous confusion that pervades the psychological literature, 
including the psychoanalytical, about the relationship existing between thinking and 
emotion. Everybody accepts the enormous influence that emotions have on thinking, but 
nobody, as far as I  know, has been able to present a comprehensible account o f how a 
link can be established between both which have been viewed as entirely different. Now if  
one aspect o f emotion is a form of thinking, then it is easier to understand that it may 
have intimate connections with other forms of thinking (Matte-Bianco 1975 p. 244).
The logic of emotion partakes of such processes as symmetrizing, infinitizing, general­
ization, maximization, and irradiation - processes which Freud himself began to elucidate 
through his interpretation of dreams. The symmetrizing logic of the human psyche does 
not make the distinctions of logico-bivalent thinking, but rather collapses these distinc­
tions or differences into sets based on general attributes. In what is called transference, 
the affect or cathexis which develops in a subject toward an other can be related to spe­
cific attributes shared by the other and a previously cathected object - for example the 
mother or a previous lover. Consequently, the multiplicity of differences are ignored and 
the two objects of desire are equivalized or symmetrized without regard for difference. 
This is a classical logical fallacy - but the unconscious emotional mind of the human psy­
che does not operate by logico-bivalent logic. The human psyche is bi-logical: it operates 
through symmetrizing and asymmetrizing. Asymmetrizing is what makes distinctions and 
it is this primal differention which actualizes events out of the virtual totality of the possi­
ble through the organizations of chaos in our perception thus creating our experience 
with a modicum of stability. Symmetrizing leads us into the collapse of distinction and 
difference toward the chaosmic reformation of these differences so that they do not
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become stagnant or sterile but continue to transform. But symmetrizing can also lead one 
into dangerous paths of undifferentiation found in mystical and schizophrenic experience. 
And the psychotic “breakdown” or fall into this zone which can lead to a breakthrough 
can also become stuck or “hung up” in turbulence as Pribram (1991) describes of systems 
faced with catastrophic change.
Viewed from this angle, the action o f psychoanalytic therapy consists o f divesting per­
sons, things and circumstances from their symbolic meaning (which leads to the confu­
sion o f the individual with the whole class) and transforming them, for conscious think­
ing, into what they really should be, that is, circumscribed entitites in which the halo o f 
the class does not interfere with their concrete meaning, by making them appear more 
than what they actually are. It is, in short, an action o f divesting or taking away from the 
concrete object the infinite set to which it plays host: a process o f discharge (Matte- 
Blanco 1975, p. 185).
Although differentiation and distinction is what saves us from psychosis, the symbolic 
law handed down from above and the identification of the subject with the ego of the 
analyst are not the only routes toward emerging from primary undifferentiation. Practices 
of psychoanalysis, mysticism, and consciousness may give back to the subject his own 
sovereign and autopoetic ability to organize his psyche as a complex system between 
order and chaos. Bataille’s (1986) practice of “heterology,” Derrida’s (1967, 1973) prac­
tice of “differance” and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s (1972,1980, 1992) practices of “schizo- 
analysis” and “chaosmosis” engage in the same pragmatics. Similarly, Matte-Bianco 
claims that the practice of analysis entails not the lifting of repression or the strengthen­
ing of the self - but the “unfolding” of the translating function which operates bi-logical- 
ly in human subjectivity.
The consideration o f the translating function brings the realization that much, probably 
the majority, of present-day analytic work deals with this function rather than the lifting 
of repression. In other words, “becoming conscious ” seems to be attained more frequent­
ly with the help o f the translating function than through lifting o f repression. This is 
inevitably so because, after all, the repressed is only a small portion o f the unconscious,
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which is a collection o f infinite sets. In actual practice we often have to work simultane­
ously on lifting repression and translation (Matte-Bianco 1975, p. 302).
Translation takes place in the subject through the continual organization of matter. And 
the human subject organizes and differentiates at a complex level of mind and body 
through what we call emotion, cognition, and consciousness. Signs, symbols, words, 
meanings, and beliefs - the symbolic and the noetic - are the asymmetrical tools of the 
translating-unfolding function. But our unconscious emotion is infinite in its reworking 
of being and becoming.
I f  emotion is an infinite set, the translating function is, potentially, necessarily infinite. In 
fact it is only a small part o f the translating function that takes place. But the potentiali­
ties o f the unconscious are actually infinite. And so are the theoretical possibilities o f art. 
Note, again, that when we describe emotion as an infinite set this is an asymmetrical way 
of describing something which in itself is alien to asymmetry: it is a process of transla­
tion (Matte-Bianco, 1975 p. 300).
Matte-Bianco uses metaphysics to understand the psyche at a practical clinical level, and 
he uses practical experience with the psyche to formulate an understanding of existence. 
The bi-logical nature of human subjectivity endlessly engaged in the translating-unfold­
ing of “homogeneous indivisible reality” through asymmetrizing and symmetrizing het­
erogenesis can only ever think about or around this undifferentiated totality. This - Matte 
Blanco claims - is our “bi-modal” existence. We attempt to think being, but we are limit­
ed by our bi-logical dividing subjectivity. If we forget for a moment the subjective limits 
of our objective attempts to think totality and being we immediately lose all objectivity. 
Only by grasping our bi-modal state and its limitations can we begin to point toward the 
real and to think, feel, and live the unique and sovereign subjectivity which is ours.
Similarly, what is divided does not exist for what is undivided, i.e., the homogeneous indi­
visible reality. Vice versa, the undivided reality is not grasped by thinking, cannot be 
thought. The translating function is a form of thinking which, however, is not thinking the 
homogeneous indivisible reality but trying to think about and only succeeding in thinking
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“outside” this reality. I f  we were to look without thinking, (a logico-bivalent or “divid­
ing” absurdity) i.e., to look from the “point o f view” of the homogeneous indivisible real­
ity, we should have to conclude that the translating function, which from the point o f view 
o f thinking can actually be said to be thinking (and sometimes excellent thinking), is not 
good or correct thiking if  it pretends to convey the homogeneous reality: so far as this 
pretension or intention is concerned, it is a complete failure, a pitiful babbling (Matte- 
Blanco 1981, p. 525)
We cannot think chaos, being, or totality - we cannot know the homogeneous indivisible 
reality. But we can find ourselves plunged into this chaos by the “acrostics” of the mind 
which - in our logico-bivalent ignorance - we call psychic and psychotic experience. 
Delusions are real - they are as real as the asymmetrical divisions we live our life by. 
What turns mystical, psychic, or psychotic experience into a breakdown is not being able 
to escape from this belief - not seeing that the differentiated reality which we construct is 
also real and pits itself against the chaos that causes all organized sovereign forms to melt 
into each other in a hyper-communication which sweeps away all heterogeneity and dif­
ference.
All the acrostics o f the mind are disqueiting: they tend to provoke the sense o f the uncan­
ny. As an extreme case we may consider the paranoid delusion that some patients have 
when they think that people are making references to them on the radio or in the newspa­
pers. From a logico-bivalent point o f view this is false, but not from a bi-modal point of 
view, for any bimodal acrostic - which means every one o f the thoughts and utterances o f 
the world - makes a reference to any one o f us, individuals, so far as we are the homoge­
neous indivisible reality. Viewed from this point o f view we may say that a delusion 
always has an aspect o f truth. What makes it a delusion is the fact that the “blend” 
between both modes that is expressed in it does not respect completely the heterogenic 
mode (Matte-Bianco 1981, p. 527).
For Matte-Bianco this grasp of the essential movement of being and becoming in the bi- 
modal universe of human subjectivity is both the result and the aim of a psychoanalytic 
practice which elucidates being by practicing the becoming which we are. His ethical-
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aesthetic approach is similar to that of Nietzsche, Steiner, Bergson, and Whitehead who 
sought to reveal man’s subjective limitations in the play of the universe as objectively as 
possible in order to more fully celebrate such possibilities for becoming and to seize the 
irreducible and incomparable sovereignty which constitutes the event, process, and con­
crescence which is ours. For the individual subject, the grasping of one’s nature as both 
“god” and “nothing” through simultaneous and alternating poles of subject and object - 
which Deleuze (1983) and Guattari (1992) map out in a way similar to Matte Blanco - is 
the highest achievement in any intersubjective relationship with the other who is both 
“me” and also “not me.” The practice of analysis - individual, collective, institutional, 
and otherwise - should strive to achieve such an art and science of life lived to its fullest 
among the multiplicity of subjectivities unfolding from the infinite.
I f  somebody is authentic and creative, then he feels, symmetrically, that he is God. I f  and 
when he discovers the creativity-divinity o f another, he feels annihilated. Then he tries 
deicide. I f  that God does not die there is no alternative but to accept his existence. A form 
o f politheism is then bom in the depths o f one's entrails. Maturity means accepting that 
one is god and at the same time a point, i.e., so small as to have no dimensions, and that 
the others are also gods and point as well. This is a very difficult achievement; most peo­
ple remain at the level o f self-deification and annihilation o f the other. Maturity con­
tains and implicitly expresses the long and detailed story o f self-deification, deicide, 
annihilation, self-deification, birth o f two (or more) gods (Matte-Bianco 1981, p. 527- 
528).
5. The Aesthetic Object - Donald Meltzer
An aesthetic approach to the psychic apparatus does not necessarily exclude a full under­
standing of its interaction with and manifestation through the neurophysiological system. 
Both Freud and Matte-Bianco sought to map the complex operations of the psyche which 
contains logics of its own. Klein and Bion enlarged the scope of biological developmen­
tal stages by grasping the ongoing development of the mind which organizes itself into 
complex coexisting layers or “fields” of experience. Donald Meltzer draws on such an
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enlarged understanding of the bio-social psyche in order to elaborate a metapsychology 
in which the aesthetic is at stake. For Meltzer, like Bion, thoughts precede thinking - 
thoughts are what create thinking. But these thoughts are none other than forces, drives, 
sensations, and above all the enigma of trying to understand - to translate - to think these 
forces. Bioenergetic drives are intertwined with meaning, belief, and thought in the con­
struction of human subjectivities. There is no definite line between emotion and cogni­
tion - only this endless process of digestion.
The “field” orientation which accepts multiple levels o f simultaneous and more-or-less 
integrated functioning seems to allow the question “how” and not only “when” is the 
mental level called into operation to superimpose itself on the purely neurophysiologi- 
cal? Bion s approach to the problem, by assuming that the first operation is the creation 
of thoughts which then require an apparatus to think (manipulate, use) them, seems to be 
the crucial break with the traditional implication that thinking is prior as a function and 
generates thoughts (Meltzer 1986, p. 206).
Meltzer describes the journey of the human infant as an extended encounter with the aes­
thetic object which - although it may begin with the mother - includes an endless array of 
objects and others. We are not far from Lacan’s (1966) notion of the object (a) - or other - 
which forms the primal foundation of our desire or jouissance. Indeed what is the aesthet­
ic foundation of human subjectivity described by Meltzer - as well as Peirce (1935-66) 
and Sebeok (1981) - other than this jouissance. But while the immediate external sensual 
qualities of the object provide a secure and pleasurable experience for the subject, simul­
taneously its internal qualities present the subject with an enigma of uncertainty: “what 
does the other want from me?” in Lacan’s language.
The problem area that the key o f symbol formation was called into play to open, was the 
enigma of the inside and the outside o f the aesthetic object. Its power to evoke emotional­
ity was only equalled by its ability to generate anxiety, doubt, distrust. While the sensual 
qualities o f the aesthetic object could be apprehended with some degree o f confidence, its 
internal qualities, being infra- or supra-sensual, carried no such comfort (Meltzer 1986, 
p. 207).
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Symbol formation or the translating function - by which thoughts as forces and enigmas 
come to be unfolded by a thinking apparatus - attempts to resolve the ambiguity of such 
pleasureable and frightening - or good and bad - experience. But is it not the very enigma 
of uncertainty which causes fear, doubt, and anxiety also that which makes sensual plea­
sure more than just that? What Lacan calls “jouissance” characterizes this experience 
beyond pain and pleasure that forms the unique basis of human subjectivity. Similarly, 
Bataille (1954, 1961, 1986) claims that we must live up to such ambiguity and ambiva­
lence if we are ever to heal ourselves or to grasp the essence of being human. Bataille’s 
project of finding a practice of “turning anguish into ecstasy” is a pragmatic response to 
our failure to resolve the schizoid experience of primary splitting in the depressive phase 
of the psyche. Ancient rituals and representations of tragedy worked to enable the collec­
tive and individual psyche to learn to tolerate the pain of ambiguity with respect to love 
and hate, presence and absence. According to Meltzer, in standing before the ambiguity 
of the aesthetic object and its alternating presence and absence, trust is bom in the ability 
to accept such ambivalence and impermanence.
This then would be the context in which absence of the object makes its crucial impact 
and tests the mettle. Bion has defined this problem o f the absent object as “the absent 
object as a present persecutor” with respect to the “space where the object used to be”. .
. . Trust would then be a compound quality o f mind, like foot-pounds as the definition of 
work: hope-hours, or minutes or days or years (Meltzer 1986, p. 207).
This experience of trust in which hope is maintained during the aesthetic object’s absence 
through the extension backwards toward the memory of its presence reconstructs the 
organization of time-space in the subject and transforms immediate desire into faith. The 
experience of faith, trust, and hope extends the human psyche beyond immediate percep­
tion and limited episodic consciousness without the requirement of language or the sym­
bolic in a manner similar to the neural recategorization of higher level consciousness 
described by neuroscientists (Edelman 1992, Damasio 1994). Meltzer’s elaboration of 
trust, however, need make no reference to biology in mapping the intersubjective world 
of the human psyche. For despite the biological and physical foundations of the human
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experience, it is in the spiritual or aesthetic realm of desire, love, and affect where subjec­
tivities are formed.
By defining the fundamental problem o f aesthetic relations in this way and by asserting 
the aesthetic relationship to the world and the primal stimulus to thought, we have adopt­
ed a position compatible with a field theory that is also inherently genetic. What it does, 
that the differentiation o f paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions fails to do in their 
adherence to a Life and Death Instinct foundation, is to allow fo r a purely mental 
approach to values unencumbered by biological speculation. While the issue o f mental 
pain and tolerance therefore loses none o f its clinical vibrance as an arbiter o f ego 
strength, a new factor is introduced to the dynamism o f conflict. Trust, in units of hope­
time, schematically speaking, would seem to have qualitative roots in the richness of the 
aesthetic experience to which separation is the sequel. And this richness is surely to be 
found in the element o f mutuality o f apprehension of beauty. For the baby must be held as 
an aesthetic object by the mother for the experience o f their love-making to reverberate 
and escalate in intensity (Meltzer 1986, p. 207-208).
For Meltzer the reverberation of love between infant and mother - or between subject and 
other - depends on a mutual “apprehension of beauty” in which each is experienced as an 
aesthetic object by the other. It is not enough for the mother to provide a containing or 
holding environment. There must be desire, love, and faith for the infant to develop the 
same process. But this intersubjectivity is extremely complicated, for the experience of 
desire or love without faith which remains dyadic and dependent can lead to subjectivi­
ties characterized by a “mimetic desire” caught in the mirror of delusions, fantasies, and 
insecurities which in turn lead to the collective, social, and institutional formations of 
bureaucracy, oppression, and master-slave relations which Rene Girard (1978) and 
Emmanuel Levinas (1961) have described as constituting most civilizations. Fear and 
dependence on the part of the mother will only be introjected in the infant in the con­
struction of his subjective experience, and the overabundance of desire and love between 
the mother and infant will not allow for the development of faith through trust. The faith 
of trust on the other hand will allow the subject to enter into the semiotic construction 
and symbol formation which will enable him to communicate across time and space with
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other subjectivities within himself and in the external environment. Without the intersub­
jectivity developed through trust, subjective experience will to different degrees be 
turned in on itself in a world of isolated fantsasies projected onto the other forming a 
range of subjectivities from autism to narcissism.
Such a basis which allows us to conceive the “how” o f the calling into action o f the 
capacity for symbolic thought, the product o f the mysterious alpha-function, more or less 
releases us from any great concern with the “when” o f the matter. Pre-natal or post­
natal, it must occur, and if  this conjunction o f mutuality is its essential ingredient, its 
inception may be widely variable in time. But, sadly, we must recognise that it may not 
occcur at all, as in the children who do not seem to make the post-natal adjustment or 
whose neurophysiological apparatus is not o f sufficient complexity to achieve the aesthet­
ic level o f response. The autist and the non-developer may taste it and rebel against its 
dominace.
But more important for clinical practice is the corollary, that the defensive opera­
tions which psychoanalysis is specially fashioned to follow may mostly, perhaps entirely, 
be seen as moves against the impact o f the aesthetic object. . .  (Meltzer 1986, p. 208).
If the impact of the aesthetic object is too great - if the encounter is too traumatic to 
assimilate - the subject may be forced to retreat into the security of the familiar. Meltzer’s 
mapping of this encounter is beyond stages or phases and forms the basis of human indi­
vidual and collective experience at all times. The psychoanalytic process - like the family, 
the school, the love relationship - would be an environment for undertaking such an 
encounter in which defensive operations against anxiety would be released for a con­
frontation with the depths of anguish found in death, loss, and uncertainty lying at the 
heart of human experience. The focus of the analytic encounter, then, would not be on the 
semiotics of meaning and language but on the relationship itself which precedes the sym­
bolic and forms the foundations of emotion, cognition, and consciousness.
Undoubtedly, the first and most important alteration is a diminished emphasis on the 
“correctness” o f interpretation, perhaps a lessening o f the urgency to interpret altogeth­
er. Instead, the focus moves forwards, as it were, into the interaction, the relationship
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from which interpretive ideas emerge. The model o f container-contained places a new 
value on receptivenes and the holding o f the dynamic situation o f transference-counter- 
transference in the mind (Meltzer 1986, p. 208).
The encounter with the aesthetic object is the encounter with what is other in all its forms
- the encounter with desire. One can withdraw into one’s own world or face the enigma 
of difference. One can fight anxiety with rigid “neurotic” symptoms or push forward with 
courage into the unknown. Lacan claims guilt and neurosis result not from enacting one’s 
desires, but from not enacting them and instead allowing one’s destiny to be determined 
by the imperative of the Other. In becoming conscious of how our subjectivity has been 
constructed, we can return to the encounter with the aesthetic - return to our jouissance - 
in order to apprehend beauty beyond the safety of familiar forms.
6. Transitional Phenomena - Donald Winnicott
Paradox is the essence of human subjectivity - in splitting, in ambivalence, in ambiguity, 
in symmetry, and in the usage of the object. In the pragmatic approach of Donald 
Winnicott, the field of human experience becomes the facilitating environment in which 
the usage of the object leads to the creation of the subject. Winnicott’s illustration of cir­
cles within circles sketches the concentric holding environments in which the infant is 
contained by the mother who is contained by the family which is contained by the com­
munity and so on. This map parallels the nested hierarchies of levels of organization from 
the molecule to the individual organism to the galaxy. The newborn human being is more 
dependent and vulnerable then any other such organism, but it is precisely the long incu­
bation and learning period which will endow it with such complexity. During this 
process, holding must be neither too little nor too much. Without the basic level of stabil­
ity, every impingement will send the subject inward seeking protection. Too much will 
smother him. The holding which is like a life jacket - constantly present yet nonintrusive
- allows the subject to move outwards and to explore the external world.
I  should like to put in a reminder here that the essential feature in the concept o f transi-
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tional objects and phenomena (according to my presentation o f the subject) is the para­
dox, and the acceptance o f the paradox: the baby creates the object, but the object was 
there waiting to be created and to become a cathected object (Winnicott 1971, p. 89).
For Winnicott the journey from birth is one of transitional phenomena in which the sub­
ject replaces his dependence on the womb with a successions of more mediated objects, 
from the mother to the plaything to the symbolic realm of language and culture. This is 
why the psyche is both individual and social, and why the symptoms of the individual 
subject can never be separated from the community or society as a whole. The play of 
transitional phenomena takes place in an intersubjective field of meaning which holds the 
psyche as it manifests itself in individual, collective, and momentary subjectivities. In 
this process the initial object relations of primary splitting are eventually transformed into 
the active usage of the object.
In the sequence, one can say that first there is object-relating, then in the end there is 
object-use; in between, however, is the most difficult thing, perhaps, in human develop­
ment; or the most irksome o f all the early failures that come for mending. This thing that 
there is in between relating and use is the subject’s placing o f the object outside the area 
of the subject’s omnipotent control; that is, the subject’s perception o f the object as an 
external phenomenon, not as a projective entity, in fact recognition o f it as an entity in its 
own right (Winnicott 1971, p. 89).
The active usage of the object endows the subject with the ability to master the creation 
and transformation of the external world and to understand it within the province of the 
mind. What is required for this to take place is the working through of forces of desire, 
love, and hate in the destruction and rebirth of the object. Similar to Meltzer’s process of 
trust, Winnicott’s destruction of the object allows the infant to find the limitations of the 
unknown and unthought forces which play through him. The drive to possess, to control, 
and to destroy what is other or outside remains uncertain and unprocessed unless the sub­
ject experiences the other who does not retaliate but rather holds and contains these 
forces, allowing himself to be attacked and surviving such drives. At this point, Winnicott 
claims, the other is recognized outside of the domain of the self and this recognition initi-
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ates the subject’s ability to think at a more complex level.
This change (from relating to usage) means that the subject destroys the object. From 
here it could be argued by an armchair philosopher that there is therefore no such thing 
in practice as the use o f an object: if  the object is external, then the object is destroyed by 
the subject. Should the philosopher come out of his chair and sit on the floor with his 
patient, however, he will find that there is an intermediate position. In other words, he 
will find that after “subject relates to object” comes “subject destroys object” (as it 
becomes external); and then may come “object survives destruction by the subject”. But 
there may or may not be survival. A new feature thus arrives in the thoery o f object-relat­
ing. The subject says to the object: “I destroyed you”, and the object is there to receive 
the communication. From now on the subject says: “Hullo object!” “I  destroyed you” “I  
love you” “You have value for me because of your survival o f my destruction o f you” 
“While I  am loving you I am all the time destroying you in (unconscious) fantasy. ” Here 
fantasy begins for the individual. The subject can now use the object that has survived. It 
is important to note that it is not only that the subject destroys the object because the 
object is placed outside the area o f omnipotent control. It is equally significant to state 
this the other way round and to say that it is the destruction o f the object that places the 
object outside the area of the subject’s omnipotent control. In these ways the object devel­
ops its own autonomy and life, and (if it survives) contributes-in to the subject, according 
to its own properties (Winnicott 1971, p. 90).
At this point the projection and introjection of schizoid object relations become assimilat­
ed into the more cognitive, less emotional perceptual organization of the world. 
Perception/creation becomes in a sense more “objective” and less “subjective” in its 
interaction with the world through the intersubjective recognition of other subjectivities. 
If the object does not survive the forces of desire and destruction which are unleashed 
through the subject, a feeling of guilt and hopelessness pervades relationships and stifles 
creativity. On the other the hand, the repeated destruction and resurection of the object 
strengthens the confidence of cognitive operations of the “self’ in the world and its emo­
tional cathexes of desire and love.
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I f  it is in an analysis that these matters are taking place, then the analyst, the analytic 
technique, and the analytic setting all come in as surviving or not surviving the patient’s 
destructive attacks. This destructive activity is the patient’s attempt to place the analyst 
outside the area of omnipotent control, that is, out in the world. Without the experience of 
maximum destructiveness (object not protected) the subject never places the analyst out­
side and therefore can never do more than experience a kind o f self-analysis, using the 
analyst as a projection o f a part o f the se//(Winnicott 1971, p. 91).
The analytic process sets up a facillitating environment by which this process of object- 
usage will be worked through. The focus is not so much the past reality or cathexes as the 
field of transitional phenomena itself which might come to exist anywhere. For Freud the 
individual myths of the family had replaced a dying cultural space of ritual and play. 
Increasingly the analytic or therapeutic environment is called upon to replace other 
realms of collective play previously providing environments for transitional phenomena. 
Winnicott perceives the cultural realm as surrounding and interlocking with the familial 
and intersubjective transformation of the human psyche, but we now exist in a world in 
which the social forms are increasingly breaking down and leaving a chaotic schizoid 
social environment of forces without security, stability, or faith.
There is in many a failure in confidence which cramps the person’s play-capacity because 
of the limitations of the potential space; likewise there is for many a poverty o f play and 
cultural life because, although the person had a place for erudition, there was a relative 
failure on the part of those who constitute the child’s world o f persons to introduce cul­
tural elements at the appropriate phases o f the person’s personality development. 
Naturally, limitations arise out o f the relative lack of cultural erudition or even the lack 
o f acquaintance with the cultural heritage which may characterize those acually in 
charge o f a child (Winnicott 1971, p. 109).
Winnicott moves away from the analytic process by which interpretations lead to con­
sciousness of one’s particular life history and the identification with the ideal ego of the 
analyst and toward the field of multiple subjectivities deconstructed and reconstructed 
through play with rituals, relations, objects, and semiotic and symbolic creations. In this
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scenario, the analyst no longer enacts the holding of the mother or the law of the father, 
but rather becomes a guide in a complex field of unfolding possibilities and continual 
reorganizations of chaos.
The potential space between baby and mother, between child and family, between individ­
ual and society or the world, depends on experience which leads to trust. It can be looked 
upon as sacred to the individual in that it is here that the individual experiences creative 
living.
By contrast, exploitation o f this area leads to a pathological condition in which 
the individual is cluttered up with persecutory elements o f which he has no means o f rid­
ding himself.
It may perhaps be seen from this how important it can be for the analyst ot recog­
nize the existence o f this place, the only place where play can start, a place that is at the 
continuity-contiguity moment, where transitional phenomena originate (Winnicott 1971, 
p. 103).
Without stable forms of holding in family, community, or society or even in cultural sym­
bolic myths, transitional phenomena become increasingly persecutory, resulting in psy­
chic symptoms manifestng at a social level in the form of bizzare explosions of violence 
and destruction to which people only turn a blind eye - and in the name of which they call 
for further punishment, persecution, and confinement. At the level of individual and 
intersubjective relations, feelings of depression, confusion, and derealization abound in a 
world in which too many choices - too much novelty - finally implodes into an experi­
ence of inertia in the absence of the singularity of any specific event, process, or subjec­
tive moment. When all things are quantifiable and exchangeable according to some gen­
eral equivalent, the sovereignty of the subject disappears into the objectification of life.
7. The Emotion Processing Mind - Robert Langs
Robert Langs has attempted to enlarge the scope of metapsychology and psychotherapeu­
tic practice by placing the psyche within the nested hierarchy of interacting adaptive sys-
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tems coevolving throughout the universe. In focusing on the nexus of mind and body in 
the interaction of human biology and psyche, Langs remaps the architecture of the mind 
as an adaptive system which operates simultaneously at conscious and unconscious lev­
els. Langs’s metapsychology is very much a return to Freud’s attempt to unite a scientific 
understanding of the energetics of body, brain, and mind with an aesthetic understanding 
of their interaction through story, myth, and language. It is through the stories we tell of 
ourselves that we reveal the operation of the bi-level psyche and its attempts to process 
emotional experience.
Human adaptation takes place on two planes - one with actual or potential awareness, 
and the other without such a possibility. . . .
Human verbal communication (an observable o f great importance to our efforts 
to fathom the design of the mind) is two-tiered - especially when it is conveyed in narra­
tive form. Storied communication is a means o f conveying double messages, in that it 
consistently embodies two sets o f meanings that reflect two distinctive levels o f adapta­
tion - conscious and unconscious (Langs 1995, p. 13-14).
Langs recenters our understanding of the psyche on the adaptation of the conscious - and 
unconscious - organism which is the human being. Everything begins with adaptation to 
the immediate environment. What becomes dislodged and stored as the residue of the 
unconscious grows alongside the ongoing immediate “attention to life” of our percep­
tion/action in the world as it satisfies basic needs and drives. What Bergson (1896) calls 
spirit or memory is this psychic part of our existence which is cut loose from immediate 
perception/action and deepens our emotional and cognitive faculties - the realm responsi­
ble for higher-level (self)consciousness, desire, and mental fractures. Despite the growth 
of the cognitive and emotional depth of the mind, Langs believes that our responses are 
always geared toward dealing with immediate encounters which include events that trig­
ger unconscious residues and symmetrically related events from other time-space config­
urations.
The evolved design o f the adaptive capacities, physical and mental, o f all living organ­
isms centers on coping efforts that are responsive to immediate stimuli or triggers. This
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concentration on dealing first and foremost with contemporaneous stimuli applies to 
human mental adaptations, despite the highly developed capacities o f humans to remem­
ber the past and to anticipate the future, to deal with past traumas for long periods of 
time and anticipate and respond to future emotional issues far ahead o f their occurrence.
While unresolved adaptive issues, past and future, may therefore evoke conscious 
- and, under selective conditions, unconscious - responses, coping with one's current 
environment, interactions, and impinging stimuli takes precedence adaptively. The most 
common configuration is one in which the present situation is the primary cause for 
adaptation, while related experiences, past and future, activate secondary coping 
responses largely because the present situation resembles or in some way calls forth 
experiences from other time-frames (Langs 1995, p. 14-15).
The response to the reconfiguration of our understanding of the human mind is the trans­
formation of therapy or analysis from a sterile practice based on dogmatic principles to 
an open-ended pragmatics with various possibilites at its disposal. The relationship 
between belief and the transformation of the real in terms of both psychic and physical 
symptoms has hardly been examined. Rather, psychoanalytic practice has been buried 
under ideologies passed down like religions to which followers are indoctrinated. These 
laws of practice and theory precede the practical truth of the complexity and uncertainty 
of the psyche which outstrips and eludes all existing metapsychologies and metaphysics 
in the same way that the working of the brain outstrips the most elaborate computers. 
Langs maps out the positions of a variety of therapies with respect to the psyche and their 
attempts to deal alternatively with deep unconscious residues of the mind or with the 
more immediately adaptive conscious realm.
Until now, the issue of the kind o f psychotherapy a therapist chooses to practice has been 
seen as an intellectual choice with some vague psychodynamic underpinnings. The key 
issue has been defined as whether or not one decides to pursue the realm o f unconscious 
meaning as in dynamic forms of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy or, instead, opts for a 
more cognitive approach such as retraining, conditioning, and the like, as in cognitive 
and gestalt therapies (Langs 1995, p. 115).
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For Langs it is essential to undertake the nearly impossible task of reconstructing the bi­
level subjectivity of the adaptive mind. Behavioral reconditioning may be able to alter the 
patterned reponses of the unconscious, but they simply replace one set of programs with 
another. Cognitive therapies aim to increase conscious adaptation, but they ignore the 
power of unconscious processing to dominate human experience. Only a therapy which 
works with the deep unconscious system that determines so much of human functioning 
and attempts to bring to consciousness the very workings of this system for any particular 
individual will endow the subject with the power to reconstruct his own subjective expe­
rience of the world within the limitations of the mental or psychic apparatus through 
which he operates.
Animals adapt instinctively to any immediate danger in favor of survival. The evolution 
of the human mind into a complex consciousness beyond immediate time and space has 
brought with it the emotional experiences of fear and anxiety which initiates reponses to 
avoid such unpleasant experience. Consciousness of death as the end of one’s subjective 
concrescence is not perceived without the accompanying fear of the unknown and sad­
ness at the loss of oneself introjected into one’s inner world and projected outwards into 
the world of others. According to Langs the psyche responds to such fear with denial and 
defenses of various forms.
Secured-frame anxieties are closely linked with death anxiety - the claustrum qualites o f 
the secured frame are experienced deeply as the claustrum of life as it is surrounded and 
encased by death. The human mind has evolved only one basic mechanism to cope with 
and handle death anxiety - the use o f denial in its myriad o f forms. One form o f denial 
involves modifying frames in order to deny one's entrapment in a life that ends with 
death. This means that by design, the minds o f both patients and therapists are unable to 
cope with death and death-related anxieties through insight; they therefore opt for mal­
adaptive, action-oriented, frame-deviant solutions and forms o f treatment that in the long 
run are very costly and harmful (Langs 1995, p. 117).
Paradoxically, the human subject cannot find security in either rest or movement. It is 
obvious that the human being seeks security and stability in repetition and the familiar,
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but as Langs makes clear the more subtle form of denial acts through modifying secure 
frames which would otherwise bring on the unmediated encounter with death, absence, 
and presence itself. While we grasp on to stable forms, objects, and truths as security 
blankets, and fear the chaos of change and becoming that takes these away, we fear even 
more the conscious encounter with the limitations of our becoming and the recognition of 
our being. The process of analysis in individual, collective, and institutional forms 
invokes a double process: first to deconstruct those stagnant form of subjectivity con­
structed for us and forced upon us by the Other and second to increase consciousness of 
our own forms of stagnation and distraction which avoid the encounter with the real of 
chaos and uncertainty and the limitations death, loss, and nothingness.
As opposed to this, most therapists and analysts participate in the reconstruction of 
oppressive forms of order through reorganizing subjectivities according to already 
mapped out imperatives and ethics or more subtly through encouraging identification 
with the analyst. Fearing chaos and the secured-frame anxieties evoking entrapment, ana­
lysts themselves are rarely equipped to accompany the subject into this territory and 
instead proliferate further distractions under the rubric of various models of success in 
healing.
Indeed, deep unconscious meaning and secured frames are two sides o f the same coin - 
embracing one goes with embracing the other, much as avoiding one goes with avoiding 
the other. Given their own unresolved secured-frame anxieites, therapists are loath to 
work within secured frames or to trigger-decode their patient’s frame-evoked narratives 
lest they be faced with powerful encoded directives to establish or maintain secured 
frames (Langs 1995, p. 118).
Langs’s recommendation that therapy proceed through the analysis of triggered adaptive 
responses to the immediate threat of secured-frame anxieties does not wait for regression 
and holding to be established as a return to infancy, but makes conscious the ever-present 
ongoing element of our movement between stability and change, difference and repetion, 
order and chaos in search of a general economy (Bataille 1949,1967,1976) or ecology of 
mind (Bateson 1972, Guattari 1992). The focus on the semiotic triggers and symbolic
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narratives of the subject which reveal the unconscious psychic aggenda underlying con­
sciously asserted intention elegantly unites important elements of Freud, Lacan, and Bion 
while stripping the analytic process of its sectarian claims.
The new forms o f psychotherapy will fully recognize the central role played by ground- 
rule impingements for the deep unconscious experience and emotional lives o f both 
patients and therapists. Psychotherapy will become frame-centred and will stress the 
need to offer patients as secured a frame as possible. Rectification o f frame deviations at 
the behest o f the patient’s derivative or encoded narratives and the trigger-decoded inter­
pretation o f all frame-related transactions will be among the most frequent interventions 
made by therapist.
This kind o f work will be recognized as the essence o f cure. Such work provides 
patients (and therapists) with an optimal healing setting and background experience. It 
allows for the insightful working-through o f foreground frame issues as they become acti­
vated by actions o f either party to therapy. It also enables the therapist to connect the 
patient’s unconscious experience to the patient’s life history and psychopathology. The 
secured frame is also the best setting for the resolution o f pathological forms o f death 
anxiety (Langs 1995, p. 121).
Freud’s initial effort to integrate mind and body through a metapsychology of matter, 
energy, and drives and ethical-aesthetic, symbolic-noetic myths was augmented in prac­
tice by Bion’s transformation of mental space through the containment of secure frames 
and Lacan’s repeated encounter with the real beyond symbolic and imaginary diversions. 
Langs has a similar project but uses a language of objectivity and cybernetics in the 
hopes of preventing the return to myths which permeate the poetics of processes turned 
into beliefs. The pragmatics of frame analysis and the transformation of structurally-cou­
pled systems moves the understanding and healing of the psyche out of the specific realm 
of individual therapy and into new spaces of social, collective, and transpersonal forma­
tions of human subjectivity.
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8. Psycho-Semiotics - Alfred Silver
Psychoanalysis has always been concerned with a semiotics of expression in human 
experience. Alfred Silver’s integration of Charles Peirce’s semiotic practice with the psy­
choanalytic theories of Freud, Klein, and Bion constitutes a theory and practice of the 
“psycho-semiotics” of mental space and the development of symbol formation through 
emotional-cognitive learning. Peirce’s idea of “firstness” evokes the pure point of indivis­
ible oneness experienced by the undifferentiated infant in the womb and by the subjectiv­
ity of autistic isolation and the fall into psychotic chaos. “Secondness” begins to develop 
in human subjectivity with the schizoid splitting of objects and forces and the mirroring 
of self and other. But it is only through “thirdness” that distance and mediation develop, 
allowing human subjectivity to free itself from immediate episodic consciousness and to 
plan, think, and organize at the complex level of space-time representation which forms 
the basis for the pragmatics of survival from everyday life to advanced technology. 
Thirdness also frees us from the seizure of passion in forces of attraction/repulsion which 
play themselves out in the realm of secondness or mimetic desire experienced in love, 
hate, war, group trance, and Freud’s “mass-psychology”. Third-level abstract symbol for­
mation provides the distancing from immediate seizure which constitutes the fundamen­
tal and unconscious belief of any symptom - psychic, social, or physical. Through the 
symbolic we gain distance by moving from the “emotional” to the “mental” or “cogni­
tive.”
In the psycho-semiotic view, “symptom-formation” may be translated as concrete proto­
symbol formation, i.e., one-dimensional identification: a pseudo-conceptualization due to 
an experience o f extremely narrow perspective. This in turn is associated with a primitive 
semiotic whose sign is so poorly evolved that it is indistinguishable from its primal object 
which contains primitive preconceptions; it may even be a likeness o f some bizarre frag­
ment o f a primal object (mirrored back as a bizarre identification) rather than having 
evolved through bonafide triadic symbol formation. In other words, Bergson's “intu­
ition, " Freud's “symptom-formation," and Klein's “projective identification" have essen­
tially the same psycho-semiotic structure: a narrowed triad that functions cyclopically 
and which is experienced phenomenally in “secondness" (in one-dimension) as a con-
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cretistic brute actuality - an ineffable signal, an immediate symptom, or a confused iden­
tification (Silver 1981, p. 298-299).
Silver likens Peirce’s secondness to Freudian “symptom-formation” and Kleinian “pro­
jective identification” as a form of primitive mediation which may not fully develop into 
the smooth abstraction of language. He also compares it to Bergson’s method of “intu­
ition” in which primitive semiotic reading looks beyond the surface of logical-deductive 
language. But Bergson’s and Peirce’s semiotic-philosophical method has the ability to 
move back and forth between primal semiotics and more abstract symbolics, whereas 
certain subjects may become stuck in a specific symptom-formation which not only can­
not partake of abstraction and distancing but always returns to the same cycle.
Thirdness develops a triadic relationship between subject, object, and sign - or self, other, 
and symbol. Signs do not signify or represent things in the world in an objectively true 
sense - they represent something for someone. Every event, system, or organism is a sub­
ject to the extent that it has its own internal horizon, but each subject organizes or per­
ceives other subjects as objects represented through sign-symbol-signifier. This thirdness 
is objectivity - not the objectivity of truth - for the real is inaccessible to any subject - but 
the pragmatic objectivity of scientific distance which functions to manipulate the real for 
survival and alters our subjective dependence on the immediate seizure of primitive mir­
roring relations of mimetic desire which can lead to hysterical and schizophrenic traps.
It is important to make clear the vital phenomenological distinction between the “mirror­
ing’’ which occurs in the narrowed triads o f mania, intuition, and pseudo- or proto-sym- 
bol formation from the “reflections ” characteristic o f conceptual thinking. The mirroring 
refers to the effect produced prototypically in paranoid identification when hostile predis­
positions are felt to emanate from even inanimate objects, but scientific interpretation 
leads to a realization that these hostile signs emanate or are projected out to the object 
and mirrored back without further significant development. They are falsely identified as 
belonging to the accused and blamed object which is the recipient o f the projection. On 
the other hand, true reflective thinking occurs as a critique o f the understanding and is 
the manifestation o f pure reason. It occurs when the empirical self and the empirical
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object o f scrutiny are observed and their relationship judged by the (un-manifest) self of 
pure apperception (the I-in-itself) which acts as “third” in this triadic object-relation. 
The basic distinction consists in the fate o f the preconception (Silver 1981, p. 299).
The space from dyad to triad is developed differently in human subjectivity, and it is 
always fluctuating. Dyadic relations not only give us our initial cognition, they provide 
the depth of emotional experience found in love, mysticism, art, and the sacred. The point 
is not to replace the dyadic subjectivity with the triadic subjectivity of reflective thought, 
but to extend both and to integrate them into an emotional-cognitive richness where 
desire and consciousness coexist.
Our attention to life and immediate being in the world finds us organizing, translating, 
containing, and embodying forces of matter and energy from the beginning of life. What 
are symptoms but a form of psychic metabolism by which we attempt to digest such 
experience? The whole complex map of human subjectivities including physical and psy­
chic symptoms, character, style, art, design, rituals, religions, ideas, theories, laws, 
thoughts, and feelings can be read as the semiotic translation of embodiment and the 
transmutation of energy, matter, and form.
In distinction to the unfolding o f sophisticated spirals o f thirdness, an experience may be 
signified only by some inexpressible feeling. The sign o f such an experience may only be 
manifest in some physical action, perhaps only inside a primitive autonomic or kinesthet­
ic system. However, I  would take as an irreducible principle that a subjective experience 
must be manifested by some sign o f embodiment, otherwise the experience could not be 
said to be actual. This is true even if  the embodiment is only known by the signs o f its 
denial in the form o f some symptom such as depersonalization or alexithymia. This prin­
ciple is o f great importance in that it establishes the phenomenological necessity that an 
experience, to have any actuality or even potential quality, must be contained or embod­
ied (Silver 1981, p. 300).
What is this “inexpressible feeling” other than what Bataille (1954) calls the sacred. But 
we can only contain so much, and the ethic of psychoanalysis is that one responds simply
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to the request of suffering as too much or too little of such feeling - to reintegrate the 
emotional-cognitive subjectivity through a practice of reorganization based on the psy­
cho-semiotic system which makes up each particular subject. The “objectivity” of third­
ness is not true - it is necessary. It is functional for survival and pragmatic for reworking 
the complexity of beliefs and drives in a world in which collective and institutional forms 
of rituals and religions no longer provide such a service.
Thought, cognition, and consciousness constitute that part of human subjectivity which 
contests or questions immediate experience - feeling, desire, and intuition. This doubt or 
skepticism frees us from the binds of “superstition” and circular traps and leads to the 
foundation of new forms of thinking, feeling, and being and to pragmatic transformations 
of the real which provide easier and more pleasurable means of survival. At the same 
time, however, this scientific doubt can in itself lead to an infinite questioning which 
divorces us from our immediate experience - the foundation of faith in our perceptual 
organization of the universe as what is real. In the end absolute philosophical and scien­
tific consciousness leads back to the infinite chaos of the possible, which is why Lacan 
called science a kind of absolute hysteria or purified psychosis capable of leading any 
subjectivity - including humanity in general - into delusion.
Emerging into full space-time dimensionality from the one-dimensionality o f the bound­
ary line are the transitional oneiric and ludic phenomena characterized by iconic and 
indexical signs, but they are also characterized by the emergence o f symbolism. Symbol 
formation is marked by the inhibitory constraints imposed on phantasy by the demands of 
truthful space-time representation and structural rules o f proper conceptualization. The 
penalty to be paid for multi-dimensionality and perspective is the increasing “scientific” 
doubt which accompanies one's experience - which in the absence o f these contstraints 
associated with symbol formation would have the full reign o f unchecked delusional cer­
tainty (Silver 1981, p. 302).
Abstract symbol formation does not necessarily lead to reflective rational thought or 
social cohesion. The thirdness of the symbolic may be used to embody the richness of 
primal dyadic subjectivity outside the implicit social contract of any symbolic communi-
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ty. What is called hysterical, perverse, or psychotic experience not only eludes the order 
of normal reality, but it does so in such a way that the brilliance of such individual myths 
often eludes analytic understanding and healing. Providing a subject with a culturally 
accepted character-formation or with a strong ego with which to identify may be as use­
less for embodying the drives of the subject as was the family and culture in which he 
grew up. This symbolic may in itself be “normotic” or “normopathic” - simply the collec­
tively agreed upon symptom formation which is never challenged (Freud 1930, Reich 
1949, Laing 1967, Guattari 1992, Bollas 1987).
But just as dreaming, playing, and thinking capitalize on concrete phantasy, so may the 
reverse, regressive situation develop and prevail. For in the interest o f disavowing and 
escaping from dependency on the symbolic object world o f representational but separate 
reality, and in order to regain the transcendental paradise o f the primal world, the sub­
ject may capitalize on already acquired conceptual and symbolic experience and the 
mimicry so natural in the boundary line world o f analogical iconic signs. Here verbal 
symbols may be employed concretely as substitutes or symbolic equations for primal 
objects. An autistically devised pseudo-code o f analogical significance may be surrepti­
tiously substituted for or imposed upon the culturally dictated code o f abststract symbols 
(Silver 1981, p. 303)
Here the lines between sane and insane, healthy and ill become blurred - as does the rela­
tionship between the individual and the social psyche. Again, laws, rituals, and rules are 
pragmatic - not true or moral. They serve the function of mediating among a complex 
web of interacting systems of desire and their embodiments through meaning and action. 
At this point, any practice of analysis in the form of individual therapy or social change 
must be united in working toward a pragmatics of complexity which fully recognizes the 
general economy of such systems and the absolute jouissance, sovereignty, and free will 
possessed by each system of subjectivity - be it individual, collective, symbolic, noetic, 
or machinic to assert its choice - its leap of faith against the pragmatics of the law of the 
symbolic. The artist or mystic not only rejects the symbolic embodiment of collective 
subjectivities and replaces it with his own, he is able to transform this collectivity itself 
by breaking down sterile forms and transforming the collective itself which will recon-
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struct a new symbolic narrative of order from the chaos into which the mystic plunges it 
(Bergson 1932, Bion 1970, Derrida 1992).
The analysis o f psycho-semiotic structure may provide a basis for renewed investigation 
of so-called “reality testing. ” Peirce's pragmatic logic establishes a basis for testing 
which demands more than formal deductive validation. The pragmatic logic demands a 
structure by means o f which the actuality o f experience through concrete phantasy is 
truly and properly linked by symbol formation to conceptualization or identification. This 
should properly be called “truth testing” rather than “reality-testing” since the sound­
ness o f the symbolic structure is a matter o f consistency with cultural convention on an 
internal basis o f con-sensual or common-sense consistency. This is related to truth in the 
pragmatic sense by which is meant a belief consistent with the beliefs o f the community o f 
so-called scientific thinkers; those qualified to doubt. This criterion allows for the emer­
gence o f creative departures from the previously accepted hypothetical consequents 
(interpretants). This concept o f truth contrasts greatly with the pragmatic concept of the 
real. In a pragmatic sense, that which is brute, actual and directly experienced, is the 
most real. In this sense a delusion is most highly qualified to be defined as “real" for its 
realness is not challenged by other possible consequents given in the understanding pro­
vided by other perspectives in the representational space-time o f true symbol formation 
(Silver 1981, p. 313).
What Silver calls “reality” is an experience of Lacan’s “real” whereas the “truth” for 
Silver is what Lacan calls the “symbolic” - the pragmatic establishment of a collectively 
agreed embodiment or psycho-semiotic translation of the real. What is it that we call 
“reality?” Reality is engineered by the construction of subjectivities - by the organization 
of chaos - by the programing of one’s experience of the real. The real is “brute, actual and 
directly experienced,” provided that we understand that we only approach the real - we 
never actually know or experience it apart from the way our organizing or perceiving of it 
has been created - apart from the engineering of our reality by ourselves or by others 
(Von Glaserfeld 1987). But if we free ourselves from the programming of the Other - if 
we take responsibility for the creation of our reality - the construction of our own subjec­
tivity - what will we “choose” to believe - what will we desire? For desire is the faith, the
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seduction, the fall into belief, the willingness to be seduced, hypnotized, and programed 
which in a flash obliterates all objectivity and reflective consciousness and steps forward 
without question. Desire is the limit of thought.
9. The Subject of Analysis - Jacques Lacan
Jacques Lacan’s transformation of psychoanalysis traces the sovereignty of the subject of 
desire against the symbolic web of meaning intersubjectively constructed in the social. In 
mapping the world he posits three realms. The “real” constitutes the totality of the possi­
ble in its concrete form including the effects of the psyche itself in its attempt to translate 
and give form to its experience in this real. The “imaginary” forms the proto-semiotic 
formation of the real in the iconic image of the other which binds subjects through primal 
drives of attraction/repulsion and the mimetic desire of master-slave relations in the 
struggle to the death for recognition as sovereign. The “symbolic” describes the triadic 
development of abstract semiotic, noetic, and linguistic embodiments of our experience 
in the real. The interaction of these interlocking realms of real, imaginary, and symbolic 
forms a knot - as do all structurally coupled systems - which cannot be cut but only 
untied. To analyze is to untie - as in the Greek roots of the word. To untie is to grasp the 
concrescence of events and organisms - to divide things into components - and to prag­
matically rework the complex interaction among them through splitting, dissolving, link­
ing, and reframing.
While many analysts have added important components to the metapsychology of emo­
tion and cognition, it was Lacan who grasped the full nature of the subject and its impli­
cations beyond a truth or ethics of practice. While psychoanalysis as a practice and theory 
was being lost in dogmatic theologies, Lacan had already grasped its wider scope for 
human subjectivity outside of individual therapy, and in fact his whole project can be 
seen as an analysis of analysis itself - that psychoanalysis of civilization which Freud 
(1930) had called for at the end of his life.
The omnipresence of human discourse will perhaps one day he embraced under the open
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sky o f an omnicommunication o f its text. This is not to say that human discourse will be 
any more harmonious than now. But this is the field that our experience polarizes in a 
relation that is only apparently two-way, for any positing o f its structure in merely dual 
terms is as inadequate to it in theory as it is ruinous for its technique (Lacan 1956, p. 56).
Lacan’s critique of cultural morality and scientific subjectivity and their attempts to sup­
press the individual sovereignty of the subject’s jouissance through the true, the rational, 
and the good recalls Nietzsche’s project. The escape from confronting the essence of life 
in its fleeting concrescence bound by death and loss in time is for Lacan an avoidance of 
the real and a cowardice of which most are guilty - and which modem society as a whole 
encourages through its own denial. And it is exactly guilt which is the result according to 
Lacan - the guilt and neurotic symptoms resulting from the sacrifice of jouissance as the 
drive beyond good and evil in exchange for “the good” - of truth, morality, and economy.
But a way out is offered to the subject for the resolution o f that impasse when his dis­
course is delusional. Communication can be validly established for him in the common 
task o f science and in the posts that it commands in our universal civilization; this com­
munication will be effective within the enormous objectification constituted by that sci­
ence, and it will enable him to forget his subjectivity. He will make an effective contribu­
tion to the common task in his daily work and will be able to furnish his leisure time with 
all the pleasures o f a profuse culture which, from detective novels to historical memoirs, 
from educational lectures to the orthopaedics o f group relations, will give him the where­
withal to forget his own existence and his death, at the same time to misconstrue the par­
ticular meaning o f his life in false communication (Lacan 1956, p. 70).
Lacan’s practice of analysis follows an ethic of embodying the object of the other for the 
subject in order to lead him to the consciousness and practice of his desire - or jouis­
sance. What the subject says he desires may only be determined by the construction of 
his subjectivity through the imperative of the Other in the form of mother, father, com­
munity, and society and may be at odds with the unconscious desires which determine his 
feelings, thoughts, and actions with which the imperatives of the Other are bound up.
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In order to know how to reply to the subject in analysis, the procedure is to recognize first 
o f all the place where his ego is, the ego that Freud himself defined as an ego formed of a 
verbal nucleus; in other words, to know through whom and for whom the subject poses 
his question. So long as this is not known, there will be the risk o f a misunderstanding 
concerning the desire that is there to be recognized and concerning the object to whom 
this desire is addressed (Lacan 1956, p. 89).
After the stripping away of the determinant layers of imperatives demanded by the Other, 
the subject is left with nothing - with the truth of nothing against which all thinking, feel­
ing, and being must be measured. Consciousness is objective consciousness of the sub­
jective nature of the human organism: the concrescence of any event or organism is its 
unique, temporal, and limited nature. Humanity constitutes a concrescence of concres­
cences in which each individual subjectivity participates in the subjectivity of all and is 
yet conscious of its sovereign difference from others. Simultaneously the event which is 
the individual subject’s life is made up of an endless series of irreducible events each of 
which can unite itself with the totality of all of these moments by losing itself in the 
essence of itself - by communicating transversally across the breech which separates sub­
jects.
This is the only life that endures and is true, since it is transmitted without being lost in 
the perpetuated tradition of subject to subject. How is it possible not to see how loftily 
this life transcends that inherited by the animal, in which the individual disappears into 
the species, since no memorial distinguishes his ephemeral apparition from that which 
will reproduce it again in the invariability o f the type. In fact, apart from those hypotheti­
cal mutations o f the phylum that must be integrated by a subjectivity that man is still only 
approaching from the outside - nothing, except the experiments to which man associates 
it, distinguishes a rat from the rat, a horse from the horse, nothing except this inconsis­
tent passage from life to death - whereas Empedocles, by throwing himself into Mount 
Etna, leaves forever present in the memory o f men this symbolic act o f his being-for- 
death (Lacan 1956, p. 104).
If it is the thirdness of the symbolic which mediates between subjects and objects and
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allows an abstract reflection and communication, then it is this same symbolic which can 
alienate the subject from his desire by capturing his drives in the web of language and 
law. Desire continues to erupt through the very breakdown of the symbolic and this erup­
tion momentarily puts us in touch with the real in all its ecstasy and horror. For Lacan the 
psychoanalytic process is a journey toward the real which remains for the subject after 
decontextualizing the contexts in which he has come to experience the world. What 
remains as the irreducible object of desire integrates itself with consciousness of this 
desire through the enjoyment of one’s symptom.
The subject says “No!” to this intersubjective game o f hunt-the-slipper in which desire 
makes itself recognized for a moment, only to become lost in a will that is will o f the 
other. Patiently, the subject withdraws his precarious life from the sheeplike conglomera­
tion o f the Eros o f the symbol in order to affirm it at the last in an unspoken curse.
So when we wish to attain in the subject what was before the serial articulation of 
speech, and what is primordial to the birth o f symbols, we find it in death, from which his 
existence takes on all the meaning it has. It is in effect as a desire for death that he 
affirms himself for others; if he identifies himself with the other, it is by fixing him solidly 
in the metamorphosis o f his essential image, and no being is ever evoked by him except 
among the shadows o f death (Lacan 1956, p. 105).
The desire for death is not a death drive but the incomparable human subjectivity bom of 
consciousness of one’s concrescence unique and limited by death. Subjectivity and objec­
tivity are opposing poles through which to view the world. The subjective is the qualita­
tive ethical-aesthetic element of existence which recognizes the irreducible quality of 
processes, systems, and events - that the whole is not the sum of its parts. The objective 
matter or substance of any system may be changed at will without changing the relations 
or ways in which it is organized. It then retains its autopoesis - its concrescence - its sov­
ereignty. But when the organization of infinitely divisible matter is altered, that organized 
concrescence ends - that subjectivity dies. Subjectivity experiences itself as subjectivity 
in the recognition of life and death.
This schema satisfactorily expresses the endless circularity o f the dialectical process that
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is produced when the subject brings his solitude to realization, be it in the fatal ambiguity 
o f immediate desire or in the full assumption o f his being-for-death.
But by the same fact it can be grasped that the dialectic is not individual, and that 
the question o f the termination o f the analysis is that of the moment when the satisfaction 
o f the subject finds a way to realize himslf in the satisfaction o f everyone - that is to say, 
o f all those whom this satisfaction associates with itself in a human undertaking. Of all 
the undertakings that have been proposed in this century, that o f the psychoanalyst is per­
haps the loftiest, because the undertaking o f the psychoanalyst acts in our time as a medi- 
ateor between the man o f care and the subject o f absolute knowledge (Lacan 1956, p. 
105).
10. The Game of the Other - Francois Rous tang
Freud’s work with hypnosis led him to the position of not using the power of suggestion 
and seduction - as much as possible. He perhaps knew - though he did not speak of it - 
that psychoanalysis could never really do away with the forces operating between mind 
and body in human communication. Nevertheless his invention of the psychoanalytic 
method was profound for bridging the gap between such subjective forces and the objec­
tive scientific approach to becoming conscious of these forces. Rather than engaging in 
the forces of desire, love, faith, hypnosis, and trance which invoke real physical and men­
tal tranformations - or seeking to dispel them through logical explanations - psychoanaly­
sis seeks to elucidate these processes - to find the objective limits of their subjective 
effects. Freud and Lacan made this the essence of their ethic and their practice - to bring 
to consciousness the unconscious forces or desires playing through and determining the 
subject without replacing them with others. Their aim was to found a science of human 
subjectivity. They did not resort to the power of the trance to effect a cure, yet they did 
not - like so many followers - become duped into believing in the possibility of its 
absolute eradication through consciousness.
Francois Roustang’s work seeks to get to the heart of the relationship between the hyp­
notic powers of seduction and the mediating effects of consciousness and the symbolic.
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Many of Lacan’s followers have become obsessed with the ethic of detachment and the 
belief in their ability to avoid the seduction and hypnosis of their clients. But to what 
degree does this actually occur. Are the members of a community whose symbolic beliefs 
form a social contract truly free from the group trance of the primal horde, the hysteria of 
desire, or the faith of religious sects. Roustang poses this important yet untouchable ques­
tion for analysts who consider their methods free from such uncertainty.
After such a long detour, can analysis avoid this overwhelming regression which would 
signal at best the uselessness o f the treatment, at worst its aberration, but which would 
perhaps explain the fascination that it exerts? As if each one sought not to understand 
more clearly the unconscious mechanisms that control him, not to rid himself o f his 
symptoms, but to practice what one could call the game o f the other, or the game o f 
death, the most fascinating game because the stakes are at their highest and the game is 
always unresolved and because there is nothing more dangerous or more sterile 
(Roustang 1980, p. 97).
What Roustang calls the “game of the other” or the “archaic non-relation” is the danger­
ous game of seduction which lies at the heart of human subjectivity. Any subject has two 
choices: to maintain the beliefs which form the foundation of one’s subjectivity which 
are the result of the previous seduction and construction of one’s experience of the world 
- or to risk the deconstruction and reconstruction of one’s subjectivity through the seduc­
tion of other beliefs. Of course these are not exactly choices - one is either seduced or one 
is not. Some are very open to suggestion and some are very certain in maintaining their 
subjectivity. According to Roustang, the analytic setting is a particular place for this 
process to be played out in which the analyst’s consciousness of this fundamental human 
game itself aids in providing the distance for an opportunity to work through these beliefs 
with the increased conscsiousness of how these forces operate for the analysand and pos­
sibly for others. What Roustang wants to make clear is that this process cannot be puri­
fied from the uncertainties of the outcome of engaging such forces. The analyst has a 
dual process to his practice: to be able to engage the forces of attraction/repulsion at the 
heart of human “subjectivity” and to be able to stand back far enough to maintain the 
mediated “objectivity” which will provide consciousness. He must have one foot inside
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and one foot outside the circle of this “game of the other.” He must integrate subjectivity 
and objectivity in a special way which he can never determine ahead of time.
The analyst’s errors are not only inevitable - it is impossible for him to choose the right 
distance - they are indispensable to the progress o f the analysis. As we have seen, if  it is 
not taken, nothing happens (because the patient can not unfold the absurdity o f which he 
dreams), but if it does not slip away again, there is no possibility o f analyzing this dream. 
Faced with a vain reiteration of the game, one must little by little separate the events. I f  
the nonrelation is called archaic or prehistoric, it is only in a limited sense, since by defi­
nition it escapes time and cannot properly be made part o f a history (Roustang 1980, p. 
99).
Neurotic and psychotic symptoms are for Roustang a failure of mediated symbolization 
in favor of the embodiment or containment of forces through primal modes. The analytic 
process sets in motion the dyadic enactment of such forces in the hopes of drawing out 
the affect from the symptoms which are the supposed reason for analysis so that they can 
be put into play in new ways. Can we consider psychoanalysis a pragmatics in which the 
forces of drive, affect, or seduction are dislodged from their circular patterns, returned to 
chaos, and reorganized into new forms of embodiment? Healing, teaching, and spiritual 
rituals throughout human history have engaged in such transformative practices, but psy­
choanalysis attempts to give the tools of the process itself to the analysand rather than 
transforming his subjectivity with an end result in mind.
Let us grant that neurosis is a failure o f symbolization. One can then ask what forces are 
capable of holding language with distortions in which the individual’s relation to himself 
and to others becomes impracticable or is even annulled, as in psychosis? . . . Let us 
hypothesize that the adversary o f language and o f sexuality would be located in the game 
o f the other, which is also the passion o f the one, for which the condition o f mute and 
masturbatory autism would be the consummate image. From this perspective, the neurot­
ic, that failed autist, would be someone who, luckily, would always insufficiently resist the 
necessity to speak and the need for sexual relations (Roustang 1980, p. 100).
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In analysis, interpretations are not meant to be correct translations of the subject’s experi­
ence, but reconstructions negotiated between subject and analyst in the system or event 
which the analytic setting creates. The thirdness of symbolic language provides the medi­
ated consciousness which makes its form of the translation of drives a powerful method 
for embodiment and containment with which the subject can embrace/enact his desire 
without being at the mercy of it. Time, history, and the story form the noetic, ontic, and 
symbolic foundations of individuation which allow for human subjectivity to organize its 
experience of the chaos of matter-energy in an active creative way.
Nothing is possible as long as the patient does not make the analyst enter into the battle 
o f devouring energies and hate. Through his “bodily attention ” the analyst resists 
absorption, and after a while his resistance enables the patient to speak his hate and to 
show the analyst its means and ends. The counter-transference is not, therefore, a mixture 
o f feelings and attitudes. It is first the acceptance o f confrontation and at the same time 
the refusal o f the game o f the other; afterwards, if  the right remark comes from the 
patient, it becomes the verbal expression o f the respective positions in which the patient 
has placed the analyst and in which the patient himself is placed. It is never a question of 
more or less emotional outpourings. The moment o f detachment is the putting into 
words o f the moment o f seizure. Here, truly, saying is doing. The word puts into effect a 
distance in relation to symbiosis; it emerges from the seizure in proportion to its involve­
ment. The word is released from the grasp o f symbiosis because the word is the result o f 
symbiosis, to the extent that the word expresses symbiosis in a singularly adequate way 
that departs from any well-known generalities. Language can thus effect a separation in 
the ahistorical if it takes it into account, obviously, but also if it derives its force from that 
ahistorical state. One could say that words are all the more effective when they struggle 
against the silence that attempts to suppress them. This silence in psychoanalysis is none 
other than “the unknowable and non-existent unconscious. ” It is perhaps in this context 
that one could interpret Freud’s remarks on working-through, which are significant only 
i f  we understand them to mean that working-through is necessary in the treatment after 
the transference has been revealed as the carrier o f the ultimate threat (Roustang 1980,
p. 112).
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For Roustang, psychoanalysis is an art and science of life which has served to investigate 
that which scientific objectivity has never found a place for. The objective pole of science 
grasps the essence of events from outside - “etically.” The subjective pole of experience 
grasps them from within - “emically.” Somewhere between lies psychoanalysis which - 
like ethology and ethnography - uses Peirce’s method of “abduction” or a form of partici­
pant observation in order to understand and affect. It is not that psychoanalysis wanted to 
become an objective science from the standpoint of induction and deduction - though 
many analysts and critics have thought as much - but that psychoanalysis sought to create 
the first science of the human - the one which Bataille (1973) called for which would turn 
the objective lamp of science upon the subjective limits of the one shining the lamp.
In other words, psychoanalysis produces a myth that does not introduce an alien force 
into the present system in the hope o f overturning it, still less in order to explode it; on 
the contrary, it produes a myth that in principle domesticates what cannot be integrated 
into a scientific, techno-logical, rational world and gives it the status of science and logic 
and thus makes it acceptable. By giving a scientific intelligibility to what was outside the 
field o f science and technology, psychoanalysis at first creates the impression that it is 
subverting that field, but afterwards it becomes the means o f extending science beyond its 
own limits. In other words, the technological society that rejected dreams, fantasies, and 
madness into the shadows o f superstition, magic, or myth might feel threatened by their 
reintroduction into its midst. But, because these phenomena, which are constitutive o f the 
human being, have been acclimated to the new formation o f society, they can reenforce 
that society, because they place at its disposal what had, by definition, escaped it and 
what it therefore risked forgetting, although they were intrinsically necessary to its sur­
vival. In a period when science and the society it created risked being enclosed in scien­
tism, psychoanalysis make it tolerable to integrate these foreign and neglected domains 
into science, but it risked making them dangerous enemies (Roustang 1980, p. 119-120).
Paradoxically, psychoanalysts have forgotten their purpose in the creation of a human sci­
ence and practice - if they ever knew it. Many have fallen into the same trap as other 
therapists who seek to reprogram their subjects with their own ends in mind, carrying 
them out in the name of the good and the healthy. Still others have fallen into the trap of
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believing that analysis can be purified by “mathemes” or that it can be made a “falsifi- 
able” experimental science. The point is for the analyst to remain attentive to the nature 
of suggestion and seduction and to continue to analyze the ends of one’s means while 
recognizing that the forces at work are irreducible to objective certainty. The forces of 
attraction/repulsion, drive, the unconscious, or the non-relation are not only irreducible to 
rational thought and consciousness, they constitute the gap that forms their limits.
To sum up, I  propose this formulation: the task o f psychoanalysis in modem society is to 
administer the irrational as scientifically as possible. It is an indispensable task, for no 
society, not even the most technological, should disregard what is on its borders, what is 
at its limits, and what risks invading it at any moment. . . .One could say broadly that 
psychoanalysts as a whole are a marginal group, unable, whether because o f their elevat­
ed or their lowly condition, to be integrated into the economic circuit o f production; at 
the same time they are marginals who are reconverted to society through the lucrative 
detour o f managing the irrational (in order to avoid speaking o f the unconscious in this 
context). More particularly, they manage the irrational through the dysfunctions of the 
dominant class (Roustang 1980, p. 120).
At the limits of thought we encounter desire. Along with Godel (1931) and Derrida 
(1992) we can say that no system of thought, no knowledge, no morality, no ethic, no law 
can justify itself by appealing to its own internal system. Each is founded on an intial act 
of faith - an initial desire - upon which the rest of the system is based. These are the “hid­
den foundations of the law” which Derrida attempts to elucidate. The socially agreed 
upon symbolic depends not on truth but on belief and the pragmatics of an act of faith in 
accepting or agreeing to - or being seduced or hypnotized by - this belief. Nevertheless, 
the individual must confront at every point his own desire, faith, or belief interlocked 
with - yet often opposed to - the beliefs of others. Similarly the individual subject’s 
knowledge or conscious actions depend on collections of unconscious, unquestioned, 
unanalyzed beliefs on which they are founded. To question them infinitely would leave 
one nowhere. But each action, each belief, each perceptual organization of the world 
enacts a desire - a moment of faith - of which it is the sole authority. Conscious reflection 
can prepare one by analyzing the complex web of interdependent factors, and this clari-
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fies the many dimensions of opposing forces, desires, and ethics involved in any event, 
but in the end the event becomes the act which speaks for itself.
11. Primary Seduction - Jean Laplanche
In recent times the debate over Freud’s “seduction theory” has returned us to the question 
of the real and the imaginary in human experience (Masson 1985). It is claimed that 
Freud first put forward the theory that his female clients had in each case “really” been 
seduced or abused by their families, but that after meeting with controversy and denial - 
and his own marginalization - he altered his theory to state that these seductions had been 
“imagined.” More likely, the situation was a complex combination of both. No doubt 
there were - and still are - extreme cases of abuse, but what Freud discovered was the 
imaginary element of human subjectivity persisting through dreams and infecting the 
very “reality” of memory - specifically as it related to the seductive scenario of the fami­
ly drama.
Jean Laplanche has reworked psychoanalytic metapsychology and the nature of seduction 
in particular. Laplanche describes the scene of infant and parent as a labyrinth of recipro­
cal interactions in which seduction is primary or primal and not identifiable with one 
party. The theory of “primal seduction” describes the event of childhood as the confronta­
tion with “enigmatic signifiers” and the attempt to translate them. The construction of the 
child’s subjectivity - his way of perceptually organizing and emotionally and cognitively 
experiencing the world - takes place as he is brought through the long state of dependen­
cy in the intersubjective world of his fellow human beings. Not only must natural forces 
and drives be embodied and contained by the infant in proto-semiotic pre-signifying 
events, but from the beginning these events already take place in a world of signification. 
The simple acts and objects that are offered to the child are simultaneously accompanied 
by the enigma of desire, meaning, and language which pemeates human relating. The 
child cannot master or embody or translate these messages, yet he is driven to try. The 
enigma which exceeds his translating capacity leaves an unknown - or an unthought but 
known (Bollas 1987) - element which is nevertheless registered unconciously. Too little
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enigma stifles creativity and desire - too much leaves a debilitating trauma.
The point for Laplanche is that seduction is primary in the development of human subjec­
tivity and that enigma of the symbolic is not only necessary but the very basis of human 
complexity and vulnerability. The fragile state of subjectivity within the realm of the 
human being in early life leads to the development of emotional and cognitive robust­
ness but also holds great possibility for breakdown and trauma. Real trauma is never just 
physical. The human being may adapt to “real” physical - and/or sexual - trauma quite 
easily, but every physical event is already engaged in a psychic attempt to understand or 
translate the event in terms of signification. In addition the enigma of seduction surround­
ing attraction/repulsion, desire, love, or affect which unconsciously accompanies all 
human interrelating is complex, and it is quite possible that unconscious residues or 
embodiments of enigmatic signifiers which are in no way evidently sexual can - upon 
later evocation and suggestion - bring back memories of seemingly “real” sexual abuse. 
Laplanche transforms Freud’s special theory of seduction into a general theory of seduc­
tion in the same way that physicists transformed the theory of relativity.
The seduction theory, in its general form, must be reconstructed on the basis o f a specific 
conception o f a hierarchy o f seductions. This reconstruction will allow us to move from 
Freud's “special” theory to a new level, in precisely the same way that physics made the 
transition from the special theory o f relativity to the general theory. The general theory is 
no longer restricted to pathology. . .  it is intended to found the structure o f the psychical 
or soul apparatus in general; and it invalidates the appeal to biology and phylogenesis, 
though it may justify it at a later stage. The theory must be able to use the mechanism o f 
repression to account for the constitution and continued existence o f an unconscious, and 
for the “drive” effect that is inevitably associated with it. But the model must also be able 
to take in “treatment” and its effects and limitations.
I  have already outlined a general but extremely detailed schema in the context o f 
a discussion o f the drives. It represents an encounter between an individual whose psy­
chosomatic structures are situated predominantly at the level o f need, and signifiers 
emanating from an adult. Those signifiers pertain to the satisfaction o f the child's needs, 
but they also convey the purely interrogative potential o f other messages - and those
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other messages are sexual These enigmatic messages set the child a difficult, or even 
impossible, task o f mastery and symbolization and the attempt to perform it inevitably 
leaves behind unconscious residues.. .  .1 refer to them as the source-objects o f the drives.
. . . The language o f the child is not adequate to that o f the adult. What is more impor­
tant, the language o f the adult is not adequate to the source-object that acts upon him 
(Laplanche 1987, p. 129-130).
The ontogeny of human development and adaptation proceeds not simply through the 
biological mutation of matter-energy but psychically through the primary seduction of 
enigmatic signifiers. Biological need and instinct is always bound up with the conscious­
ness of language and meaning permeating the environment and transforming what would 
be immediate need and instinct into a mediated desire. Feeding does not just satisfy 
hunger but engages a whole symbolic, imaginary, noetic realm of human interaction. The 
psyche - which is socially constructed - rests on but is not reducible to the biochemical- 
physical organism. Perception/action is always organized through the social, and the 
unconscious is not only repression but the untranslatable which human beings continue to 
experience and - depending on their subjectivity - seek out throughout their lives.
I f  it were simply a matter o f the perception o f inanimate objects, perception would at best 
supply an index. I f  it were simply a matter o f indications, o f purely factual traces or o f 
residues devoid o f all semiological intentionality how could they suggest even an initial 
translation to the object? We can therefore state that the first indication o f perception, or 
the first inscription in the psychical appartatus is the enigmatic signifier, and that it is 
inscribed before any attempt is made to translate it.. . .
The human being is, and will go on being, a self-translating and self-theorizing 
being. Primal repression is merely the first founding moment in a life-long process 
(Laplanche 1987, p. 131).
For Laplanche primal seduction does not refer to a stage but to the foundation or core of 
a field theory of multi-level subjectivity similar to Daniel Stem’s (1985) map of the 
human psyche. The core of primal seduction and the proto-semiotic pre-signifying 
regimes of Silver’s firstness and secondness may be evoked by certain physical and psy-
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chic events, and Laplanche presents the analytic environment as a place for engaging 
with such realms of subjectivity. It is not surprising then, that electromagnetic and psy- 
chopharmacological alterations of the nervous system can recall unconscious embodied 
residues in the form of hallucinatory “schizophrenic” or “paranormal” phenomena or that 
belief and suggestion in certain affective relationships including amorous, religious, and 
psychotherapeutic forms can evoke memories of abuse.
It is primal seduction alone which comes into play here, and it does so in a much purer 
and more essential form than it does in childhood because, in childhood situations, it is 
always to some extent mediated by sexual gestures or sexual behaviour. This sheds a new 
light on the notion o f the primed: the primal is not essentially that which comes first, but 
that which is fundamental; it is therefore not surprising that the primal should be at least 
potentially present in the early stages o f life. But it is by no means impossible for a later 
situation such as analysis to reactivate the very essence o f the primal (Laplanche 1987, 
p. 157).
The analytic process functions between the double movement of belief and consciousness 
- between the subjective and objective poles - between desire and thought. The enigma is 
the unknowing of desire which constitutes the uncertain event that is human subjectivity. 
The analysand “knows” and “believes” in his symptom. Rather than replacing this with 
another suggestion, seduction, belief, or knowledge, the analyst sets the process itself in 
motion. Knowledge closes down whereas consciousness opens up and brings awareness 
of how the process operates. But pure consciousness if it could be attained would only be 
a groundless void. Instead, the movement of consciousness leads to consciousness of the 
limits of consciousness in the arbitrary assent, the act of faith, the momentary knowledge 
which closes down. It is the unknowing of the analyst’s desiring process itself which 
maintains the enigma that propels the analytic event as a microcosm of the chaosmosis of 
human being and becoming.
The situation establishes a primal relationship with the enigma and with its bearer who 
is, to borrow an expression used, if not elaborated upon, by Lacan, “supposed to know”. 
This brings us to the essential element in the ethics o f the psychoanalyst: counter trans-
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ference. There is talk o f mastering counter-transference, using counter-transference, o f 
counter-transference as affect, participation, implication, and so on. But perhaps that is 
missing the point, the point being that if  the analyst must be in the position o f one sup­
posed to know, he must obviously refuse knowledge, but he must also refuse to let himself 
know. This refusal to know, this refusal o f knowledge, is the second form o f analytic 
“refusing”, the first being the refusal to adapt. This is the motor, the source o f energy, 
and perhaps it is the source o f a new energy, which propels the cure. The search for  
knowledge both enslaves and propels the analysand, just as it once propelled the small 
child (Laplanche 1987, p. 158).
Metapsychological and metaphysical theorizing enact at the level of socio-cultural sub­
jectivities what the pragmatics of individual and collective analysis enact for subjectivi­
ties of self and other. Art, literature, philosophy, science, and religious and political insti­
tutions all engage new subjectivities - new embodiments, translations, or maps of the pri­
mal seduction of our desire for the unknown in human experience. Rather than being 
engaged in discovering truths or rights - and in addition to being engaged in the pragmat­
ics of survival - they are above all engaged in ethical-aesthetic processes of meaning or 
theorization.
At least two, and probably three, levels o f theorization can be identified. Firstly, we have 
general theory, o f which the present text is an example; general theory has to be recon­
structed o f the basis o f new foundations and it is therefore a metapsychology. It would be 
absurd to claim that I  intend to introduce that level o f theory into practical analysis. It is 
not simply that theory must not intrude into analysis; it is there to limit the intrusions o f 
any theory which is alien to the subject. At the opposite extreme, we have the subject’s 
self-symbolization, and that is synonymous with analytic treatment itself. . . . But the 
human being’s self-theorization is not based on nothing; no human being and no 
analysand invents his life story from scratch. We do not have an infinite number of sce­
narios at our disposal. Between the two extremes represented by self-theorization (and 
analytic treatment is a privileged moment within that theorization) and the general theo­
ry o f psychoanalysis, there is, then room for an intermediary level, or for theoretical 
schemata which are in part bound up with a cultural milieu (Laplanche 1987, p. 162-
125
163).
For Laplanche, the practice of analysis as a practice of consciousness is limited by the 
unconscious. Thought is limited by the desire at the heart of the unknown enigma which 
forms the basis for seduction. For this very reason, analysis is interminable. Human sub­
jectivity as an autopoetic concrescence is defined by its desiring production or eternal 
seduction. That which is not constituted by this desire is not human. In Buddhist terms, 
“nirvana” as the freedom from the illusions of desire is a mutation into another form. The 
bodhisattva approaches this limit in order to return to the human concrescence and inhab­
it it differently - with a certain consciousness and ethic of practice. Similarly, the analyst 
recognizes the knot made up of conscious thought and unconscious desire and each ana­
lytic process is an event which engages this knot at the foundation of human subjectivity 
- an event which also has its end.
Let me introduce three terms: “limited”, “interminable”, and “terminated”. Analysis is 
limited: it is limited by the unconscious and, even within the unconscious, it is limited by 
what I  call the source-objects o f the drive. It is possible to breach this unconscious limit, 
and to push it back, but it is not possible to abolish it, as Freud hoped. My second propo­
sition is that even though - or perhaps because - it is limited, analysis is also inter­
minable. Fortunately for human beings, self-interpretation is, potentially, an infinite 
process. It will be a very sad day when that process comes to an end! But the fact that 
self-interpretation is infinite does not mean that the analytic situation is infinte or that 
every analysis is interminable. And it is at this point that we have to introduce a third 
term: the end. In the light o f what has been said above, the end cannot mean the “resolu­
tion o f transference” because transference is a relationship with the enigmatic object. It 
may simply mean that the process o f transference is transferred into one or more different 
sites, one or more different relationships. The transference o f transference is, then, the 
only conceivable end for a psychoanalysis (Laplanche 1987, p. 163-164).
The analytic process is not limited to what has hitherto been known as psychotherapy or 
psychoanalysis but forms the basis of a variety of transformative practices. The analytic 
process of untying the complex knot of the psyche - of analyzing the individuated com-
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ponents of any organized concrescence - of dislodging rigid beliefs, forms, or “hung up” 
quasi-stable organizations - in the pragmatic and cybernetic ecology of subjectivities and 
systems at the edge of order and chaos takes place in self-theorizing and artistic creation, 
collective practices of mysticism and consciousness, teaching and healing environments, 
socio-political institutions, cultural myths, and human relations of all types. Highly “exte­
riorized” social, collective, and ritual subjectivities of the sacred at one point imploded 
into individual inner experience and found expression and transformation through the ini­
tial psychoanalytic setting, but this setting already lags behind the increasingly rapid 
transformation of today’s psyche. The increase in consciousness and the interlinking of 
maps of information and communication gives rise to a hysterical-schizophrenic field of 
subjectivities in which the individual conscrescence of the integrated self or ego is 
already disappearing along with the ability to believe in or commit to any stable form. In 
the face of the concrete facts of the real, our option is not to return to the past but to 
attempt to grasp the implications of the complexity of multi-layered interacting subjectiv­
ities unfolding through time-space coordinates, while not losing our ability to arbitrarily 
assent - to fully inhabit or incarnate - the sovereign singularity and existential essence of 
each event. This practice which Guattari called “schizoanalysis” is likewise Bataille’s 
“sovereignty within the general economy,” Nietzsche’s “will to power,” and Lacan’s 
practice of “enjoying your symptom” all of which elucidate the ends of analysis and the 
initiation of what lies beyond.
12. Translation and Poetics - Nicolas Abraham
Bergson and Whitehead criticized Western metaphysics for spatializing the temporal, and 
although Darwin and Freud reengaged with time by grasping human concrescence in its 
limited, mutating, and decentered nature, there is in almost every case of scientific theo­
rizing an attempt to found the eternal or the structural - to escape from the temporal 
unfolding of the actual out of the possible. Nicolas Abraham’s phenomenological trans­
formation of psychoanalysis is an attempt to map - not the complex organization of men­
tal space but - the invention of time in human subjectivity. Returning to Freud, Abraham 
begins with the notion of unconscious wish or desire. Freud claims that the wish lies out-
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side of temporal “reality” and also that it is the result of repression by the obstacle of the 
introjected superego. For Abraham the wish and and its obstacle form a complement 
which creates the time of human subjectivity. This time would not be eternal time but 
rather Bergson’s “duration” which is the subjective experience of temporality that is 
unique to each concrescence - the metabolism which creates multiple “times of time” 
(Boscolo & Bertrando 1993) within and across subjectivities.
Two major psychoanalytic concepts apppear to be independent o f the process o f tempo­
rality; the (unconscious) wish - whose extratemporal nature was emphasized by Freud - 
and the (equally unconscious) superego which, like the wish, cannot by itself bring about 
any sort o f change. To say that the wish endures in the unconscious, that it persists out­
side time, can only mean that it is an eternally active present and that, by nature, it can 
never be fulfilled. The wish is meant to remain a simple wish. It cannot single-handedly 
create time. The wish is not even conceivable on its own. And if  the wish is necessarily 
shielded from fulfillment, it must also imply an intrinsic obstacle that keeps it simultane­
ously active and unfulfilled. Such in fact is the function o f the superego as a complement 
to the wish. Because they arise together, it is correct to say: to every wish its superego. 
The specific and respective contents o f each are utterly inseparable (Abraham 1985, p. 
112).
It is not the wish that lies outside of time but the process of wishing itself - or desire - 
which remains eternal in its movement: fulfillment, wish, obstacle, fulfillment. . . .  We 
do not need to resort to the concept of lack in this case for it is not lack which is desired, 
but the eternal movement. Desire does not desire lack but desires desire itself which is 
not lack but the process of desires matched with obstacles which are overcome only to 
find new desires. We do not have to worry about achieving fulfillment, because absolute 
fulfillment can never be reached. One can “have one’s cake and eat it too.” Here we over­
come an important false dilemma, for the dialectical movement found in Hegel and 
Lacan is in fact already a part of the organic multiplicity of affects found in Spinoza and 
Deleuze. The dialectic - when followed through to its limits - leads to the multiple dura­
tions of time, but a theory of multiplicity threatens to lose sight of the becoming of time 
if it does not recognize the primary splitting of the dialectic which creates all difference
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in the first place.
Abraham transforms Freud’s concept of the ego by claiming that it is this process of 
time-creation or “temporo-genesis” by which obstacles are overcome through desire. The 
ego is never the completed self, but the story of one’s desire-repression complements or 
circuits which form a historical past that continues to slide toward the present from every 
direction.
Given that the ego also symbolizes the obstacle from which it emerges, and that every one 
of its acts is also the negation o f an unconscious wish, the fulfillment the ego may provide 
is necessarily tinged with dissatisfaction. Such is the ego's fundamental ambiguity. This 
observation is crucial: if  the fulfillment o f the ego’s every desire entails the disappoint­
ment of an underlying unconscious wish, if  what comes is always something other than 
what is expected in one’s heart o f hearts, the present cannot solidify into a definitive 
accomplishment. It must slide implacably toward another present, itself, o f course, tinged 
with the same inherent ambiguity. The ego, apprised o f a world, conquers its own unity 
through successive repressions and carries within it their imprints. Through the activity 
o f his ego, man implicitly conveys the history o f his repressions (Abraham 1985, p. 114).
If repression did not exist we would have to create it. And we do. Physical-material 
obstacles engage our struggles in a world which is marked by such heroics. But when 
nothing steps in to play the role of obstacle we supply our own repressions - Freud’s 
superego. We play games with ourselves by setting goals and being seduced into desires 
that are unattainable. Girard’s (1978) idea of “mimetic desire” describes the process by 
which the struggle to the death for recognition itself leads to neurotic impasses. Similarly 
when the process of desire ends in failure at every turn - as in Bateson’s (1972) “double­
bind” situation - the result is learned helplessness, resignation, and depression, or a com­
plete rewriting of the rules as in schizophrenic subjectivity.
These remarks, though incomplete, do make one point clear. The creation o f time, under­
stood as both the genesis and the operation of the ego, cannot be described without the 
Freudian concept o f the unconscious. All creations o f genuine temporality - the result of
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actual conflicts - entail a repression, just as every temporal operation, functioning by the 
repetition of this creation, specifies this same repression. Man needs repression to such a 
degree that a complete lack o f repressing affections drives him to fabricate them. We can­
not live without repressive affections (whatever they may be); they are nourishment for 
the superego, a means o f keeping desire alive (Abraham 1985, p. 115).
Temporo-genesis forms a part of the unfolding individuation of organized concrescences 
at all levels of the universe. Pattern in adaptation, evolution, and self-organization shows 
similarities across singular forms which can be tapped into through the intuitive and 
abductive method of empathy which forms the basis of psychoanalysis, ethology, ethnog­
raphy, phenomenological semiotics, and other sciences of subjectivity. Even in the natur­
al sciences of biology, chemistry, and physics, this approach has begun to be recognized. 
If the human being can follow the method of Spinoza’s sage - by objectively placing his 
subjectivity in parallel with other subjectivities without affirming arbitrary assent as 
much as possible - he may be able to map pattern and organization which communicate 
throughout the universe in other forms.
These a priori patterns are not only specific and unique; they also lay claim to universal 
validity. A temporal structure, conveyed through acts, words, or a work o f art, speaks to 
all by revealing its genetic depth. At the core o f this universality lies the fact that every 
human being uses similar instruments o f maturation and that these similarities also 
reflect a common store o f original affections rehearsed in our individual childhoods. This 
is one reason why empathy, in the genetic and psychoanalytic sense, is not mere projec­
tion but rather a form o f knowledge open to comparison. This is also why there can be 
criteria, however intuitive they may be, for distinguishing between a genuine work of art 
and an empty simulacrum (Abraham 1985, p. 117).
The semiotics of translation is a poetic science. All maps are tautologies in that they do 
not reveal any essential truth but produce truth by translating one concrescent form or 
system into another - what Bateson (1972) and Rossi (1988, 1993) call “information 
transduction.” Apart from the limited sovereignty of singular events, there is only this 
transversal communication which bridges such singular essences. Abraham’s poetics of
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psychoanalytic translation is akin to a kind of detective work in which the process or 
event is fleshed out by analyzing its organic self-organization so that it can be wrenched 
from its stagnation and put in contact with the movement of other mutating and evolving 
forms. The analysis of works of art, of institutions, and of human subjectivities trans­
forms dead symbols into living processes.
We are used to treating symbols like archaeologists who attempt to decipher the written 
documents o f an unknown language. What is given is “something ” with a meaning. Many 
o f us live with the convenient misconception that in order to decipher [the document] it is 
sufficient to add meaning to the “thing” or the hieroglyphs. . . . Yet, in so doing [we] 
merely convert one system o f symbols into another, and this latter system still stops short 
o f laying open its secret. Actually, the reading o f a symbolic text cannnot be content with 
registering one-to-one equivalence between two terms. The work o f deciphering will be 
completed only if  we restore the entire circuit o f functions involving a multiplicity o f sub­
jects and in which the symbol-thing is simply a relay.
Here a first distinction must be made between, on the one hand, the symbol-thing 
considered as a hieroglyph. . .  - the lifeless symbol - and, on the other hand, the symbol 
included in a process, the symbol in operation, endowed with meaning and implying con­
crete subjects, together considered a functioning unit (Abraham 1985, p. 152).
Meanings are not given - they are created through human subjectivity and translated 
through individuated symbolic forms only in order to find expression and communication 
in a route toward the other which dissolves the very barriers which had been set up. The 
process of desire-repression which creates time, rhythm, and metabolism forms a part of 
the chaosmic movement of all individuation-dissolution - the setting up and breaking 
down of barriers. Abraham’s psychoanalytic practice bypasses the notion of the individ­
ual ego or self as an entity of significance along with the notion of adaptation to the order 
of things. Everything is a matter of the rhythm, of the refrain - of listening for the hidden 
processes which play through us and seek expression just as in the oral poetry of primi­
tive cultures (Brown 1991). The subject is the poem which is being written on the world, 
and the analyst is only another translator, midwife, or shaman who brings it to fruition
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Psychoanalytic listening consists o f a special way o f treating language. While normally 
we are given meanings, the analyst is given symbols. Symbols are data that are missing 
an as yet undetermined part, but that can, in principle, be determined. The special aim of 
psychoanalytic listening is to find the symbol’s complement, recovering it from indetermi­
nacy. From the beginnings o f psychoanalysis to the present, theoretical efforts have been 
aimed at inventing rules that will permit us to find the unknown missing complement, in 
other words, the fragment that symbolizes with . . .  or . . .  co-symbolizes.
It does happen, however, that this type o f listening encounters a form of speech 
that resists the search for a co-symbol and defeats every attempt at completion. In such 
cases it is as if the sense o f the words was shrouded by an enigma too dense to be deci­
phered by known forms o f listening. [We must] not back down from the search for co­
symbols no matter how hopeless the task seems. They cannot be lacking even if  they are 
hard to find although their discovery may require breaking the usual rules o f listening...  
(Abraham 1985, p. 152-153).
13. Signs of Affect - Julia Kristeva
Psychoanalysis was a response to a change in human subjectivity. Just as the organization 
and selection of certain interwoven forms in evolution has changed to favor the concen­
tration of certain types - individual, group, species, gene - so too has the human psyche 
mutated in its organization of subjectivity. The development from collective forms of rit­
ual, religion, and political institutions to the individual subject brought with it new 
affects, new concepts, and new maladies. Freud’s discovery of the implosion of social 
relations into the individual psyche also served to invent this subjectivity - to give it 
expression. Yet in a sense, psychoanalysis has always been one step behind. Freud’s 
metapsychology and his psychoanalytic practice took for granted the stable environments 
of family and society which contained his subjects. In fact it was the intense and stifling 
stability itself which lead to so many of the symptoms he was mapping out. Over the past 
century psychoanalysis has been reworking these maps, but meanwhile the psyche has 
changed. The breakdown of stable forms of containment in the socius has left an increas­
ingly fragmented social life and has lead to an increasingly fragmented psyche.
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Julia Kristeva has attempted to understand the current state of the psyche within its envi­
ronment and the “new maladies of the soul” which have arisen - often to the blindness of 
analysts and therapists stuck in their outdated maps and practices. Rather than being 
engaged in the process of meaning which acts previously took on, modem man is disap­
pearing into the act itself - the movement of objects and information which creates links 
devoid of any sovereignty or soul.
Actions and their imminent abandonment have replaced the interpretation o f meaning.
We have neither the time nor the space needed to create a soul for ourselves, and 
the mere hint o f such activity seems frivolous and ill-advised. Held back by his aloofness, 
modem man is a narcissist - a narcissist who may suffer, but who feels no remorse. He 
manifests his suffering in his body and he is afflicted with somatic symptoms. His prob­
lems serve to justify his refuge in the very problems that his own desire paradoxically 
solicits. When he is not depressed, he becomes swept away by insignificant and valueless 
objects that offer a perverse pleasure, but no satisfaction. Living in a piecemeal and 
accelerated space and time, he often has trouble acknowledging his own physiognomy; 
left without a sexual, subjective, or moral identity, this amphibian is a being o f bound­
aries, a borderline, or a “false se lf ' - a body that acts, often without even the joys o f such 
performative drunkenness. Modem man is losing his soul, but he does not know it, for the 
psychic apparatus is what registers representations and their meaningful values for the 
subject (Kristeva 1993, p. 7-8).
The neurotic symptoms of the past were rituals which required the subjective experience 
of time - a time which no longer exists. For Kristeva, the symptoms of today are increas­
ingly psychotic in that they evoke the extremely schizoid nature of the socio-cultural 
environment from which they emerge. The rapid increase of efficiency has not lead to the 
increase of subjective time for reflection, meaning, and the sacred, but to the disappear­
ance of sovereign subjectivity and its shared communion with the other in favor of the 
communication of information, maps, and forms for their own sake devoid of a soul. This 
is easier for us. Without joy there is no pain. We plug in. We abandon the identification 
with our individual and even momentary subjective experience in order to experience
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ourselves as objects free from the illusion of beliefs.
A wide variety o f troubles can bring new patients to the analyses couch: sexual and rela­
tionship difficulties, somatic symptoms, a difficulty in expressing oneself, and a general 
malaise caused by a language experienced as “artificial, ” “empty, ” or “mechanical. ” 
These patients often resemble “traditional ” analysands, but “maladies o f the soul soon 
break through their hysterical and obsessional allure - umaladies o f the soul ” that are 
not necessarily psychoses, but that evoke the psychotic patient’s inability to symbolize his 
unbearable traumas (Kristeva 1993, p. 8-9).
Like Bataille (1973, 1975), Kristeva poses contemporary humanity with a dual problem. 
First, the current state of affairs is in no way equipped to handle the drives of human 
experience, and what we see are only new outlets - new symptoms which we ignore or 
pretend are the result of some outside enemy. The increasing number of physical, psy­
chic, and social symptoms renders absurd the idea of technological advances in health 
and general living conditions. The symptoms simply change form. But second, Kristeva - 
like Bataille - also confronts the possibility that humanity may find its “solution” through 
the absolute obliteration of subjectivity. In this case the turn to psychopharmacology, vir­
tual reality, and biotechnology may be able to eclipse everything which constitutes the 
human concrescence. In this case the autopoetic organization of humanity would have 
changed to such an extent that humanity would reach the fulfillment of its concrescence - 
it would die.
We see all too easily, however, that this mutation may be beneficial. More than just a 
commodity or a new variant of the “opium o f the people, ” the current transformation of 
psychic life may foreshadow a new humanity, one whose psychological conveniences will 
be able to overcome metaphysical anxiety and the need for meaning. Wouldn’t it be great 
to be satisfied with just a pill and a television screen (Kristeva 1993, p. 8)?
Of course the position of maintaining the sovereign subjectivity which characterizes 
humanity is an affirmation of arbitrary assent - a choice. The mutation of humanity to 
another form of subjectivity without what Kristeva call a “soul” - or what Bataille calls
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“sovereignty” - is for many the next step in evolution whether they are conscious of the 
implications or not. For Kristeva, however, the soul of individual choice and meaning 
able to distinguish itself from the other and yet to communicate this isolation and bridge 
the gap between self and other is the essence of humanity. Without it there would be no 
humanity. Perhaps we can define human subjectivity by its ability to distinguish itself 
from its fellow beings and to choose for itself - to seize its own singularity and to enact 
its jouissance. And the evocation of singularity is exactly what Kristeva recommends of 
psychoanalytic practice. Maps of the psyche may serve as a template, but in the end, each 
individual subjectivity is a world in itself.
The fact remains, however, that analysts who do not discover a new malady o f the soul in 
each o f their patients do not fully appreciate the uniqeness o f each individual. Similarly, 
we can place ourselves at the heart o f the analytic project by realizing that these new 
maladies o f the soul go beyond traditional classification systems and their inevitable 
overhaul. What is more important, they embody difficulties or obstacles in psychic repre­
sentation, difficulties that end up destroying psychic life. Revitalizing grammar and 
rhetoric, and enriching the style o f those who wish to speak with us because they can no 
longer remain silent and brushed aside: do such projects not mirror the new life and new 
psyche that psychoanalysis wishes to unearth (Kristeva 1993, p. 9-10)?
Representations of the psyche which have been supplied for the individual subject by cul­
tural symbolic forms may be used without serving to embody or translate the affectivity 
of life. Images, signs, and symbols permeate modem social life as the creation of objects 
through a detached media spectacle without being developed from inner experience out­
ward. Kristeva follows Guattari’s path of psychoanalytic practice as a pragmatics of the 
psyche in which the mobilization of percepts, affects, and concepts is developed through 
what works in each subjective event. While structures and maps of the psyche may help 
suggest possibilities, like Bion’s “Grid” they should not stifle the construction of new 
subjectivities by filtering possible experience through rigid categories.
To put it another way, although the psychiatric notions of "structure ” (hysterical, obses­
sional, schizophrenic, paranoid, etc.) can offer an initial and rudimentary outline that the
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analyst may find useful, these notions are unable to withstand a microanalysis that is 
attentive to the diversity and polyvalence o f psychic representatives. We have a growing 
interest in structural interferences as well as “borderline states” that go beyond their 
status as new clinical occurrences indicating the growth o f subjectivity and psychic 
states, for they also have the advantage o f challenging the foundation o f traditional clas­
sification systems (Kristeva 1993, p. 35).
For Kristeva, the “borderline” state is not a diagnostic category, but the increasingly com­
mon vulnerable position into which we are plunged on the edge of order and chaos. 
Bateson, Guattari, Laing, and other “antipsychiatric” therapists sought to transform the 
breakdown of schizophrenia into a breakthrough rather than arresting and paralyzing sub­
jectivities in a state of chaos or entropy. Kristeva suggests that the analysand of today - 
and increasingly the subject of contemporary society - offers such a complex and fragile 
system which could either mutate toward richness or devolve into a breakdown.
Kristeva’s lineage in both Lacanian and more traditional psychoanalytic traditions and in 
semiotic practices has lead her to develop a full map of human subjectivity and its trans­
formative practices. Despite the importance of Lacan’s attention to the symbolic expres­
sion of experience and its final necessity for the elaboration of jouissance, Kristeva is not 
affraid to work with the proto-symbolic forms of affects at the level of the imaginary and 
real. In fact it may be the symbolic itself in abstract levels of cognitive, conscious, and 
linguistic development which blocks the depth of emotional affect. Kristeva seeks to 
break through intellectual impasses by evoking emotion through hysterical-dramatic 
engagement with the imaginary. This return to chaos can release forces of energy or dri­
ves which can then come to be translated and embodied in new semiotic signifying prac­
tices which embody the complexity of percept, affect, concept, and act through an 
expressionism in which the abstraction of the symbolic does not swamp the intensity of 
the event.
Faced with such problems, analytical technique has two possible solutions:
1. To mobilize affects, without hesitating to encourage the psychodramatic aspect 
o f the treatment that tends to attract hysterics, since this mode enables them to express
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affect. The mobilization o f affects is an anti-inhibitor o f the signifying process. New 
affects realized in the transference disrupt the intellectualization and the inhibiting func­
tion that are characteristic o f intellectual acting-out. Analysts mobilize affect by openly 
presenting themselves during interpretation as a magnet o f libido. This emphasis on the 
analyst’s ego is an “imaginary-ization” o f the treatment, one that is able to combat the 
hysteric \s sensory autism.
2. A verbalization o f perception and sensation can then free up the signifying 
process that defensively withdrew itself though intellectualization, that is, in order to 
restore an image o f the eroticized body, to restore sensation and perception by giving 
them a name. Subjects can only be revived if  they endow perceptions and sensations with 
signifiance. Without signifiance, we are faced with the separation between the I-cogito 
and an ego linked with incommunicable affects. What is the figure o f inhibition? The 1- 
cogito interrupted by the affect-ridden ego blocking the l-cogito. Could the subject be the 
advent o f one in the other, o f the I-cogito in the affect-ridden ego, and vice versa 
(Kristeva 1993, p. 99-100)?
Kristeva reintegrates the linguistic-mythic element of psychoanalysis with the metapsy- 
chological expression of drives and forces through perceptual, emotional, and conceptual 
organization in a manner which recalls Jung’s practice of individuation and psychosyn­
thesis (Rossi 1985). Free association unleashes more than just the symbolic. It brings 
about a multiplicity of drives and forces through pre-signifying regimes and accompany­
ing uncertainties. The analytic space - whether in private practice or institutional realms - 
becomes a facilitating environment for the rediscovery and reconstruction of spatio-tem­
poral dimensions for the subject.
The type o f memory brought about by free association is a search for the past. This mem­
ory enables subjects to confront their traumatic experience with speech, yet we cannot 
solicit this traumatic memory without opening up the genealogy o f cognitive signs. That 
is, to topple the cogito over into sensation.. . .  Time regained is nothing if  not the subject, 
but only insofar as he is able, through cognitive language, to unmask the perception itself 
(Kristeva 1993, p. 100).
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Kristeva’s analytic space is a development of Winnicott’s facilitating environment in 
which the whole field of human subjectivity is put into play and reworked. Kristeva is not 
affraid to expand the field of analysis to include dramatization, semiotic practices, or any­
thing that works. In this sense she follows the direction of recent family and systems ther­
apists in taking a more open and experimental approach to subjectivity embedded in a 
complex network of relations, yet she never loses sight of the unconscious depth of the 
psyche revealed through traditional psychoanalytic work (Elkaim 1990, Andersen 1991, 
Boscolo & Bertrando 1993, Cecchin et al 1992, Watzlawick et al 1974, Simon 1996). The 
end of human experience remains the jouissance of the subject as it mutates through time 
- the sovereignty of meaning experienced immediately within and beyond the recognition 
of ecologically integrated systems. Toward this end, Kristeva offers the experience of 
women, children, and artists who with openness and playing are able to maintain the 
imaginary realm through the development of semiotic and symbolic forms. In the future 
the analyst may serve not only as the subject supposed to know, the object to be used, or 
the container, but as a guide through a series of individual and collective semiotic and 
noetic practices which reorganize the psyche’s experience of the world and transform 
subjectivity into a multiplicity of forms.
Women are undoubtedly capable o f this transferential plasticity and these adolescent 
dynamics. What is more, certain subjects attain the symbolic elaboration and the creative 
transmission o f this particularity - 1 am referring to artists. A “domestication ” o f perver­
sion follows, which focuses on an ideal father and enables us to adapt o f other people by 
giving our utmost effort within an optimal jouissance.
I  am convinced that this sort o f specificity is necessary if one wishes to become an 
analyst (Kristeva 1993, p. 200).
14. Schizoanalysis and Chaosmosis - Felix Guattari
With Felix Guattari, psychoanalysis reaches its absolute transformation and fullfillment 
as a theory and practice of subjectivity. Guattari’s crossing of multiple lines of trajectory 
as analyst, activist, artist, and philosopher allowed him to rethink the analytic apparatus
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again and again. While paying homage to his Freudian and Lacanian roots, he never ceas­
es to develop a pragmatic approach which borrows, exchanges, and puts into play ideas, 
metaphors, examples, and possibilities from the most disparate fields.
Freud’s original map of the psyche has in Guattari’s eyes come to find itself increasingly 
thwarted in any attempt to find a clear answer. Rather, the multiplicity of symptoms 
which manifest themselves out of the chaotic heterogeneity of the unconscious and form 
quasi-stable forms reveal the fractal and complex nature of the psyche. At any point what 
is discovered is simultaneously invented. We never actually perceive - or receive - the 
real. Rather we create our “reality” within the real. Perception/creation is the organization 
of events in new forms from the individual moment to the grand theory in varying 
degrees of passivity and activity.
The Unconscious presented as a universe o f non-contradiction, o f the heterogenesis of 
opposites, envelops the manifest Territories o f the symptom, whose tendency towards 
autonomisation, autopoietic, pathic and pathogenic repetition threatens the unity o f the 
self And this will reveal itself moreover during the history o f the analytical clinic to be 
increasingly precarious, indeed fractalised. Freudian cartography is not only descriptive; 
it is inseparable from the pragmatics o f transference and interpretation. In any event, I  
would argue that it should be disengaged from a significational perspective and under­
stood as a conversation of expressive means and as a mutation o f ontological textures 
releasing new lines o f the possible - and this from the simple fact o f putting into place 
new assemblages o f listening and modelisation (Guattari 1992, p. 62-63).
Freudian psychoanalysis does not succeed in completely modeling the psyche - and nei­
ther does any theory - but it does create new ways of experiencing the world which can 
only continue to be transformed through practice. Indeed the psyche always runs ahead of 
theory. The subject essentialized only becomes trapped or “subjected” by those defini­
tions and imperatives which come from above. Subjectivity itself evokes the sovereign 
essence of the subjective pole of experience as it is lived through which marks the limits 
and singularity of each fleeting form. Freudian mapping invented new forms of subjectiv­
ity - new ways of experiencing the world - which were lost through his followers the
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moment they became objective descriptive factors rather than possible modes to be 
inhabited. At stake in Guattari is the refusal to define in relation to norms or to lack. The 
idea is not to make the unconscious conscious - for consciousness destroys alterity - but 
to enact the heterogeneity of the unconscious. If the unconscious is a chaotic resevoir of 
the possible, then it is the place not of the other but of otherness itself - alterity. Alterity is 
the enigma of the unknown, and consciousness, knowing, and signifying mastery always 
destroy this enigma at the heart of existence.
With the invention of the analytic apparatus, Freudian modelisation brought about a 
clear enrichment in the production o f subjectivity, an enlargement o f its referential con­
stellations, a new pragmatic opening. But it quickly encountered limits with its familial 
and universalising conceptions, with its stereotyped practice o f interpretation, but above 
all with its inability to go beyond linguistic semiology. While psychoanalysis conceptu­
alises psychosis through its vision o f neurosis, schizoanalysis approaches all modalities 
of subjectivation in light of the mode of being in the world o f psychosis. Because nowhere 
more than here is the ordinary modelisation o f everyday existence so denuded; the 
“axioms o f daily life” stand in the way of the a-signifying function, the degree zero o f all 
possible modelisation. With neurosis, symptomatic matter continues to bathe in the envi­
ronment o f dominant significations while with psychosis the world o f standardised 
Dasein loses its consistency. Alterity, as such, becomes the primary question. For exam­
ple, what finds itself fragilised, cracked up, schizzed, in delire or hallucinating when con­
fronted with the status o f the objective world, is the point o f view of the other in me, the 
recognised body in articulation with the lived body and the felt body; these are the nor­
malised coordinates o f alterity which give their foundation to sensible evidence (Guattari 
1992, p. 63-64).
Freud centered his modeling of the psyche around the neurotic symptomatologies which 
characterized the subjectivities of his milieu, and psychosis has always been defined in 
relation to these moderately functional symptoms as an absolute breakdown. Most ana­
lysts have declined to deal with “psychotic” experience. Guattari’s work with schizo­
phrenics lead him to approach such subjectivities without prejudged labeling and to grasp 
the schizoid or fractalized state of the psyche as the essence of all human subjectivity.
140
Rather than finding integration for primal splitting like Klein or symbolic expression for 
the divided subject like Lacan, Guattari invents “schizoanalysis” as a process of mapping 
and reconstructing the heterogenic nature of human subjectivity proactively. Guattari 
deconstructs the pejorative label of lack by which the concept of schizophrenia operates, 
while simultaneously revealing the essentially schizoid nature of human experience 
inhabited by alterity. The event labeled “schizophrenia” is in no way valorized but pre­
sented as one of many possible breakdowns on the borderline of order and chaos which - 
because of its paralysis and petrification through labels, judgements, and physical and 
chemical restraint - fails to lead to a breakthrough or reorganization but rather becomes 
“hung up” in turbulence as Pribram (1991) describes of complex systems. Nevertheless, 
the object is not to valorize chaos or schizoid experience, but to multiply the possible 
reorganizations or reconquests of “existential territories” of sovereignty and meaning - 
subjective moments suffused with their own singularity.
Schizoanalysis obviously does not consist in miming schizophrenia, but in crossing, like 
it, the barriers o f non-sense which prohibit access to a-signifying nuclei o f subjectivation, 
the only way to shift petrified systems o f modelisation. It implies an optimal enlargement 
of pragmatic entrances into Unconscious formations. . . . The psychotic complex is thus 
not the exclusive concern of verbal communication and individuated transference. The 
treatment o f a psychotic, in the context o f institutional psychotherapy, works, with a 
renewed approach to transference, focussed henceforth on parts o f the body, on a con­
stellation o f individuals, on a group, on an institutional ensemble, a machinic system, a 
semiotic economy, etc. (grafts o f transference), and conceived as desiring becoming, that 
is to say, pathic existential intensity, impossible to circumscribe as a distinct entity. The 
objective o f such a therapeutic approach would be to increase as much as possible the 
range of means offered in the recompostion o f a patient's corporeal, biological, psychical 
and social Territories.. . .  Treated as an ensemble o f autopoietic and transversalist social 
machines, the caring institution becomes a field propitious to an ability to discern these 
vectors which intersect with individuated subjectivity, which work it despite itself 
(Guattari 1992, p. 68-69).
What is at stake in the transformation of subjectivity is a scene - a scenario - in which
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perceptual, affective, semiotic, and conceptual dimensions cross lines of force. The La 
Borde Clinic which Guattari helped create served as a model for experimentation with 
institutional approaches to “schizophrenic” experience. Through La Borde, Guattari 
transferred analytic practice from the private setting of the consulting room to the institu­
tional environment itself in which desires, relationships, and expressions are reworked 
through a multiplicity of individual and collective practices.
Consider, for example, the institutional sub-ensemble that constitutes the kitchen at La 
Borde Clinic. It combines highly heterogeneous social, subjective and functional dimen­
sions. This Territory can close in on itself, become the site o f stereotyped attitudes and 
behaviour, where everyone mechanically carries out their little refrain. But it can also 
come to life, trigger an existential agglomeration, a drive machine - and not simply o f an 
oral kind, which will have an influence on the people who participate in its activities or 
just passing through. The kitchen then becomes a little opera scene: in it people talk, 
dance and play with all kinds o f instruments, with water and fire, dough and dustbins, 
relations o f prestige and submission. As a place for the preparation o f food, it is the cen­
tre o f exchange o f material and indicative Fluxes and prestations o f every kind. But this 
metabolism o f Flux will only have transferential significance on the condition that the 
whole apparatus functions effectively as a structure which welcomes the preverbal com­
ponents o f the psychotic patients. This resource o f ambience, o f contextual subjectivity, is 
itself indexed to the degree of openness (coefficient o f transversality) o f this institutional 
sub-ensemble to the rest o f the institution (Guattari 1992, p. 69).
Without becoming an adherent of theologies of psychoanalysis or deluded by political 
utopianism, Guattari constantly deconstructs fixed ideas by approaching the pragmatic 
realities and infinite possibilities of each situation. Individual psychotherapy is not 
thrown aside but recuperated as one of many possible realms for the reworking of trans­
ference affects, dramatizations, rituals, and other proto-semiotic pre-signifying embodi­
ments of drives. Guattari reveals the inherent prejudices and moralities underlying diag­
nostic categories and therapeutic goals by reformulating therapeutic, pedagogical, and 
creative practices and dissolving their boundaries. Subjectivities are marked by the 
autopoetic concrescence of organisms and systems not necessarily individual but rela-
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tional, existential, and machinic. For Guattari the focus on regimes and assemblages 
bypasses rigid categories without losing the essence of the concrete lived situation 
invoked by Guy Debord’s (1967,1988) political-artistic practices.
The most autistic psychical world is not in itself lacking in alterity. It is simply engaged 
in a constellation o f Universes disconnected from the dominant assemblages o f sociality. 
Lines can be thrown to the psychotic by mediations which will give consistency to certain 
o f these components o f Universes, or by the aggregation o f other components which did 
not previously exist. (Through the introduction o f materials o f expression unknown to the 
subject, for example, relating to the plastic arts, video, music, theatre, or quite simply. . .  
cooking!). Schizoanalytic cartography consists in the ability to discern those components 
lacking in consistency or existence. But it is a question here o f an essentially precarious 
undertaking, o f a continual creation, which does not have the benefit o f any pre-estab­
lished theoretical support. The enunciative emergence o f the kitchen at La Borde, to stay 
with this example, can lead it to take on the role o f partial analyser, without any guaran­
tee in time. The autopoietic character o f such an instance calls for a permanent renewal 
of the assemblage, a verification o f its capacity to welcome a-signifying singularities - 
unbearable patients, insoluble conflicts - a constant readustment o f its transversalist 
opening onto the outside world. Only the network o f nuclei o f partial enunciation - com­
prising groups, meetings, workshops, responsibilites, spontaneous constellations and 
individual initiatives - could arguably hold the title o f institutional analyser. The work o f 
the psychotherapist in the office is only a link in this complex apparatus; individuated 
transference is but one element o f the generalised transference already evoked. Just as 
the schizo has broken morrings with subjective individuation, the analysis o f the 
Unconscious should be recentered on the non-human processes o f subjectivation that I  
call machinic, but which are more than human - superhuman in a Nietzschean sense 
(Guattari 1992, p. 71-72).
According to Nietzsche, “God is dead” and humanity is a bridge to another form. 
Foucault (1969) augments this by claiming that the individual subjectivity created and 
lived by a humanity of the past has already left us. Theorists of the “postmodern” herald 
the death of grand narratives and the flattening of experience in which as Warhol pro-
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claimed everyone is “famous for fifteen minutes” (Lyotard 1979). Guattari picks up this 
thread in order to move beyond the human - not toward the imaginary fantasies of the 
group mind in cyberspace but toward new subjectivities of infinite finitude. If the finite is 
that which traps and rigidifies subjective experience in control mechanisms, and the infi­
nite is that which dissolves all concrescences into the entropy of non-differentiation, than 
infinite finitude is the process of chaosmosis itself which characterizes all systems fluctu­
ating between order and chaos, in which sovereign singularities are continually construct­
ed. Finally then, analytic transformative practices must be expanded beyond the private 
consulting room to include ecological communities, productive organizations, and teach­
ing and healing environments in a whole pragmatics of life engaged in endowing com­
plex systems with sovereign meaning within the multiplication of possibilities.
This novel type o f procedure is not reserved for the analysis o f psychotics but is also 
applicable to neurotics, psychopaths, normopaths. . . .  It both puts into question future 
analytical apparatuses in the domain o f pedagogy, the life o f the neighbourhood, the 
ecology o f retirement - in a whole field of molecular revolutions; and it works towards an 
escape from contemporary social desertification. The stakes o f a metamodelising theoret­
ical recomposition o f analysis are accordingly raised. They primarily involve a psycho­
analysis which constrain and sterilise the apprehension o f incorporeal Universes and 
singularising and heterogenetic becomings (Guattari 1992, p. 72).
By analyzing the general economy of organic and inorganic functioning, Guattari’s mod­
eling of chaosmosis aligns human subjectivity with the patterning of systems throughout 
the universe without losing sight of its essential singularity. All systems, events, or con­
crescences engage a process of chaosmosis, though with different metabolisms. In the 
modeling of Stuart Kauffman (1993), highly ordered “frozen” or “solid” states perform 
consistently but are unable to interact or communicate with other forms or to mutate into 
other states. On the other hand, chaotic “gaseous” systems are extremely vulnerable and 
unable to organize an essence or tradition of any type. Between the two, complex “liq­
uid” systems live at the edge of order and chaos and are liable to go over continually into 
chaos as a result of communication with other sovereign concrescences. This entrance 
into chaos or entropy makes for a vulnerable entity but also for the ability to adapt,
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evolve, and mutate - continually reorganizing new territories.
Human subjectivity holds its own particular place in a complex system of concrescences. 
The chaosmic nature of the psyche is far more complex than any map available. What is 
needed is metamodeling - the process of mapping and modeling itself which transforms 
our perspective and allows us to experience the next higher “logical level” (Bateson 
1972, Bandler & Grinder 1982) from which we can choose our fate. For example, the 
homogenetic reorganization of forms can be passively experienced as rigid control, petri­
fied stagnation, and inescapable repetitive symptomatology, yet it can also be an active 
creation of ontic, noetic, and symbolic forms. Similarly the complementary heterogenetic 
pole of chaosmosis can be undergone as breakdown, confusion, and disintegration or 
seized as a plunge into alterity and uncertainty which will lead to the reorganization of 
subjectivities.
We should be wary of the simplifying and reifying use o f categories such as autism and 
dissociation to describe schizo strangeness, the loss o f vital feeling for depression, glis- 
chrogeny for epilepsy. . . . Rather than global and standard deficit alterations o f normal 
subjectivity, we are actually dealing with modalities o f auto-alterity that are at once plur­
al and singular. I  is an other, a multiplicity o f others, embodied at the intersection o f par­
tial components o f enunciation, breaching on all sides individuated identity and the 
organised body. The cursor of chaosmosis never stops oscillating between these diverse 
enunciative nuclei - not in order to totalise them, synthesise them in a transcendent self, 
but in spite o f everything, to make a world o f them. So we are in the presence o f two types 
of homogenesis; a normal and/or neurotic homogenesis, which stops itself from going too 
far and for too long into a chaosmic, schizo type o f reduction; and an extreme pathic- 
pathological homogenesis leading to a positioning point o f worldly complexions, where 
not only do components o f sensibility (fixed in a time and a space) and those o f affectivity 
and cognition find themselves conjoined, but also axiological, ethical and aesthetic 
"charges ” as well. On the passive side o f schizo ontology we thus find a reductive home- 
genesis, a loss o f colour, flavour and timbre in Universes o f reference, but on the active 
side we find an emergent alterification relieved o f the mimetic barriers o f the self. Being 
is affirmed as the responsibility o f the other (Levinas) when nuclei o f partial subjectiva-
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tion are constituted in absorption or adsorption with the autonomy and autopoiesis o f 
creative processes (Guattari 1992, p. 83-84).
Despite the infinite possibilities of the pathways he opens up, Guattari never loses sight 
of the concrete limitations by which we are bound. On the contrary, his mapping of the 
human psyche is not a theology of theory or practice but an empirical-concrete-pragmatic 
science of subjectivity which forms the basis for an art of life. This is in some way simi­
lar to the practices described by Clastres (1974,1980) and Baudrillard (1976) in primitive 
tribal communities, but it is in no way a return. Guattari’s chaosmosis maps the complex 
process of order out of chaos which the human psyche engages through metamodelling, 
symbol-formation, ritual, and myth despite its genetic, biological, and physical limita­
tions.
It is thus equally from a hotchpotch o f banalities, prejudices, stereotypes, absurd situa­
tions - a whole free association of everyday life - that we have to extricate, once and for 
all, these Z  or Zen points o f chaosmosis, which can only be discovered in nonsense, 
through the lapsus, symptoms, aporias, the acting out o f somatic scenes, familial theatri- 
calism, or institutional structures. This, I  repeat, stems from the fact that chaosmosis is 
not exclusive to the individuated psyche. We are confronted by it in group life, in econom­
ic relations, machinism (for example, informatics) and even in the incorporeal Universes 
o f art or religion. In each case it calls for the reconstruction o f an operational narrativi- 
ty, that is, functioning beyond information and communication, like an existential crystal- 
isation o f ontological heterogenesis. The fact that the production o f a new real-other-vir­
tual complexion always results from a rupture o f sense, a short circuiting o f significa­
tions, the manifestation o f non-redundant repetition, auto-affirmative o f its own consis­
tency and the promotion of partial non-” identifiable” nuclei o f alterity - which escape 
identification - condemns the therapist and mental health worker to an essentially ethical 
duplicity. On one hand they work in the register o f a heterogenesis o f bits and pieces in 
order to remodel existential Territories, to forge transitory semiotic components between 
blocks o f immanence in the process o f petrification. . . . And on the other they can only 
claim pathic access to the chaosmic thing - within psychosis and the institution - to the 
extent that they in one way or another recreate and reinvent themselves as bodies without
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organs receptive to non-discursive intensities. Their potential conquests o f supplementary 
coefficients o f heterogenetic liberty, their access to mutant Universes o f reference and 
their entrance into renewed registers o f alterity, depend on their own submersion in 
homogenetic immanence (Guattari 1992, p. 86).
If we do not essentialize maps and models - if we do not mistake them for the truth - we 
can use any one of them. Epistemological and even ontological preeminence is replaced 
by ethical-aesthetic preeminence: sovereign jouissance marked by its relation to the sov­
ereign jouissance of others. The objective pole of ecosophically integrated complex sys­
tems which informs the position of the Spinozist sage shows us the way to the limitations 
of our objectifying thought and consciousness, and reveals the subjective process of con­
crete pragmatic knowledge in the expressionistic a-signifiying semiotic and symbolic 
translations of the arbitrary assent - the act of faith - the embracing of the practice of 
desire which we are.
Nosographic categories, pychiatric and psychoanalytic cartographies, necessarily betray 
the chaosmic texture o f psychotic transference. They constitute so many languages, mod­
erations among others - o f delire, the novel, the television serial - which cannot aspire 
to any epistemological preeminence. Nothing more but nothing less! Which is perhaps 
already a lot, because they themselves embody roles, points o f view and submissive 
behaviour, and even, why not, liberating processes. Who speaks the truth? This is no 
longer the question; but how and under what conditions can the best bring about the 
pragmatics o f incorporeal events that will recompose a world and reinstall processual 
complexity? The idiosyncratic modelisations grafted onto one-to-one analysis, self-analy­
sis and group psychotherapy . . .  always resort to borrowing from specialised languages. 
Our problematic o f chaosmosis and the schizoanalytic escape from the prison o f signifi­
cation is directed to compensate for these borrowings - towards a necessary a-signifying 
deconstruction o f their discursivity and towards placing their ontological efficacity into a 
pragmatic perspective (Guattari 1992, p. 86-87).
Forms are deconstructed and then reconstructed. Guattari and Deleuze collaborated 
(1972,1980) in a series of works in which they both became others. Guattari collaborated
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with activists, artists, and “schizophrenics” through processes where subjectivities were 
not properly named. Already the freedom evoked by Deleuze and Guattari has become an 
apology for lines of flight in which those who seek to escape traps deny the essential 
recapture of territories which create the complement of chaosmosis. Schizoanalysis traces 
patterns of escape and new possibilities which crack open the striated forms decaying 
around and within us. But the virtual reality of cyberspace and the altered states of psy­
chopharmacology already lend themselves too well to the reconquest of “capital time” in 
which everything is reduced to the objective and everyone is made to serve (Bataille 
1973, Debord 1988, Alliez 1992). Capitalism itself is schizoanalytic in its methods of 
withdrawing existence from the processes of production and efficiency: it always gets 
there first.
Holding a sovereign zone of subjectivity for a moment - or a lifetime - requires an identi­
fication which few are willing consciously to endure. The ego has always been a “false 
self’ constructed through a false consciousness of imaginary projection. But the sacred 
feeling of sovereignty - the essence of subjectivity - manifests a tragic tear over the loss 
of each singular concrescence which will be bom, live, and die uniquely despite its unity 
with the totality of everything that is. It is this tragic tear which cuts transversally across 
subjective singularities binding them momentarily through a fire of communication.
After deterritorialization comes reterritorialization. The “nomadic war machine” which 
escapes determination and signification nevertheless employs an “apparatus of capture” - 
if only for a moment - to organize its experience: chaos is seduced into order. The dialec­
tical and circular chaosmosis of being and becoming is also an unfolding multiplicity 
which is both linear and holographic. Nietzsche suggested that where one can no longer 
love, one should pass by. Schizoanalysis does not stop to judge or to understand, rather it 
engages, listens, seduces, and activates. The consciousness of not being the thing that you 
are - of being nothing if not everything - need not lead to nihilism, but to the reinvest­






1. Sacrifice and Magic - Shamanism
Subjectivity is as much social as it is individual. Cultural manifestations of the psyche in 
myth, ritual, art, and religion give external collective form to what in the individual 
remains inner experience. While psychoanalysis has succeeded in mapping the divided 
subjectivity of the modem psyche, its true genius depends on its ability to map other sub­
jectivities which lie outside this realm. As long as psychoanalysis reifies its mapping of 
modem subjectivity in order to understand the experiences of other civilizations and 
other states - including, for example, mystical, psychotic, psychic, hypnotic, and psyche­
delic subjectivities - it will remain but one more form of knowledge or truth. The impor­
tance of the analytic method itself lies in its ability to perceive other subjectivities with­
out objectifying them from within one’s own subjectivity. Ethnography, ethology, and 
other abductive approaches use similar methods of participant observation in trying to 
map animal and human states from within. A “metapsychoanalytic” understanding of 
experience will only have reached its potential when the delusions of science and the 
boundaries of specific disciplines have given way to an analytic approach to the other - 
whether human, animal, cultural, energetic, material, or machinic.
While an analytic or ethnopsychological human science cannot necessarily discover the 
“facts” about cultural forms, that does not mean that one cannot take a more objective or 
scientific approach through ethnographic, psychoanalytic, or other abductive methods - 
perhaps by collecting and comparing as many stories or maps as possible about a particu­
lar event - perhaps by returning to the original sources and documents or by collecting 
the reports of those who have bom witness to a certain time and place. The birth of eth­
nology from folklore and the oral tradition has only produced another approach to the 
knowledge of human experience. In this sense the difference between history and story is 
similar to the difference Jean Laplanche (1987) describes between theory and fantasy. Of 
course at one level all theory is fantasy - all history is a story - and this must be kept in 
mind, but a theory is also something more than a fantasy in the meaning that it takes on 
for people on a large scale. But it must also be remembered that a fantasy or a story is 
never “just” a fantasy or a story. They too have real effects at the individual level. The 
truth then of history and story - of theory and fantasy - is not to be found in their factuali-
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ty or fictionality but in their pragmatic effects in the real - in their sense.
No one has done more to question the assumptions of socio-historical research than 
Michel Foucault (1969). While Foucault certainly did not attempt to be comprehensive in 
his histories, he did demonstrate another way of seeing history and story by tracing 
genealogies of the forgotten and excluded documents of the time - of the everyday circu­
lation of language within these documents rather than the history constructed by histori­
ans. By taking the statements of language first, as the very way in which truth is created 
by the dominant ideologies of a certain age, Foucault showed in fact how the very 
desires, thoughts, and inner experiences of whole peoples come to be formed by the 
desires of the Other, and how those that think and act differently come to be excluded 
through the construction of the symbolic.
In addition to this, he made clear for the first time the blurred boundaries between our 
conceptions of history as fact and the myths of “primitive” civilizations. Obviously those 
of the past have believed in the truth of their histories just as much as we do - even more 
so given their willingness to fight and die for them. If there is any advance in our own 
“objective” perspective, it will not arrive until it achieves the very distance that allows us 
to see the simultaneous truth and fiction of any (hi)story. Research may allow us to get 
closer to the “truth” of what really happened, but we will never know for certain.
In a narrativist or hermeneutic view of history, what matters is how the stories come to be 
told. This does not mean that anything can be invented, but that in any case, all histories 
on every level will involve the subjective experience of the historian or story-teller in his 
present milieux. This is also what is important for the analysand. Psychoanalysis is not an 
excavation into the past in order to discover the facts of a subject’s life, but a deciphering 
of how the subject has constructed the story of his life for himself - or how others have 
constructed it for him. Trauma is not simply an event but an effect of the impossibility of 
incorporating a subject’s real experience into consciousness and language. Specific trau­
mas only reveal the trauma or the scandal of life and death in each subject - the impossi­
ble to symbolize which must nevertheless be symbolized.
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The true purpose of the analyst is not to interpret or to construct for the analysand but to 
give him the space to discover his own self-theorization. If anything, the analyst must 
deconstruct every self-theorization the subject makes until he recognizes the nature of his 
- of human - experience as one of continual symbolization and translation of the real, not 
based on any true facts or knowledge which are in the world or in the possession of any 
Other: parent, lover, teacher, or analyst.
If what we suffer from is the past in terms of being confined to the “truth” of exact repeti­
tion, than what must liberate us is the past as an eternal recurrence. This was the idea of 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Pierre Klossowski (1969): the science of history as a geneology 
of experience and thought enabling us to liberate ourselves for the creation of a future. 
This socio-cultural psychoanalysis was what Foucault carried out through his genealogies 
in an attempt to liberate the subject from the weight of a subjectivity determined for him 
by the milieux into which he is bom. We suffer both individually and socially from this 
stagnation of truth. For Foucault and Lacan, what is most intimate to us is what is most 
“extimate” - the thought from outside - the forgotten, excluded, and accursed. 
Remembering not the past but all of the pasts - especially those most obscure - is like 
ethnography what allows us to preserve different practices of jouissance - different ways 
of being. It is what saves us from “the hell of the same.”
According to the ethnographic work of Pierre Clastres (1974,1980) with some of the last 
remaining societies untouched by modernity, primitive or ahistoric communities were not 
based on subsistence economies, as is often supposed by minds dominated by concepts of 
rationality and efficiency who cannot conceive of a human community which would not 
be geared toward maximum production alone. Although primitive subjectivities may not 
have been “conscious” in the sense in which the being of divided subjectivity is, there 
was an other kind of awareness of the nature of human existence. While work for the pro­
duction of food and shelter provided survival, this was only the means to an end which 
was “sacred” in Bataille’s terms. The experience of the sacred in the form of a return to 
intimacy or jouissance took on various forms of collective experience including festival, 
sacrifice, and myth. For Bataille, the momentary death of the individual subject in the 
return to the collective went beyond the social to the point of fusion with the cosmos.
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Death and violence carry a deeply unconscious judgement based on the preservation of 
the individual subject and the fear of its dissolution in the return to chaos.
Paradoxically, intimacy is violence, and it is destruction, because it is not compatible 
with the positing of the separate individual. I f  one describes the individual in the opera­
tion o f sacrifice, he is defined by anguish. But if sacrifice is distressing, the reason is that 
the individual takes part in it. The individual identifies with the victim in the sudden 
movement that restores it to immanence (to intimacy), but the assimilation that is linked 
to the return to immanence is nonetheless based on the fact that the victim is the thing, 
just as the sacrificer is the individual. The separate individual is o f the same nature as 
the thing, or rather the anxiousness to remain personally alive that establishes the per­
son's individuality is linked to the integration o f existence into the world o f things. To put 
it differently, work and the fear o f dying are interdependent; the former implies the thing 
and vice versa. In fact it is not even necessary to work in order to be the thing of fear: 
man is an individual to the extent that his apprehension ties him to the results o f labor. 
But man is not, as one might think, a thing because he is afraid. He would have no 
anguish if he were not the individual (the thing), and it is essentially the fact o f being an 
individual that fuels his anguish. It is in order to satisfy the demands o f the thing, it is 
insofar as the world o f things has posited his duration as the basic condition o f his worth, 
that he learns anguish. He is afraid o f death as soon as he enters the system of projects 
that is the order of things. Death disturbs the order o f things and the order o f things 
holds us. Man is afraid o f the intimate order that is not reconcilable with the order of 
things. Otherwise there would be no sacrifice, and there would be no mankind either. The 
intimate order would not reveal itself in the destruction and the sacred anguish o f the 
individual. Because man is not squarely within that order, but only partakes o f it through 
a thing that is threatened in its nature (in the projects that constitute it), intimacy, in the 
trembling of the individual, is holy, sacred, and suffused with anguish (Bataille 1973, p. 
51).
Paradoxically, it is these violent practices of the sacred which have served to preserve life 
itself. The human organism being a volatile system existing at the edge of chaos partakes 
of this chaos in order to transform and evolve its complexity. But this “death drive” car-
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ries a high risk that the organism will not emerge from its encounter with the real. For 
Bataille, all practices of the sacred served to collectively structure the rhythmic cycles of 
subjectivity - to maintain order through chaos.
For the Aztec Indians, the purpose of war was not the defense of borders or the conquest 
of land, but the capture of members of the other tribe for the purposes of sacrifice. War 
among these tribes was something like gambling - a fundamental throw of the dice in 
which lives would be put at stake with the prize being the capture of sacrificial victims. 
Something like an animal instinct made it clear that victims must come from the outside 
in order to preserve the fundamental survival of the group. But there was no vengeance or 
punishment implied in these rituals. It was all in the game. For days before the victim 
was to be sacrificed, he was given the most sublime pleasures and treated with the utmost 
respect as if he were a king, thus rendering the drama more tragic for all and bestowing 
upon him the sacred sovereignty deserved by one on his way toward death.
Among the Native American tribes of the Pacific Northwest, the practice of potlatch 
served a similar purpose. In an environment in which nature had blessed them with an 
overabundance of available resources, work was reduced to a minimum. The great chiefs 
of each tribe amassed huge amounts of wealth which they would bestow upon each other 
in the form of gifts. But these gifts constituted a raising of the stakes as in gambling 
which required the recipient to return even more in order to save face. Once again this 
practice of the sacred puts forth the challenge to risk the voluptuousness of life in the 
realm of loss, destruction, and death. Whole fortunes of food, pelts, and jewelry would be 
thrown into the sea in a game in which not just one’s status but one’s very survival was 
put on the line.
Freud would have recognized something like the “death drive” in these practices. But in 
the context of primitive subjectivity, the idea of the death drive loses its pejorative value. 
For these tribes, the gravity of life was rendered sacred by staying close to its dissolution 
in death - but in a majestic way in which the whole of the community was involved in the 
death of any of its parts. Death was a part of life, and these practices enabled human sub­
jectivity to experience the sovereignty of the event of life in its limited concrescence. The
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death drive in the life of the individual subject of today may only be the unconscious 
form of this inevitable fact of human existence. For although history and civilization have 
brought the human subject to higher forms of consciousness in terms of the ability to 
abstract and to distance himself from the immediacy of drive in order to plan, think, cre­
ate, and endure in an unprecedented way, he has become distanced from his own death - 
and perhaps from the very meaning of his life. The discovery or the positing of the 
unconscious may be the result of this distancing. In fact the unconscious itself may only 
be the repressed nature of our drive toward death as a desire to return to the im-mediacy 
of everything which conscious calculation and rationality has taken away from us: dream, 
myth, memory, fantasy, spirit, sexuality, intoxication, consumption, celebration.
Psychological or spiritual healing within primitive communities was a collective event. 
Individual subjectivity was not separated from the tribe as a whole, so any symptom was 
considered to be a result of and a problem for the community. The shaman was both a 
mystic and a healer, responsible for the guidance and functional balance of the communi­
ty and its members. Called to his position by his own breakdown - his own dis-ease - the 
shaman as wounded healer posessed knowledge of the dark side or the shadow of chaos 
and evil which haunted every aspect of life, and he maintained balance by drawing on his 
own experience of immanence or intimacy with the universe - an experience which has 
been excluded, ignored, and persecuted by modem science, medicine, and therapy as 
much as by the medieval church.
Undoubtedly, the violent nature of this intimacy or immediacy is antithetical to survival, 
but primitive man maintained a social ecology of the psyche without experiencing the 
divided subjectivity of individual self-consciousness and reflection which characterizes 
our subjective experience. A place was set aside for the time when everything of order, 
stability, and law would be turned on its head. The time of the festival - if it was not pre­
scribed - nevertheless would find its way through the killing of the king. According to 
Bataille and George Dumezil (1940) in many communities there existed sacred dualities 
in the form of gods and their human representatives: one of order, law, and survival, and 
another of destruction, transgression and chaos. This sacred general economy guided the 
movement of humanity through its need to produce and to survive, and through its long-
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ing to return to the immediacy of life at the edge of chaos debased by the absolute adher­
ence to order and stability in which man loses his essential meaning and becomes only a 
thing.
The principle o f sacrifice is destruction, but though it sometimes goes so far as to destroy 
completely (as in a holocaust), the destruction that sacrifice is intended to bring about is 
not annihilation. The thing - only the thing - is what sacrifice means to destroy in the vic­
tim. Sacrifice destroys an object's real ties o f subordination; it draws the victim out of the 
world o f utility and restores it to that o f unintelligible caprice When the offered animal 
enters the circle in which the priest will immolate it, it passes from the world o f things 
which are closed to man and are nothing to him, which he knows from the outside - to the 
world that is immanent to it, intimate, known as the wife is known in sexual consumption 
(consumation chamelle). This assumes that it has ceased to be separated from its own 
intimacy, as it is in the subordination o f labor. The sacrificer’s prior separation from the 
world o f things is necessary for the return to intimacy, o f immanence between man and 
the world, between the subject and the object. The sacrificer’s prior separation from the 
world o f things is necessary for the return to intimacy, o f immanence between man and 
the world, between the subject and the object. The sacrificer needs the sacrifice in order 
to separate himself from the world o f things and the victim could not be separated from it 
in turn if the sacrificer was not already separated in advance. The sacrificer declares 
“Intimately, I  belong to the sovereign world o f the gods and myths, to the world o f violent 
and uncalculated generosity, just as my wife belongs to my desires. I  withdraw you, vic­
tim, from the world in which you were and could only be reduced to the condition o f a 
thing, having a meaning that was foreign to your intimate nature. I  call you back to the 
intimacy of the divine world, o f the profound immanence o f all that is” (Bataille 1973, p. 
43).
If the growth of consciousness and the individual subject has given us anything - as 
opposed to simply removing us from the sublime experience of the sacred jouissance 
once available to whole communities - then it must be to somehow enrich this drama of 
sacred jouissance through the details and delays of its further elaboration and to extend 
this drama in the lengthening of life. But modem man cannot see the forest for the trees.
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In his attempt to improve the means of life in order to extend the survival of his own 
flesh, he has lost the end or purpose of this life. But this end, this sacred, this jouissance, 
this impossible, this unknown returns anyway - indestructible as physicists claim of ener­
gy - to the unconscious practices of jouissance found in psychic and somatic symptoms, 
and even in the socio-cultural symptoms of crime, murder, and mass exploitation. At this 
point what rituals - social or individual - do we still possess to balance the tenuousness of 
our human psyche? What myths and practices can we still believe in?
2. Beyond Enlightenment - Pantheism
As opposed to the history of master-slave relations and collective fantasies which have 
dominated Western Civilization, the East has been influenced to a greater extent by vari­
ous forms of mysticism offering an escape from these social fantasies through practices 
of enlightenment or self-consciousness. Buddhism, Taoism, Sufism, and Tantrism can all 
be seen as precursors to psychoanalysis in their attempts to allow the subject to traverse 
the social fantasy of the Other which has determined his being and to become conscious 
of the illusory nature of his own desires. Slavoj Zizek has elucidated the experience of 
the Buddhist bodhisattva and the Taoist sage as illustrations of the Lacanian notion of the 
psychoanalyst’s position in the world.
In Taoism, the choice is ultimately a simple one: we either persist in the world o f illusions 
or “follow the Way” (Tao) - leave behind us the world o f false oppositions - whereas the 
basic experience of bodhisattva concerns precisely the impossibility o f such an immediate 
withdrawal o f the individual from the world o f illusions - if  an individual accomplishes 
it, he thereby ascertains his difference from other human beings and thus falls prey to his 
selfishness in the very gesture o f leaving it behind. The only escape from this deadlock is 
for the bodhisattva to postpone his own bliss until all mankind has reached the same 
point as he; this way, the Taoist sage's indifference passes over into ethical heroism: the 
bodhisattva performs the act o f supreme sacrifice by postsponing his own entry into 
Nirvana for the sake o f the salvation o f mankind (Zizek 1991 p. 25).
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In reality the story of the bodhisattva is even more complex. It is not that the Taoist takes 
the path of ethical heroism by attempting to attain impossible purity in withdrawing from 
the illusions of the world in desire and following the way, whereas the bodhisattva recog­
nizes the impossibility of escaping from being contaminated by mundane illusions. This 
would amount to saying that the bodhisattva - and the analyst - have some sort of higher 
ethical idea in the traditional sense of a judgmental moralism. On the contrary, at the 
point of reaching nirvana, the bodhisattva “recognizes his desire” as the desire to remain 
in the world and (perhaps) to play the role of the bodhisattva - to bring others to this same 
point. The bodhisattva has realized that perfection, balance, and complete (self)con- 
sciousness are synonymous with death - with entropy - with the return to the inorganic 
and the completion of one’s concrescence. If this were his desire then he would cease to 
exist - he would die. Otherwise he would accept that his desire brought him into the illu­
sions of the mundane cycle of the world in the first place - from the immanence of chaos 
or nirvana - and that his place, his desire, is there.
Similarly, the analysand at the end of analysis recognizes his specific desire in the world - 
which may or may not include playing the role of the psychoanalyst for others - one who 
helps others to find the way to their desire. If this “desire” or “enlightenment” consists of 
death in the form of suicide, accident, or the willed death of many a mystic, then so be it - 
this is not to be judged or pitied. And in order to recognize that the experience of the true 
Taoist sage is the same as that of the bodhisattva and the analyst, it is enough to grasp the 
meaning of the Taoist adage: “if one hears the Tao in the morning, one may well die that 
night.”
What the Buddhist bodhisattva, the Taoist sage, and the Lacanian analyst make clear is 
that the experience of absolute knowledge, (self)consciousness, or enlightenment 
includes its own lack. This is not to say that we can accept this at face value as a given. 
Rather we have to go through the process of believing we are climbing to the attainment 
of some complete lucidity and upon reaching it see it dissolve before our eyes. Perhaps 
this must even happen several times before we can experience - not just know or under­
stand - that knowing includes unknowing - that all systems or ways are only set in motion 
by an arbitrary assent which cannot be guaranteed. But rather than leaving us in a state of
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cynicism or nihilism, this experience can bring about the ecstasy of unknowing - the rich­
ness of faith - the “arbitrary” force or choice which grounds our illusions - and the very 
understanding that this failed or incomplete knowledge is the impossible real itself which 
we can never approach directly. Nowhere is all of this - and the links among psycho­
analysis and mysticism - summed up better than in the work of George Bataille.
A. ’s lucidity depends on a lack o f desire. Mine is the result o f an excess - undoubtedly it is 
also the only true lucidity. I f  it is only the negation o f delirium, lucidity is not completely 
lucid, is still a bit the fear o f going all the way - transposed into boredom, that is into 
contempt for the object o f an excessive desire. We reason with ourselves and we tell our­
selves: this object doesn’t have in itself the value that desire gives it. We don’t see that 
mere lucidity, which we also attain, is still blind. We must see at the same time the delu­
sion and the truth of the object. No doubt we have to know that we are deluding our­
selves, that the object is first o f all what is perceived by a desirelsess being, but it is also 
what a desire perceives in it. B. is also what is only attained by the extremity o f delirium 
and my lucidity would not exist if my delirium were not so great. Just as it would not exist 
if  the other, ridiculous sides ofB. escaped me (Bataille 1962, p. 53).
What Bataille makes clear - what is not recognized by most practices of enlightenment - 
is that, whether conscious or not, every human being sustains himself by some form of 
jouissance. Only in certain practices of Zen is this made clear. For example, Suzuki 
(1949-53) tells the tale of how humble Buddhist monks, who survive on only the rice 
they can beg from the townsfolk, when given a gift of large cuts of beef, immediately 
consume to the point of delirium. And the story is told of how one day upon receiving a 
gift in the mosastery of very rich rice candy, the normally ascetic master proceeded to 
gorge himself on one after another, while his disciple looked on in horror and exclaimed: 
“But master, what about asceticism?” “Shut up!” cried the master. He who is not enlight­
ened but only follows the ways or fantasies of his masters does not realize that his 
silence, his cell, and his piety are his practice of jouissance - different from - but in anoth­
er way no different from - that of another. True enlightenment grasps this, however, from 
head to toe.
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The practice of the Yaqi Indian nagual or teacher as presented by Carlos Castaneda 
(1987) offers another perspective of jouissance freed from the domination of moralism or 
cognition. The nagual Don Juan uses what often appear as cruel tricks to bring his pupil 
to consciousness, but these menthods must be seen in light of the care, devotion, and con­
tainment, which the teacher provides in his undying dedication to his student Castaneda. 
Just as the analyst uses his own (counter)transference to transform the analysand through 
the relationship, so Don Juan describes how each nagual uses his style or character in his 
teaching method. There is no particular method or practice to be followed. William 
Burroughs compares the ethic or jouissance of Don Juan to that of the artist, but it also 
evokes that of the analyst - who mediates and helps to “polish” the relationship between 
two worlds for the subject.
The warrior's state is achieved with the aid of a teacher and a benefactor. To understand 
the respective roles o f teacher and benefactor, one must consider the concepts o f the 
tonal and the nagual, which are basic to the warrior's path. The tonal is the sum o f any 
individual's perceptions and knowledge, everything he can talk about and explain, 
including his own physical being. The nagual is everything outside the tonal: the inex­
plicable, the unpredictable, the unknown. The nagual is everything that cannot be talked 
about or explained, but only witnessed. The sudden irruption o f the nagual into the tonal 
can be lethal unless the student is carefully prepared. The teacher's role is to clean up 
and strengthen the tonal, so that the student is able to deal with the nagual which the 
benefactor will then demonstrate. The teacher and the benefactor show the student how 
to reach the unknown, but they cannot predict what will happen when he does reach the 
nagual. The nagual is by its nature unpredictable, and the whole training is exremely 
dangerous. While the tonal, the totality o f conscious existence, shapes the individual 
being, the tonal is in turn shaped by the nagual, by everything it is not, which surrounds 
it like a mold. The tonal tends to shut out and deny the nagual, which takes over com­
pletely in the moment o f death. I f  we see the nagual as the unknown, the unpredictable 
and unexplainable, the role o f the artist is to make contact with the nagual and bring a 
part o f it back into the tonal in paint or works, sculpture, film, or music. The nagual is 
also the area of so-called psychic pheomena which the Buddhists consider as distractions 
from the way of enlightenment. Buddhism and the teachings o f Don Juan are simply not
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directed towards the same goals. Don Juan does not offer any final solution or enlighten- 
mnent. Neither does the artist (Burroughs 1984, p. 190).
Like the nagual, the analyst also offers not a solution but a practice of jouissance as the 
relation between the tonal and the nagual realms particular to each subject. Castaneda’s 
description of the tonal and the nagual is very much like Freud’s conscious and uncon­
scious, but it is even closer to Lacan’s formulation of the imaginary-symbolic and the 
real, for while the real is - like the nagual - the unknown totality of what is, each person’s 
experience of it will be unique as it becomes translated and enacted into their particular 
symbolic or tonal consciousness. One who comes to analysis has suffered an eruption of 
the nagual - or the real - into the tonal - or the imaginary-symbolic. This practice of life 
as the relationship between the tonal and the nagual which the nagual practices and teach­
es is what Lacan calls rendering the real. The nagual as poet, scientist, or mystic is one 
who is engaged in the practice of rendering the real for others - translating the unknown 
into “knowledge” in order to produce pragmatic effects of material survival and spiritual 
or psychic meaning. The nagual as psychoanalyst or healer is one who is engaged in 
working with the subject’s particular experience of the real - helping him to practice his 
jouissance as the art or science of life.
3. From Tragedy to Dialogue - Paganism
As a scholar of classical philology, Nietzsche was drawn to what he perceived was the 
repressed prehistory of Western Man. In the Dionysian cults, the presocatric poet- 
philosophers, and the spirit of tragedy, Nietzsche rediscovered an unconscious life force 
which he considered to be the “truth” of humanity and which he opposed to the notion of 
an objectively definable truth or morality.
It is a very remarkable moment: the Sophists verge upon the first critique o f morality, the 
first insight into morality: - they juxtapose the multiplicity (the geographical relativity) o f 
the moral value judgments; - they let it be known that every morality can be dialectically 
justified; i.e., they divine that all attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily
sophistical - a proposition later proved on the grand scale by the ancient philosophers, 
from Plato onwards (down to Kant); - they postulate the first truth that a “morality-in- 
itself, ” a “good-in-itself’ do not exist, that it is a swindle to talk o f “truth” in this field 
(Nietzsche 1968, p. 233).
What Nietzsche rediscovers is geographical relativity - the multiplicity of moral value 
judgments - an ethnographic understanding of various practices of jouissance and their 
symbolic justification. But what Nietzsche also finds in these presocratic pagans is that 
they needed no justification - they had no need to impose their own practices or to justify 
them to themselves or others in the name of the good or the true. Rather one enacted 
one’s faith in the immediacy of jouissance - through a “will to power.”
Before Socrates, the dialectical manner was repudiated in good society; one believed it 
compromised one; youth was warned against it. Why this display o f reasons? Why should 
one demonstrate? Against others one possessed authority. One commanded: that sufficed. 
Among one’s own, inter pares, one possessed tradition, also an authority: and, finally, 
one “understood one another ”! One simply had no place for dialectic. Besides, one mis­
trusted such public presentation o f one’s arguments. Honest things do not display their 
reasons in that way. There is something indecent about showing all one’s cards. What can 
be “demonstrated” is o f little worth. (Nietzsche 1968, p. 235).
Above all Nietzsche wants to know how this could have happened - how man could have 
come to mistake the apparent world - that by which we must (re)present the unapproach­
able real - with the true world - that mistaken notion that we have seized hold of this real 
once and for all - that it is permanent. Pagan formations of subjectivity worked through 
ethical-aesthetic paradigms - even the sciences were constituted an art of life. ‘Techne” 
had not yet become the mechanistic approach of technology found in the realm of scien­
tific subjectivity but included the art of concrete practices in the integration of complex 
relations of self and polis.
This antithesis o f the Dionysian and the Apollinian within the Greek soul is one o f the 
great riddles to which I felt myself drawn when considering the nature o f the Greeks.
Fundamentally I  was concerned with nothing except to guess why precisely Greek 
Apollinianism had to grow out o f a Dionysian subsoil; why the Dionysian Greek needed 
to become Apollinian; that is, to break his will to the terrible, multifarious, uncertain, 
frightful, upon a will to measure, to simplicity, to submission to rule and concept 
(Nietzsche 1968,539).
The answer that he gives is similar to the one Bataille gives about the disappearance of 
the destructive and immanent side of the sacred duality. In the duality of sacred deities 
and their human representatives, an externalized social form of psychic organization 
guaranteed both the order or stability necessary for survival, and the transgression of this 
order with its ensuing return to chaos in the intimacy and destruction of the sacrifice and 
the festival. This sacred duality remains in Greek paganism in the form of Apollo and 
Dionysus: the Apollonian sustaining everything of beauty, permanence, and perfection, 
and the Dionysian bringing forth tragedy, intoxication, and revery. Nietzsche called for a 
return to the lost or repressed side of the Dionysian though he knew this was a superhu­
man task: “are we up to it?” Nietzsche asked. Are we up to facing our unconscious - that 
which contains no negation but only affirms, as Freud said?
The two types: Dionysus and the Crucified, - To determine: whether the typical religious 
man [is] a form of decadence (the great innovators are one and all morbid and epilep­
tic); but are not here omitting one type o f religious man, the pagan? Is the pagan cult not 
a form o f thanksgiving and affirmation o f life? Must its highest representative not be an 
apology for and deification o f life? The type o f a well-constituted and ecstatically over­
flowing spirit! The type o f a spirit that takes into itself and redeems the contradictions 
and questionable aspects o f existence!
It is here I set the Dionysus o f the Greeks: the religious affirmation o f life, life 
whole and not denied or in part. . . .  (Nietzsche 1968, p. 542).
As Bataille has explained, it is inevitable that we will try to escape from this darker side 
of our human fate - we will try to sneak out the back door, seeking only what is stable 
and safe and what preserves our survival. Nevertheless this darker side - the shadow for 
Jung, the death drive for Freud, the sacred, the impossible, the real, the unconscious,
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chaos - always returns. Jouissance as an experience beyond good and evil - beyond ratio­
nal description - is another name for this drive. And with the concept of jouissance we 
discover the truly paradoxical nature of this drive. For that which brings the greatest plea­
sure brings the greatest pain - and that which makes us suffer may be the very thing 
which sustains us. It is this very paradox which Lacan believes the Greeks also discov­
ered in the form of Stoicism.
To desire involves a defensive phase that makes it identical with not wanting to desire. 
Not wanting to desire is wanting not to desire. This discipline which, in order to find a 
way out o f the impasse o f the Socratic interrogation, was practised by people who were 
not only specifically philosophers, but, in their own way, some kind o f practitioners o f 
religion - the Stoics and the Epicureans. The subject knows that not to want to desire has 
in itself something as irrefutable as that Moebius strip that has no underside, that is to 
say, that in following it, one will come back mathematically to the surface that is sup­
posed to be its other side (Lacan 1973, p. 235).
But the Stoics only made a practice of what was already present in Socrates. And Lacan 
indeed calls Socrates the first psychoanalyst - or a precursor to the analyst. So, following 
Nietzsche and Lacan, Greek paganism begins with the vestiges of a sacred dualism of 
psychic ecology in the form of Apollonian form and Dionysian revelry. Soon however 
this degenerates from the Dionysian Cult to the tragedy of the stage. The jouissance of 
the body is transformed more and more into a mimesis - a (re)presentation of the flesh - 
until the event of theatre - or art - becomes one of catharsis for Aristotle - one of release. 
Indeed, Plato and Aristotle become increasingly suspicious of music, poetry, and all those 
forms of art which incite the passions. In other words, these academics attempt to strip 
life of all Dionysian elements and leave only a completely sublimated, distanced, or 
repressed form of jouissance.
The place of Socrates however is enigmatic, for who is he apart from Plato’s stories. If 
Socrates is the first analyst, then he is the first one not to give answers but to question the 
other. But to what end? As the philosopher of the dialogue, Socrates remains the maieutic 
teacher, the guru, the master: questioning away the unconscious prejudices of his sub-
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jects. But Lacan claims that Socrates goes one step further - the step towards the analyst - 
in revealing for the first time the desire which drives man through the love of the other in 
the transference. And in the preciously unique and unknown “agalma,” Lacan finds his 
“other” as the object (a) of desire.
He [Alcibiades] asks Socrates for something, without knowing what it is, but which he 
calls agalma. Some o f you will know the use that I  made o f this term some time ago. I  will 
go back to this agalma, this mystery, which, in the mist that clouds Alcibiades vision, rep­
resents, something beyond all good.
How can one see anything other than a first adumbration o f the technique o f the 
mapping o f the transference in the fact that Socrates replies to him, not what he said to 
him when he was young, Look to your soul, but something more suited to the florid, hard­
ened man he now is, Look to your desire, look to your onions (Lacan 1973, p. 255).
But if Socrates is the first analyst-practitioner, then the Stoics are those who fulfill 
Lacan’s dream of a community of analysts - the analyzed or enlightened who experience 
their jouissance as a general economy of desire - with the recognition and acceptance of 
how desire is determined by the Other.
Is it not strange, that echo that we found - though, o f course, we are not going to stick 
our noses into this for long - between the ethic o f analysis and the Stoic ethic? What does 
the Stoic ethic really amount to other than the recognition o f the absolute authority o f the 
desire o f the Other, that Thy will be done! that is taken up again in the Christian register 
(Lacan 1973, p. 254)?
The guarantee of the Other in God or Truth having collapsed and one’s own object of 
desire having been mapped and identified, one becomes a Stoic. Beyond analysis lies a 
practice of jouissance which is a game of believing and being believed - of seducing and 
being seduced - made all the more ecstatic and all the more dangerous for being elucidat­
ed. The will to ignorance never gets us anywhere - our jouissance manifests itself never­
theless. It is here that the interminable side of psychoanalysis takes over - as the never- 
ending attempt to maintain a practice of jouissance - as an ethic of desire sustained by
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what is other in the face of our subjective destitution. But in the present age we may have 
already moved beyond analysis as a specific practice and reached the place which Jean 
Baudrillard describes where irony and seduction reign, just as the dialogues of the 
Sophists and Socratics eventually gave way to the Stoics.
Once again, what is the point of saying that the world is ecstatic, that it is ironic, that the 
world is objective? It is those things, that's that. What is the point o f saying that it is not? 
It is so anyway. What is the point o f not saying it at all? What theory can do is to defy the 
world to be more: more objective, more ironic, more seductive, more real or more unreal, 
what else? It has meaning only in terms o f this exorcism. The distance theory takes is not 
that o f retreat, but that o f exorcism. It thus takes on the power o f a fatal sign, even more 
inexorable than reality, and which can perhaps protect us from this inexorable reality, 
this objectivity, from this brilliance o f the world, whose indifference would enrage us if 
we were lucid.
Let us be Stoics: if the world is fatal, let us be more fatal than it. I f  it is indifferent, 
let us be more indifferent. We must conquer the world and seduce it through an indiffer­
ence that is at least equal to the world's (Baudrillard 1987, p. 100).
4. The Sacrifice of the Sacrifice - Monotheism
At the end of his life, Freud (1939) recounted a story of the Jews as the chosen people - 
those people chosen by a one and only Father God - those people who chose to hear the 
message. To hear, to accept, to act before understanding: this is the structure of faith. 
Between the self and the other is the third. In the realm of the imaginary - of the mirror of 
doubles, of mimetic desire - insanity and destruction reign. It is through the intercession 
of a third element - what Lacan calls the “Name of the Father” or the symbolic - that one 
is spared the psychosis of immediate jouissance. But with Judaism we pass from the 
realm of law to the realm of faith. Emmanuel Levinas interprets the experience of 
Judaism as the encounter of the face to face: not the dialectical projection of the other as 
the same, but the recognition of the other as the unknown - the unthought - the uncon­
scious. To understand the other is to persecute him. To listen is to take the radically
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ethnographic position - to place oneself in the “you” position as the addressee of the 
other’s message.
It will bring out the unique nature o f an event such as the giving o f the Torah: one 
accepts the Torah before one knows it. This shocks logic and can pass for blind faith or 
the naivete o f childish trust, yet it is what underlies any inspired act, even artistic, for the 
act only brings out the form in which it only now recognizes its model, never glimpsed 
before (Levinas 1968, p. 41).
The emergence of faith is the emergence of consciousness as “ek-stasis” - distance. No 
longer is there a given - an object - a law - which one can either follow or transgress. 
With the emergence of faith and monotheism, there is the respect of the face to face: the 
birth of the individual ego and the other. Paradoxically in order to experience the other 
we must first be separated. The birth of the self arises with the experience of the other in 
a process of individuating subjectivity - though it does not in any way guarantee an ethi­
cal relation to the other. Rather the self can easily be created and experienced for its own 
sake as an isolated and omnipotent ego if not as a completely autistic subjectivity.
Neither the separated being nor the infinite being is produced as an antithetical term. 
The inferiority that ensures separation (but not as an abstract rejoinder to the notion of 
relation) must produce a being absolutely closed over upon itself, not deriving its isola­
tion dialectically from its opposition to the Other. And this closedness must not prevent 
egress from inferiority, so that exteriority could speak to it, reveal itself to it, in an 
unforseeable movement which the isolation o f the separated being could not provoke by 
simple contrast. In the separated being the door to the outside must hence be at the same 
time open and closed (Levinas 1961, p. 148).
For Levinas the other precedes being, and ethics precedes ontology. This was already pre­
sent in Judaism, but it had been forgotten. In transforming philosophical speculation from 
truth to the very possibility of a human knowledge - a self-consciousness - Heidegger 
moved beyond Greek epistemology to the ontology of being, but for Levinas this is still 
not enough. Taking one step further - and one step further back - Levinas moves beyond
167
the “essence” of ontology to the “other” of ethics - the “otherwise than being.” This act is 
radically human. For to speculate about the nature of things - to claim to discover or pre­
sent a truth of the objective - is to forget the human subject who is speculating - and the 
human subject who is being addressed. If there were an objective nature to things outside 
of human subjectivity it would not be accessible to us “as it is” as long as we are human. 
In a sense, then, not only are the human sciences unable to become objective, but the nat­
ural sciences are within the realm of the subjective human sciences. This is the lesson of 
Niels Bohr’s physics of complementarity. But even the radical ontological perspective of 
Heideggerian philosophy, Buddhism, quantum physics, and the principle of undecidabili­
ty remain mistakes as long as they try to formulate anything like a new description of - or 
prescription for - the world. This remains persecution - speaking one’s own jouissance 
and defining the other by attempting to understand him. Here we are very close to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis as a science of the human - that which gives up attempting to 
form a cosmology and looks to the truth of subjective jouissance and desire as it is trans­
mitted by the other.
That is the perpetual ambiguity of the term unconscious. Obviously the unconscious pre­
supposes that in the speaking being there is something, somewhere, which knows more 
than he does, but this can hardly be allowed as a model for the world. To the extent that 
its possibility resides in the discourse o f science, psychoanalysis is not a cosmology . . . .  
(Lacan 1982, p. 159).
Levinas’s ethics and Lacan’s psychoanalysis are both based on a radically social founda­
tion: the other which precedes the self - in the form of the father, the mother, the lover, 
the object, the symbolic, or God. Levinas uses the plural term others. The jouissance of 
the individual - his very reason for being - is that which brings him anxiety. While the 
jouissance of the self is derived only from the outside - the other - it is constantly being 
introjected in order to maintain the strength and stability of the autonomous self. But the 
self closes in on itself in its isolated narcissism if it does not remain open to the outside: 
with the death of desire, the subject too dies. It is this tenuous balance between self and 
other which is the subject of jouissance and which can never be resolved once and for all.
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To this singular requirement jouissance does indeed answer, by the insecurity troubling 
its fundamental security. This insecurity is not due to the heterogeneity o f the world with 
respect to jouissance, which would allegedly bring the sovereignty o f the I  to naught. The 
happiness o f jouissance is stronger than every disquietude, but disquietude can trouble it; 
here lies the gap between the animal and the human. The happiness o f jouissance is 
greater than all disquietude (Levinas 1961, p. 149).
It was Freud who re-initiated the ethics of listening in order to understand the truth of the 
subject. And it was the subject of suffering - the analysand - which led him to the under­
standing of the suffering and desiring nature of humanity. What Levinas presents is what 
psychoanalysts bear witness to: that desire is the desire of the other - that our dependence 
on the other brings our greatest joy and our greatest sorrow. The enigma of sacrifice - 
which includes suicide - evokes that which defines human subjectivity beyond the princi­
ple of the survival of the individual or the species as an act of love and of life.
Suicide appears as a possibility to a being already in relation with the Other[s], already 
elevated to life for the Other[s]. It is the possibility o f an existence already metaphysical; 
only a being already capable o f sacrifice is capable o f suicide. Before defining man as 
the animal that can commit suicide it is necessary to define him as capable o f living for 
the Other[s] and o f being on the basis o f the Other[s] who is exterior to him. But the 
tragic character o f suicide and o f sacrifice evinces the radicality o f the love o f life 
(Levinas 1961, p. 149).
This sacrifice brings us back to the question of the death drive - and of jouissance. For 
jouissance is not simply one’s own jouissance as in the pleasure of the self, but the sacri­
fice of this jouissance: for another - for oneself. There is a sacrifice of jouissance and a 
jouissance of sacrifice. And even a sacrifice of the sacrifice of jouissance. Where does it 
end? Certainly not in a moral determination. Only in a play of difference - a dialectic of 
self and other - of jouissance and sacrifice - of life and death . In a practice - a pragmatics 
- an art and science of life.
For Rene Girard, Christ is the example of this sacrifice of the sacrifice - the bringing to
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consciousness of jouissance within sacrifice. In his call for a non-sacrificial reading of 
the Gospels, Girard puts forth the example of Christ as the coming to consciousness of 
mimetic desire and the end of the “victimage mechanism.” According to Girard, Christ’s 
death has become one more myth of the sacrificial victim who dies as the accursed part 
which guarantees the functioning of the law itself, whereas instead Christ should be seen 
as the coming to consciousness of this victimage mechanism by which truth and law are 
upheld to preserve order in the face of chaos.
Obviously, the revelation that they bring about cannot be dissociated from the dynamic, 
anti-sacrificial current running all through the Judeo-Christian scriptures. We were able 
to detect a series of stages in the Bible that invariably pointed toward the attenuation and 
later elimination o f the practice of sacrifice. Sacrifice must therefore appear in the light 
in which the great biblical thinker, Moses Maimonides, placed it in his youth: not as an 
eternal institution that God genuinely wished to found, but as a temporary crutch made 
necessary by the weakness of human kind. Sacrifice is an imperfect means, which human­
ity must do without (Girard 1978, p. 412).
Throughout history, that which is excluded, sacrificed, and destroyed serves as a scape­
goat for the inevitable “scandal” of humanity - its divided nature in the coexistence of joy 
and sorrow - meaning and nonmeaning - love and hate. But the scandal of the divided 
subject is denied through a will to ignorance, and the laws of truth, morality, rationality, 
and punishment only serve to maintain order and stability by allowing the excluded shad­
ow side - the death drive - to return in the form of a scapegoat in which responsibility is 
deflected to the outside. Girard’s Christian ethic - like psychoanalysis - requires each man 
to take responsibility for his own jouissance and the impossible scandal of the real. We 
are driven outside of ourselves - towards difference. The other is our desire. But in inter­
acting with the other, we want to see ourselves. We are scandalized by that which shows 
us what we are and that which refuses to think, feel, and act as we do. Racism and sexism 
at the social level derive from the same experience as the lover’s quarrel: we fear and 
hate the other’s jouissance. Girard’s theorization of the game of doubles and mimetic 
desire at the social level is related to Lacan’s elucidation of the mirror stage and the 
imaginary realm of the subject.
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Let me once again restate the mechanism of mimetic repetition. The subject who is not 
able to decide for himself on the object that he should desire relies upon the desire o f 
another person. And he automatically transforms the model desire into a desire that 
opposes and frustrates his own. Because he does not understand the automatic character 
of the rivalry, the imitator soon confers the very fact o f being opposed, frustrated and 
rejected into the major stimulant of his desire. In one way or another, he proceeds to 
inject more and more violence into his desire. To identify this tendency is to recognize 
that, in the last resort, desire tends towards death, both the death o f the model and obsta­
cle (murder) and the death o f the subject himself (self-destruction and suicide). This 
dynamic o f mimetic desire does not operate only in those who are “sick ”, in those who 
push the mimetic process too far to be able to function normally; it is also, as Freud 
acknowledged, a feature o f the people we call “normal” (Girard 1978, p. 440).
For Girard, the historical means of mediating between the identificatory doubles of 
mimetic desire have been provided by the law and sacrifice, but he finds this an imperfect 
means - and one which can no longer satisfy the present state of mankind. The collapse 
of the Other - the inability of modem man to believe in any truth, law, ritual, or religion, 
has brought us to the ultimate crisis of mimetic desire and to the tendency toward entropy 
and chaos which - through the perpetuation and acceleration of media images and tech­
nology - allows the imaginary - or secondness - free reign with no possibility of a third to 
mediate between self and other.
As the result o f our analysis, not only the Old Testament but all the religions o f mankind 
appear as intermediate stages between animal life and the crisis o f the present day, when 
we must place our bets either on the total disappearance o f the human race or on our 
arriving at forms o f freedom and awareness that we can hardly imagine, swaddled as we 
are in myths that now have become, paradoxically, myths o f demystification. We think we 
can bring these myths to a positive conclusion through our own means but they are actu­
ally leading us straight to destruction, now that there are no more Others to demystify, 
now that naive confidence in science and humanism have given way to the terrifying 
presence of a violence that is completely unmasked. (Girard 1978, p. 440).
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For Levinas and Girard, the answer to the current crisis of mimetic desire is to be found 
in the Judeo-Christian tradition of conscious faith: the intercession of a third element in 
the form of an ethic of respect for God or for others. But this only assumes life and peace 
as an unquestioned element to be elevated. Despite bringing to light the movement of 
desire and jouissance, this approach still attempts to mediate by suggesting a principle - a 
morality. For Lacan and Bataille, there is no escaping desire - no way, finally, to purify 
desire by renouncing it through consciousness.
Ignorance, indifference, an averting o f the eyes may explain beneath what veil this mys­
tery still remains hidden. But for whoever is capable o f turning a courageous gaze 
towards this phenomenon - and, once again, there are certainly few who do not succumb 
to the fascination o f the sacrifice in itself - the sacrifice signifies that, in the object o f our 
desires, we try to find evidence for the presence o f the desire o f this Other that I  call here 
the dark God.
It is the eternal meaning of the sacrifice, to which no one can resist, unless ani­
mated by that faith, so difficult to sustain which, perhaps, one man alone has been able to 
formulate in a plausible way - namely, Spinoza, with his Amor intellectualis Dei (Lacan 
1973, p. 275).
Bataille and Lacan also reveal the essential movement of desire and jouissance which 
plays through the human subject, but without elevating order, stability, and life above 
death and chaos. For them, closing off all avenues to jouissance in a society based exclu­
sively on the rational ego and capitalist production and efficiency not only impoverishes 
human experience but is impossible: jouissance will break out anyway in the form of 
wars, disease, and murder. While Lacan sought to evolve psychoanalytic practice as a 
means of responding to the victims of this mismanaged jouissance, Bataille sought to 
provide alternatives in a similar fashion through a transformed experience of desire, love, 
and faith existing beyond the highest levels of consciousness. What they were developing 
was a new form of conscious mysticism as a practice of jouissance.
As regards the Hadewijch in question, it is the same as for Saint Theresa - you only have
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to go and look at Bemini’s statue in Rome to understand immediately that she’s coming, 
there is no doubt about it. And what is her jouissance, her coming from? It is clear that 
the essential testimony o f the mystics is that they are experiencing it but know nothing 
about it (Lacan 1982, p. 147).
According to Lacan, while poets, mystics, and women were able to experience this jouis­
sance, they were not conscious of what was happening to them. They did not know what 
they knew. If conscious thought and language is itself a block to this experience of jouis­
sance, then a practice derived from Bataille’s atheological mysticism and Lacan’s psy­
choanalysis is a way not to obliterate consciousness but to push it to its limits where it 
will again reveal the truth of the human subject as desire and thought. To embody jouis­
sance through thought and language rather than allowing their disjunction to produce 
symptoms of suffering.
The analyst enables others to experience this transformation. He becomes the sacrificial 
victim, but he does not accept this role. He allows himself to be used by the subject - to 
be hated and loved - to be attacked and sacrificed. But he is not complicit in this game. 
Rather he returns the message to the subject - he shows him what he is - what he is for 
the subject. Through this circular process the dialectical trap of self and other - of master 
and slave - will be broken, and the subject will free himself from the imaginary and sym­
bolic Other which has determined his desires, thoughts, and actions - which has con­
structed his subjectivity - from birth.
5. From Knowledge to Madness - Nihilism
Descartes’ intuition founds discursive knowledge. And no doubt discursive knowledge 
once established, the “universal science” o f which Descartes undertook the project, and 
which today occupies so much place, can ignore the intuition which is found at the outset 
(it does without it, wanting, if possible, to avoid being more than it is). But this knowl­
edge - about which we are so vain - what does it mean, when its foundation is removed? 
(Bataille1954, p. 105).
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Modernity is characterized by a scientific subjectivity in which the philosopher comes to 
question and to contest that which is given in God, tradition, and law - to the point where 
nothing remains. Whereas the divided subject of self-reflection can be traced back cen­
turies, it is only in recent times that scientific subjectivity has brought us to a confronta­
tion with nihilism in the void opened up by such radical philosophical and scientific spec­
ulation. From his position at the point of a transformation in mankind’s experience, 
Georges Bataille was able to reveal the movement of modem subjectivity evident in the 
philosophical line which stretches from Descartes and Newton to Hegel and Nietzsche. It 
would be impossible to situate Bataille specifically at the culmination of modernity’s 
nihilism or at the birth of a “postmodern” age, for what Bataille reveals in the movement 
from Descartes to Hegel is an experience which even now has not penetrated the whole 
of humanity, though its effects are more than evident nevertheless.
In returning to Descartes, Bataille elucidates how the birth of the cogito, of causality, of 
the individual ego of modem rationality and science which is so taken for granted is - like 
all systems of thought - set in motion by an intially ungrounded assertion. This is 
revealed in Godel’s theory of undecidability: no system can ground itself in anything 
other than an initial arbitrary positing. This positing could derive from nowhere other 
than the jouissance of the individual and/or collective psyche which seeks ever to trans­
late its desire into conscious thought - into language - and to have its jouissance be taken 
for the truth by others. Derrida, Foucault, and Girard all extend these ethnopsychological 
lessons of Bataille by tracing how the socio-political constructions of rituals, religions, 
ideologies, and moralities come to be based on an initially repressed and excluded other 
which serves to create the very foundation of each new system.
But this “arbitrary assent” is the very truth of the subject: the fact that thought takes place 
in us like desire - that we are animals made up not of instinct but of desire-thought, and 
that the symbolic fictions we construct are necessary, though not “true”. The truth of the 
subject, however, is not only this rendering of the impossible real. What reveals to us the 
truth of our experience is not the creation of ourselves as fictional subjects through sub- 
jectivization, but the fall from these fictions into subjective destitution. This is the
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unbearable truth which Bataille stumbles onto - that the very movement of rational 
thought - of philosophical speculation and scientific objectivity - inevitably reveals to us 
what we are: creatures of jouissance. For questioning and the search for knowledge even­
tually contest the very way in which truth and knowledge are formulated in the speculat­
ing subject: the lamp of science seeking to illuminate the world through conscious 
thought is finally directed at the subject himself revealing the very experience of desire 
and thought within the subject.
It is easy for each one o f us to perceive that this science, o f which he is proud, even com­
plete with answers to all the questions which it can regularly formulate would leave us in 
the end in non-knowledge; that the existence of the world cannot in any way cease being 
unintelligible. No explanation o f the sciences (nor, more generally, o f discursive knowl­
edge) would be able to answer for it. No doubt the aptitude which was given to us to 
understand this or that from all sides, to bring numerous solutions to various problems, 
leaves us the impression o f having developed in us the faculty o f understanding. But this 
spirit o f contestation, which was the tormenting genius o f Descartes - if  it animates us in 
our turn, it no longer stops at secondary objects: it is henceforth less a question of the 
well or poorly founded nature o f accepted propostions than o f deciding, once the best 
understood propositions are established, if the infinite need for knowledge implied in the 
initial intuition o f Descartes could be satisfied. In other words, the spirit o f contestation 
manages now to formulate the final affirmation: “I  only know one thing: that a man 
will never know anything” (Bataille 1954, p. 106).
Of course this experience of self-consciousness is no different in a certain sense from 
Zen, Sufism, and other practices of enlightenment. What is different is for this experience 
of consciousness to have passed through the movement of rational thought itself, given 
that - although it is not the truth - it has a truth for the subject. Buddhists are correct in 
elucidating the illusions of truth, rationality, and causality and even the illusions of every 
desire. What they miss is the truth of these illusions: that the human subject is subject to 
thought, language, knowledge, and consciousness - and to desire, love, faith, and mean­
ing.
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To know means: to relate to the known, to grasp that an unknown thing is the same as 
another thing known. Which supposes either a solid ground upon which everything rests 
(Descartes) or the circularity o f knowledge (Hegel). In the first case, if the ground gives 
way . . .  in the second, even if  assured o f having a well-closed circle, one perceives the 
unsatisfying nature o f knowledge. The unending chain o f things known is for knowledge 
but the completion o f oneself. Satisfaction turns on the fact that a project for knowledge, 
which existed, has come to fruition, is accomplished, that nothing (at least nothing imor- 
tant) remains to be discovered. But this circular thought is dialectical. It brings with it 
the final contradiction (affecting the entire circle): circular, absolute knowledge is defin­
itive non-knowledge. Even supposing that I  were to attain it, I  know that I  would know 
nothing more than I know now (Bataille 1954, p. 108).
Conscious and distanced as we have now become, it is easy for us to think of primitive 
savages, pagans, and Christians as naive or deluded in their beliefs - like children. But 
our conscious rationality remains but one more delusion if we do not follow its experi­
ence to the limit - and the most impoverished of all in that it transforms jouissance into 
increasingly objectivized forms. If the movement of conscious thought means anything, it 
is that this experience of humanity which denies its immediacy and separates itself from 
animality only allows us to see clearly - through this faculty of thought which we have - 
what we are doing: following our desires and sacrificing them - perpetuating our survival 
through work and technique so that we can live on. But why live on - what is our reason 
for being - what is the end of this life as opposed to the means? The answer to this ques­
tion comes not in a single answer for all but in the revelation of the structure of human 
experience as the perpetuation of the means of life for the experience of a jouissance in 
continual creation which takes on an infinite variety of forms for each subject.
According to Bataille, Hegel followed thought to its limit, but held back before the 
unbearable revelation. He could not walk through the doorway he had opened and he 
even turned away. He could not accept his subjective destitution in the face of the void - 
in the collapse of the Other. Instead he constructed the story of “absolute knowledge” - 
which he himself completed - in which human subjectivity becomes conscious of what it 
is only to enter into a logical system of nirvana.
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Hegel, at the moment when the system closed, believed himself for two years to be going 
mad: perhaps he was afraid of accepting evil - which the system justifies and renders 
necessary; or perhaps linking the certainty o f having attained absolute knowledge with 
the completion o f history - with the passing of existence to the state o f empty monotony - 
he saw himself, in a profound sense, becoming dead; perhaps even his various bouts of 
sadness took shape in the more profound horror o f being God. It seems to me, however, 
that Hegel, shrinking back from the way o f ecstasy (from the only direct resolution o f 
anguish) had to take refuge in a sometimes effective (when he wrote or spoke), but essen­
tially vain attempt at equilibrium and harmony with the existing, active, official world 
(Bataille 1954, p. 110).
For Bataille, Hegel had failed. Although he performed an invaluable service by tracing 
the very limits of conscious thought and knowledge to the point where it dissolves into 
unknowing, he had reinstated an unconscious truth at the last minute: “absolute knowl­
edge” and the “science of logic.” Nietzsche, on the other hand, was not so lucky. Having 
made the same journey, Nietzsche could not however find solace in any fictional stability 
- be it a philsophical system or productive work. Nietzsche did not turn away from the 
void opened up by the collapse of all values and the death of God and truth, but revealed 
this truth in the clear light of day and perservered to find a solution to the unbearable 
weight of this revelation for himself and for others. Nietzsche’s answer to the fiction of 
truth was the truth o f fiction: not withdrawing from the illusions of the world into the 
state of the living dead of the enlightened ones of the East, but hurling oneself forward 
into the affirmation of life. The “will to power” has nothing to do with the protected ego 
or the domination of others, but seeks the strength and courage necessary not to turn 
away from the consciousness of the illusory and fleeting nature of every belief, every 
moment - and yet to believe - to live.
At this point, “desire” and “faith” in their traditional conceptions collapse into one anoth­
er: conscious desire requires - or is - faith. Desire considered unconsciously is something 
like the instinct of animals. But in human experience, what would be instinct is always 
already mediated through conscious thought and language: that which is unconscious
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already implies a partial consciousness. But consciousness is distance, contestation, and 
mediation and so threatens the immediacy of desire. Hence subjects seek to deny or 
repress desires so that they are not destroyed by consciousness. Repression is primary 
and human beings maintain a stubborn will to ignorance, but the modes of desire or jouis­
sance erupt through dreams, physical disease, neurotic symptoms, war, crime, or any 
number of unconscious experiences. This was Freud’s fundamental psychoanalytic dis­
covery, empirically demonstrated again and again in his practice.
But Bataille goes even further to elaborate a metapsychology or metapsychoanalysis of 
the human subject as a subjectivity caught in a knot of unconscious desire and conscious 
thought. Thought is not something we can use to discover the truth of existence out there 
in the world - thought is what we are - and if we follow its lesson to the end we discover 
this. Absolute knowledge reveals to us the closure of knowledge and the fact that we are 
creatures of knowing - but also of unknowing. This knowing can serve either to imprison 
us in a false permanence or to translate and elucidate the details of this impossible experi­
ence of desiring. Somewhere among desiring and knowing is jouissance - an experience 
beyond good and evil which never fails to emerge. For Bataille, this experience of the 
dissolution of knowledge into unknowing was the ecstatic experience of the mystics, and 
it was here that he located the fundamental truth of human existence which was open to 
all those who did not undergo their jouissance unconsciously in the form of symptoms, 
but made the journey - whether in analysis or not - through rational thought and self-con­
sciousness toward desire.
My existence, o f course, like any other moves from the unknown to the known (relates the 
unknown to the known). No difficulty; I  believe I  am able, as much as anyone I know, to 
surrender to operations o f knowledge. This is, for me, necessary - as much as for others. 
My existence is composed of steps forward, o f movements which it directs to points which 
are suitable. Knowledge is in me - 1 mean this for every affirmation o f this book; it is 
linked to these steps forward, to these movements (the latter are themselves linked to my 
fears, to my desires, to my joys). Knowledge is in no way distinct from me: I  am it, it is 
the existence which I am. But this existence is not reducible to it; this reduction would 
require that the known be the aim of existence and not existence the aim of the known
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(Bataille 1954, p. 110).
The usage of conscious thought allows us to distance ourselves from the immediacy of 
animal instinct - or human desire - long enough to produce practical means of survival in 
the form of technology. But we do not live in order to produce the means to live in order 
to produce the means . . . .  There must be an end - which might be called meaning - or 
desire - or jouissance. In the search for this end, rational thought is misdirected - each one 
of us experiences it differently. If there are no longer rituals and myths on a grand scale - 
if “God is dead” - there are nevertheless rituals and myths for each individual whether he 
is conscious of them or not. What Lacan called the “individual myth of the neurotic” is 
none other than jouissance as it had come to be experienced in modernity.
‘So you can reduce the traffic on the roads that you strive so hard to radiate from the 
consciousness, and which constitute the pride o f the ego, crowned by Fichte with the 
emblems o f transcendence. The trade route o f truth no longer passes through thought: 
strange to say, it now seems to pass through things: riddle, it is through you that I  com­
municate, as Freud formulates it at the end o f the first paragraph o f the sixth chapter, 
devoted to the world o f the dream, o f his work on dreams and what dreams mean’ (Lacan 
1966, p. 122).
What is this jouissance which is beyond good and evil - beyond truth and knowledge: 
unknowing - the experience of the mystics. For Lacan, the word jouissance became a sig- 
nifier for an impossible to define experience. Jouissance dissolves the distinction between 
Freud’s pleasure principle and death drive. We are not only creatures of thought or of 
instinct but of jouissance which already includes both. Jouissance includes thought to the 
extent that immediate drive is already experienced through conscious thought and signifi­
cation.
And yet it is, surely, unequivocal that, as against the being upheld by philosophical tradi­
tion, that is, the being residing in thought and taken to be its correlate, I  argue that we 
are played by jouissance.
Thought is jouissance. What analytic discourse brings out is this fact, which was
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aready intimated in the philosophy o f being - that there is a jouissance o f being (Lacan 
1982, p. 142).
Martin Heidegger (1971) proclaimed the end of philosophy and the beginning of the task 
of thinking. But this attempt to seek being beyond the closure of absolute knowledge is a 
mistake to the extent that it remains caught in thought. Heidegger was only returning to 
the experience of the presocratics, the oriental sages, and the poets - to the art of thinking. 
Yet he stubbornly maintained the question at the level of consciousness and thought: his 
philosophy became a mysticism without admitting such. Heidegger’s thought remains for 
this very reason within the closed circle of absolute knowledge: he prepares again and 
again to leave the circle - elucidating Hegel’s lesson ever more clearly - but he never 
does. Though he did not turn away from the doorway opened beyond our scientific sub­
jectivity like Hegel, neither did he walk through.
Where Heidegger only points the way, Bataille finds the way out. Already marked by an 
excessive jouissance through his own life experience, Bataille does not succumb to his 
symptoms but transforms them through “the practice of joy before death.” He comes to 
live his jouissance to the fullest and to glorify his excess through literature, politics, and 
mysticism. Finally driven to philosophical speculation, he makes the journey through 
absolute knowledge only to reveal it limits.
I f  action ( “doing”) is (as Hegel says) negativity, then there is still the problem of know­
ing whether the negativity o f someone who ”doesn’t have anything more to do” disap­
pears or remains in a state o f “unemployed negativity. ” As for me, I  can only decide in 
one way, since I  am exactly this “unemployed negativity” (I couldn’t define myself with 
more clarity). I  admit Hegel foresaw this possiblity, but at least he didn’t situate it as the 
outcome of the process he described. I  think o f my life - or better yet, its abortive condi­
tion, the open wound that my life is - as itself constituting a refutation o f Hegel’s closed 
system (Bataille 1961, p. 123).
At the limits of conscious thought, Bataille finds the truth of jouissance which he already 
knew without knowing it. He also finds the emergence of another question: what to do
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with this truth. For as long as man was deluded, life went on: he experienced the jouis­
sance of life which was his reason for being while not questioning or contesting this 
jouissance or the fictions of the symbolic order which sustained survival. But Hegel’s 
mapping of the movement of humanity through thought and desire was the equivalent for 
mankind as a whole of the analytic act in which the subject experiences the collapse of 
the Other. The interpreting self - the speaking and thinking subject - closes the tautologi­
cal circle of absolute knowledge only to reach subjective destitution - which can take the 
form of cynical resentiment, madness, depression, or ecstasy. Bataille suggested that all 
anxieties, all neurotic symptoms were but the result of a resistance to confronting this 
void of the impossible real, just as all neuroses - including “normality” - are a defense 
against the confrontation with schizoid and depressive states.
This immediately poses the problem of the sovereignty of man: Lacan’s ethic of not ced­
ing one’s desire in relation to the Other. In Spinoza’s elucidation of ethics, no concept of 
rights can found the power to act on the other. If the relations of power, knowledge, and 
truth have been revealed to be based on the constructions and seductions of jouissance - 
of arbitrary assent - than this consciousness signals the end of exploitation through mas­
ter-slave relations and the beginning of mutual recognition in post-Hegelian subjectivity. 
Communism as an ideal state is opposed the sovereignty of kings and masters which for 
Bataille is the essential lesson of Hegel and Marx. But Bataille was intent on elucidating 
and maintaining the importance of the structural experience of sovereignty once found in 
the master but now open to anyone able to transform the domination of rationality and 
production into the jouissance of the moment where nothing serves.
The communists are opposed to what seems sovereign to them. But for Nietzsche, a world 
deprived o f what I  call sovereign would no longer be bearable. With respect to tradition­
al sovereignty, he had the same attitude as the communists. But he could not accept a 
world in which man - in which each man - would be a means and not the end o f some 
common endeavor (Bataille 1976, p. 367).
For Bataille, the communitarian or communist project was essential as a socio-political 
organization, but the institution in practice had only served to enslave man even more by
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reproducing the master-slave dialectic within the individual psyche where jouissance had 
to serve the will of rational productive thought. Sovereignty, on the other hand, seizes the 
singularity of each concrescence - whether it be the individual’s life history or the unique 
moment - and withdraws it from the system of limited economy.
In fact, today there are only two admissible positions remaining in the world: commu­
nism, reducing each man to the object (thus rejecting the deceptive appearances that the 
subject had assumed), and the attitude o f Nietzsche - similar to the one that emerges from 
this work - free the subject, at the same time, o f the limits imposed on it by the past and of 
the objectivity o f the present (Bataille 1976, p. 368).
Bataille’s answer to this dilemma is the community of sovereign beings who find their 
connection not through the survival of the group or adherence to a pre-set code, but 
through the mutual recognition of the collapse of the Other, shared anguish, and the truth 
of jouissance. This community cannot be presribed or described - only witnessed in 
examples such as Sade’s libertines, Duras’s community of lovers, or Blanchot’s unavow- 
able community - the community of those who have nothing in common. Communism is 
then rediscovered through the communication of sovereignty - the communion of shared 
jouissance in which the distinction between self and other - between subject and object - 
dissolves. Rather than sovereign subjectivity dissolving in the utilitarianism of the group, 
it attains its conscious form while recognizing that of others, and it “communicates”: it 
bridges the gap between singular subjectivities while maintaining the irreducibility of 
limited concresence.
There is nothing that I do not follow in the overall movement that HegeTs thought repre­
sents in my eyes. But the autonomy o f HegeTs “absolute knoweledge, ” the discourse in 
which the subject and the object beome identical, itself dissolves into the NOTHING of 
unknowing, and the vanishing thought o f unknowing is in the moment. On the one hand, 
there is an identity of absolute knowledge and this evanescent thought; on the other, this 
identity is reencountered in life. “Absolute knowledge” closes, whereas the movement I  
speak o f opens up. Starting from uabsolute knowledge, ” Hegel could not prevent dis­
course from dissolving, but it dissolved into sleep. The vanishing thought o f which I
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speak is the awakening and not the sleep o f thought: it is reencountered in an equality - 
in the communication - with all the sovereign moments o f all men, insofar as the latter 
do not want to take them for things (Bataille 1976, p. 368).
Bataille’s idea of communication is the momentary deconstruction of boundaries which 
puts isolated events back into play with one another before they return to their essential 
state. This is similar to Guattari’s concept of transversality which links the sovereign sub­
jectivity of each organized event or organism without replicating identity or dissolving 
into homogeneity and the entropy of chaos, but rather preserving the heterogeneity and 
multiplicity of difference. On the level of large-scale political organization, however, this 
has never worked, which is why psychoanalytic political theorists have come to proclaim 
social democracy - despite its manipulations and exploitations - as the best thing which 
exists. For if manipulation and exploitation are the inevitable result of the relations 
among individuals who are not conscious of their jouissance, then democracy at least 
institutes an “analyzed” form of political power and social relations by recognizing the 
theoretical “equality” or “sovereignty” of all individuals - even if this cannot be main­
tained in practice.
The Lacanian definition o f democracy would then be: a sociopolitical order in which the 
People do not exist - do not exist as a unity, embodied in their unique representative. That 
is why the basic feature o f the democratic order is that the place o f Power is, by the 
necessity of its structure, an empty place. In a democratic order, sovereignty lies in the 
People - but what is the People if not, precisely, the collection o f the subjects o f power 
(Zizek 1989, p. 147)?
At this point we are again very close to the structure of anarchic primitive tribes 
described by Pierre Clastres (1974,1980) in which the chief holds no real power but only 
serves to fill a place in the structure. Though the structural position of the chief or head is 
necessary to guarantee a certain order and to preserve the survival of the tribe, his power 
is only mimed or enacted as faith. If he were to mistake his position for truth and exercize 
power over others in the form of his misguided jouissance or desire to control, then he 
would be laughed at - faith in his authority would be withdrawn.
183
For Claude Lefort (1986) and Slavoj Zizek (1991), democracy maintains the social forms 
of a general economy of the psyche found in primitive communities in that it includes the 
structure of the eruption of the real into the symbolic fiction of laws and leaders. It enacts 
the “time of the festival” or the “killing of the king” which was in primitive experience 
guaranteed by the malific deity in the form of elections which eject the leader from his 
position and throw everything open to chance and chaos once again.
It is against the background o f this emptying o f the place o f Power that we can measure 
the break introduced by the ‘democratic invention* in the history o f institutions: ‘democ­
ratic society* could be determined as a society whose institutional structure includes, as a 
part o f its ‘normal*, ‘regular* reproduction, the moment o f dissolution o f the socio-sym­
bolic bond, the moment o f irruption o f the Real: elections (Zizek 1989, p. 147).
Of course, those who hold the place of power often identify with it covertly if not overtly 
- and this is even encouraged by a population which still seeks sovereignty outside of 
itself despite the decline of kings and leaders. If mutual recognition of sovereign subjec­
tivity was glimpsed for a moment through the communist project - or even partially 
through the social democracy of modem times, then it has appeared to have been forgot­
ten. After a time in which social welfare and the levelling of unequal living conditions 
had improved steadily throughout most of this century, inequality and the master-slave 
struggle to the death for recognition have returned once again with hardly a resistance. In 
the midst of the failure of sovereignty for all, the possibility nevertheless remains for any 
subject to refuse the eclipse of sovereign subjectivity by the forces of production and the 
object through the seizure of singularity in the practice of jouissance.
6. Enjoying Your Symptom - Chaotism
The void revealed by the infinite questioning of philosophers and scientists was for prim­
itive man simply the chaos which accompanied and preceded any form of substantiality 
and its creative organization. The end of modernity is marked by the experience of artists,
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poets, and revolutionaries contesting form and content to their limits in the absence of 
any guarantee - challenging God, truth, and morality to exist and succumbing to madness 
and nihilism. The “postmodern” era is characterized by the collapse of this guarantee in 
any form of the Other and the return to chaos, and it is ushered in by the analytic practice 
and theory of jouissance as both an answer to - and a facilitator of - this crisis.
The lesson of modernism is that the structure, the intersubjective machine, works as well 
i f  the Thing is lacking, if the machine revolves around an emptiness; the postmodernist 
reversal shows the thing itself as the incarnated, materialized emptiness. This is accom­
plished by showing the terrifying object directly and then by revealing its frightening 
effect to be simply the effect o f its place in the structure. The terrifying object is an every­
day object that has started to function, by chance, as that which fills in the hole in the 
Other (the symbolic order). The prototype o f a modernist text would be Samuel Beckett’s 
Waiting for Godot. The whole futile and senseless action o f the play takes place while 
waiting for Godot’s arrival when finally, “something might happen’’; but one knows very 
well that “Godot” can never arrive because he is just a name for nothingness, for a cen­
tral absence. What would the “postmodernist” rewriting o f this same story look like? 
One would have to put Godot himself on stage: he would be someone exactly like us, 
someone who lives the same futile, boring life that we do, who enjoys the same stupid 
pleasures. The only difference would be that, not knowing it himself he has found himself 
by chance at the place o f the Thing; he would be the incarnation o f the Thing whose 
arrival was awaited (Zizek 1992, p. 155).
The postmodern story then, would be to fill the empty void left by the death of God - the 
collapse of the Other - with jouissance. Beckett’s Godot survives the death of God and 
waits in the enigma which has been revealed by such a death. In the hesitation in which 
life waits to find its way, existential reflection and uncertainty are bom - along with sov­
ereign subjectivity itself. But while the subject may be conscious of the sovereignty - and 
the responsibility - which has been bestowed upon him, he cannot yet embrace this expe­
rience. This is what is at stake in Nietzsche, in Kierkegaard, in Dostoyevsky, in Beckett - 
in modernist existentialism. In the postmodern version of Godot, the subject would 
embrace his position as having filled the place of sovereignty left by the abdication of
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God and king. And what is this postmodern story of God(ot) but Bataille’s Madame 
Edwarda, in which a prostitute finds herself on stage as God - conscious to the extreme 
limits of her jouissance and yet living it to the fullest - to the point of dying of it.
Let me explain myself. No use laying it all up to irony when I say o f Madame Edwarda 
that she is GOD. But GOD figured as a public whore and gone crazy - that, viewed 
through the optic o f ‘philosophy, ’ makes no sense at all. I  don't mind having my sorrow 
derided if derided it has to be, he only will grasp me aright whose heart holds a wound 
that is an incurable wound, who never, for anything, in any way, would be cured o f i t . . .  
And what man, if so wounded, would ever be willing to ‘die* o f any other hurt (Bataille 
1956, p. 155)?
And this is what all of Bataille’s stories - and his whole life and work - are concerned 
with: to enable man to traverse his fantasies, to reveal the void in the Other, to accept his 
fall into subjective destitution, and to enjoy his symptoms as the practice of jouissance - 
no longer needing false symbolic justification, but nevertheless simultaneously recogniz­
ing the fictional nature of all beliefs and desires and the truth of these fictions.
Freud witnessed the individual myths of neurotic symptoms and family dramas that 
served to fill the gap left by the collapse of all values and the death of God, but neverthe­
less he did not recognize that his own scientific aspirations and bourgeois temperment 
served to reinstate another judgmental Other which his followers would make increasing­
ly rigid. He did not traverse his own fundamental fantasy completely. Unintentionally 
Bataille followed in Freud’s footsteps through a “heroic” self-analysis, but took the 
process even further. Bataille’s experience provided a basis for a new human science - a 
new (post-Lacanian) psychoanalysis - as he was able to pass through the experience of 
the collapse of the Other without either succumbing to madness or reinstating another 
Truth. Instead he passed through the extreme limits of (self)consciousness and specula­
tive philosophical thought revealing, identifying, and glorifying his own jouissance.
The object of my desire was illusion first o f all and could be the void o f  disillusion only 
in the second instance.
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Questioning without desire is formal, immaterial. About it we cannot say, “It's the 
same thing as man. ”
Poetry reveals a power o f the unknown. But the unknown is only an insignificant 
void i f  it is not the object o f a desire. Poetry is a middle term, it conceals the known with­
in the unknown: it is the unknown painted in blinding colors, in the image o f the sun.
Dazzled by a thousand figures composed o f worry, impatience, and love. Now my 
desire has just one object: the beyond o f those thousand figures and night (Bataille 1961, 
p. 164).
Here, in a few lines, Bataille reveals his journey through the confrontation with the 
impossible real - a journey which Lacan made into the journey of the psychoanalytic 
process as a revelation of the workings of desire and seduction. The human is bom into 
the world of the symbolic from the begining. Even before he is bom, the child is deter­
mined by the jouissance of the other through the language that comes to signify him for 
the other, and through the unconscious seduction by which parents and others solicit his 
desire and imitation. There is no immediate experience. Everything for the individual - or 
the self - is always already mediated by the social, the symbolic, the “Other”. 
Subjectivity - one’s experience of the real - is constructed.
The analytic act reveals this fundamental seduction by seducing the subject one more 
time: the transference is only the ubiquitous and inevitable desire, love, and faith that per­
meates human relations through cathexis, trance, and hypnosis. But the lover and the 
believer are unconscious of what is happening to them, and as a result, their desire, love, 
and faith - their unconscious jouissance - may cause them mental or physical suffering. 
The analyst does not use the hypnotic power of transference in order to seduce the sub­
ject into another way of experiencing jouissance as do most teachers and therapists. He 
uses the structure of this transference to enable the analysand to become conscious of the 
way in which he believes or is seduced - the way in which he practices his jouissance. 
Which is why the essential characteristic of being an analyst is to have passed through 
this experience in which the Other collapses and the void - the ontological impossibility 
of being - is revealed, and in which one maps out one’s own fundamental beliefs and 
seductions, one’s own “symptoms,” one’s own jouissance.
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The symbolic order - or Other - once served to provide a kind of externalized social form 
of psychic balance through a mediation of mimetic desire. God, ritual, and law were not 
true or false - they were simply given - unquestioned - and they provided the intercession 
of distance from the violence of immediate desire. As Jean Baudrillard elucidates, all that 
we have retained of this experience is the false ideas of truth and morality which domi­
nate us, but we do not even really believe in them. We do not have the courage to live up 
to either the fiction of our truths or the truth of our fictions.
I ts  true that etiquette and politeness (and ceremony in general) are no longer what they 
once were. But it’s because we want to give etiquette meaning that we give it affectation. 
I t’s because we want to substitute the necessity o f the Law for the arbitrariness o f the rule 
that the signs o f etiquette become arbitrary conventions. We could - we might as well - 
saddle the rules o f chess with moral reprobation. Now etiquette and politeness - what 
there was o f them in a ceremonial order that is no longer our own - do not even have as a 
purpose, any more than rituals do, to temper the initial violence o f rapports, to dispel 
threats and aggressiveness (holding out one’s hand to show that one is not armed, etc.). 
As if  there were some finality in the civility o f mores: this is our hypocricy, imputing 
everywhere and always a moralizing function for exchanges. But the law inscribed in 
heaven is not at all one o f exchange. I t’s rather the pact o f alliance and seductive con­
nections (Baudrillard 1983, p. 172).
Seduction - jouissance - is the “death drive” to the extent that it is risk - the risk of a life 
of pure production and efficiency for what we enjoy. But jouissance is more than this - 
not just the willingness to risk survival for our pleasure, but the challenge of fate - against 
all rationality. For Baudrillard, we do not really want to win when we gamble - we do not 
do it in order to gain wealth. We seek to challenge the impossible to reveal itself against 
all odds. We seek to overturn the stagnant and dead objective nature of the rational order 
we are imprisoned in by our thought - by our desire to survive. We seek to be amazed by 
the return of the real in the form of chance - in the return of chaos to a subjectivity which 
has become dead through routine. This fatality is not some ineradicable death drive, but 
the very foundation of a singular and complex concrescence - human subjectivity - which
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lives at the border between order and chaos and maintains itself there even as it mutates 
into higher forms of complexity.
We are all gamblers. What we desire most intensely is that the inexorable procession of 
rational connections cease for a while. That there be installed, even for a short time, an 
unheard-of unravelling o f another kind, a marvellous escalation o f events, an extraordi­
nary succession, as if predestined, o f the smallest details, to the point where we think that 
things - until now maintained artificially at a distance through a contract o f succession 
and causality - suddenly find themselves, not delivered over to chance, but converging 
spontaneously, concurring through their very connection in selfsame intensity.
That gives us pleasure. Those are our real events. This obvious fact that nothing 
is neutral or indifferent - that all things converge if only we can eliminate their “objec­
tive” causal contract - this is the very evidence o f seduction. To circumvent the circuits o f 
causality, arbitrary signs must be projected, some kind o f arbitrary codes, which is what 
the rules o f a game are. These are the temptations that are going to upset the causal sys­
tem and the objective way things proceed and re-engage their fatal linkage. These are 
the real challenges that we commonly throw down, just like the player in the game 
(Baudrillard 1983, p. 153).
The essence of jouissance - of sovereignty - is the dissolution of the rational confines of 
the order of things into the unknown, the impossible, the miracle, the absolute other. In 
our postmodern era, all grand narratives - all versions of the Other - all forms of truth and 
order - have collapsed, and there is nothing left for us to transgress. The game of taboo 
and transgression - necessary to our survival and essential to our being - has imploded to 
the point where each individual suffers the movement of jouissance through his own 
desire, love, and faith. But only the forms have changed. Psychoanalysis was a response 
to a change of climate - to new forms of subjectivity - to a new way of mediating the 
practice of jouissance and the technique of survival. No single theory or therapy that we 
can dream up will save us. Like a virus which becomes stronger when faced with a weak 
cure, the symptoms of our unconscious jouissance have only learned how to hide better 
through our rational thought. We may be cynics and nihilists when it comes to the Other, 
but we each believe in our jouissance which - without resorting to the techniques of mod-
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em psychopharmacology - is indestructible.
What more is there to say? Nothing is closer to this delicious, vertiginous, insoluble sen­
sation o f being the decisive element in some situation without willing it, than pleasing 
someone with a single glance. A tiny cause, an extraordinary effect: it’s the only proof we 
have o f the existence o f God. Incalculable connections are the stuff o f our dreams, but 
also o f our daily bread. We like nothing more than this crazy imbalance o f cause and 
effect - it opens fabulous horizons on our origins and on our potential power. They say 
that seduction is a strategy. Nothing could be more wrong. Seduction is a matter o f these 
unexpected connections that any strategy can at best only attempt to reproduce. 
(Baudrillard 1983, p. 155).
And why not say it clearly: we seek fatality. There is a drive in us for order and rationali­
ty and the reduction of tension: this is the pleasure principle and the life instinct. But we 
desire even more the dissolution of that order and the return of the fatal, the (im)possible, 
the chaotic. It is not a matter of getting rid of the death drive or entropy - which would be 
impossible - but of finding a place for it within the preservation of life. Primitive subjec­
tivities “knew” this, though they were not “conscious.” And whether we face up to it or 
not, the facts of jouissance are evident everywhere. We could try to do away with human­
ity by numbing ourselves or by creating a psychic landscape which expunges desire (we 
may be on our way) or we could seize the courage to confront the real, become conscious 
of our symptoms, enact our desire, and practice our jouissance.
We would like there to be chance, senselessness, and therefore innocence, and for the 
gods to continue their game o f dice with the universe, but we prefer sovereignty, cruelty, 
fatal interconnection to be all-pervasive, we prefer events to be the radical consequences 
o f thought. We like this, but we prefer that. Likewise we like events to link up according to 
their causes, but we prefer chance and pure coincidence to pervade the world. Above all I 
believe that we prefer the fatal connection. Determinism will never abolish chance. But 
no chance will ever abolish fate (Baudrillard 1983, p. 161).
According to Bataille, Sade’s work revealed to modem man his blind spot - the manner in
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which he was determined by the Other - the neurosis by which his energetic life process 
was blocked. By negating any prescribed form or mode which might serve as a blockage 
to immediate drive, Sade followed the path of ecstasy. But this too ends in an impasse, 
for pure desire - like pure formless chaos - is nothing. The constant transformation, con­
struction, and reorganization of forms within the chaos of destruction depends on a cer­
tain harmonics or general economy which can never be prescribed. Perhaps it is only the 
Sadian path of jouissance which can lead us to the point where conscious harmonics sets 
in.
From an esoteric perspective, Sade’s path is what Rudolph Steiner (1911) called 
“Luciferian” - not the path of evil but that of ecstasy. As opposed to the Luciferian path 
of jouissance which had tempted past forms of human subjectivity, Steiner described 
humanity’s increasing domination by the “Ahrimanian” force marked by control, fear, 
repression, and blockage. Wilhelm Reich (1949) believed this “emotional plague” was 
responsible for psychological and physical illness as well as for social repression in 
bureaucracy and oppression. It appears however that in order to escape from Ahriman 
and reach Steiner’s third path of “Christ” as a form of balance within chaos, one must 
pass through the Luciferian journey of jouissance, chaos, and destruction. Rene Girard 
describes this as a conversion process - or “metanoia” that can be witnessed in writers 
such as Augustine, Dostoyevsky, and Proust in which the purity of self-absorbed desire 
and jouissance leads one out of the mimetic desire of competition, control, and the mas­
ter-slave dialectic and into the recognition of the other - out of sacrificial and cathartic rit­
uals (including the “sacrificial interpretation of Christ”) and into mutual recognition or 
“Christ consciousness.” Steiner (1925) even describes physical illness and the destruction 
of the body as a necessary process for the liberation of consciousness and the further 
transformation of mind and spirit through matter. It is only pain and dis-ease which bring 
on the initial consciousness or splitting of mind and body that differentiates human from 
animal. From this point a journey ensues in which psyche or subjectivity attempts to 
maintain balance through the expression of its physical vehicle of the body long enough 
to learn from, enjoy, and express this particular manifestation or sovereign event.
Consciousness unleashes a confrontation with the void which can lead in different direc-
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tions. The response of nihilism is to turn away in fear and to seek to return to sleep 
through the maintenance of stagnant forms of truth, morality, and control of self and 
other. The choice of jouissance is to pursue the path of ecstasy bom of the the awareness 
that “nothing is true, all is permitted.” This path reveals not the void but a chaosmic 
process in which life and death are simply the mutation of virtual forms of organization 
in endless transformation. In Lacanian terms only the ethic of pursuing one’s desire can 
free one of the neurosis bom of negating this desire in favor of the determination of the 
Other. But the psychoanalytic journey leads beyond the specific fantasy of one’s own par­
ticular desire and to the process of Desire itself as it operates chaosmically. The analyst 
lives in and for this Desire. Yet just as the pursuit of one’s sovereign subjectivity leads to 
objective consciousness of process throughout the social and universal environment in 
which this subjectivity is embedded, so to does this consciousness recognize the holo­
graphic essence of its particular limited sovereign event as simultaneously all that is. The 
moment lived for itself alone requires the underlying harmony of survival to sustain it. 
Yet this survival itself is nothing other than its creative expressive moment. It remains to 





Clinical and Cultural Practice
1. Life and Death - Chaosophy
The process of life and death is the story of individuation and the unfolding of the virtual 
into the actual. Life is division and capture - the striation and stagnation of forms escap­
ing o t  detaching themselves from the infinite chaos of atemporality. At the quantum 
level,, physicists cannot determine the position of the fundamental particles of matter - 
they can only map their probability to manifest in a measureable space-time continuum 
out of the wave form of pure energy. A wave of pure energy is organized into particles of 
matter which we take for “solid.” Light is warped into photons. Classical physics and 
mathematics constitute an art and science of life - as do shamanism, magic, and psycho­
analysis - which depend first on what can be conceived. The relationship between what 
we call mind and body - or psyche and matter - cannot be grasped by logico-bivalent 
thinking alone.
Death puts an end to life. Death is our word for the end of an individuated form which 
had at one time been bom into the actual out of the possible. This concrescence dies 
when the sovereign singularity of its particular organization ceases to be. Whether a con­
crescence will return to the entropy of nondifferentiated chaos or recognizably mutate 
into another organized concrescence through its momentary journey into chaos and thus 
transmit or communicate transversally something from one form to another depends on a 
number of factors. The virtual totality outside of time-space configurations is chaos. But 
neither life nor death exist as essences - and neither do order or chaos. They are rather 
two poles of a movement of chaosmosis which evokes the being and becoming of all 
forms living, dying, mutating, and recurring in the actually becoming yet virtually exist­
ing.
Subjective and objective are similarly two poles which can be approached asymptotically 
yet never attained. To experience death as the end of a concrescence and possible muta­
tion is to experience it objectively. But our subjectivity responds differently. Immediately, 
faced with death, we believe in it. We fear it. We fall prey to the anguish of loss that is the 
flip side of our joy in this sovereign existence - this life story which is ours. We could 
through consciousness learn to detach ourselves from this belief which leads to our ecsta-
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sy and our anguish. We could recognize that - yes - all desire is illusion. We could - were 
we capable - cease to glorify our story - cease to identify with the concrescence which we 
are and view it objectively as a thing which happens. In a sense this consciousness leads 
toward the destruction of the physical body. As it decontextualizes the momentary traps 
and tenitorializations of life forms, it brings about deconstruction, transformation, and 
change. But infinite questioning is formlessness and the absence of belief itself which - 
were it possible to attain absolutely - would be nothingness - nirvana. Evidently being 
also is becoming - the unfolding of limited forms and beliefs unaware - unconscious - of 
the homogeneous indivisible totality which is nothing and out of which they arise.
The search for knowledge - for absolute consciousness - leads to an impasse. Most often 
it is only false consciousness which remains propped up by unconscious - unquestioned - 
beliefs. The true discovery of groundless consciousness can lead to mystical states of 
ecstasy or to madness depending on the circumstances. Those who do not pass over 
entropically into the chaos of death or madness bring back a map of the movement of life 
and death - a map of psyche and matter being and becoming - which forms a pragmatics - 
an art and science of life. Returning to chaos or mutating into another form may be one’s 
choice - one’s arbitrary assent - one’s act of faith. If the choice is to live the particular set 
of concrescences forming humanity and one’s own singular existence, then the art and 
science of life is a pragmatics of chaosmosis which is both conservative and radical. The 
deconstruction and reconstruction of new forms of subjectivity - especially those 
imposed from outside - takes place against the preservation and optimalization of singu­
lar subjectivities and organized concrescences which have developed a sovereign rich­
ness through time and tradition. Across these isolated sovereign concrescences - each of 
which invokes infinite possibilities - links of communion or communication can be estab­
lished transversally - either through the objective pole of consciousness or through the 
subjective pole of empathy, seduction, and belief - desire, love, and faith.
Paradoxically the realm of cognition and consciousness and the realm of emotion and 
belief lead - in different ways - to similar transversal linkings - the ultimate of which 
would be non-differentiation. But the immanent interlinking and omni-communication 
resulting from belief or consciousness is always offset by the stubborn individuation of
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isolated concrescences - sovereign forms, beings, events, and processes which - self­
organizing and autopoetic - refuse to give up their measure of singularity and dissolve 
into “the anonymous mass of the irrevocable.”
2. Ecosophy and Sovereignty - A General Economy
In the end, desire and thought do not exist. What exists is our way of organizing or expe­
riencing chaos or the homogeneous indivisible totality. Desire and thought organize order 
through dividing and mapping - they are part of our subjectivity. Drive, perception, sen­
sation, affect, emotion, cognition, consciousness, and meaning are bound up in complex 
relations which construct “reality.”
A variety of theories within philosophy, psychoanalysis, psychology, neuroscience, and 
ethnology add complementary elements to a complex map of the psyche. Transformative 
practices of a therapeutic, pedagogical, mystical, ecological, or physical nature serve to 
reorganize our subjectivity - our experience of the world within the complexity of these 
maps - which is always initially constructed for us through our phylogenetic and ontoge­
netic development as embodied beings in the world.
An ethics of jouissance advocates an action of sovereignty, autopoesis, and non-interven­
tion. The experience of sovereignty frees one from the need to control others or to manip­
ulate the organization of reality for the purposes of production itself. It recognizes the 
sovereignty of each entity, system, event, or concrescence to organize its experience of 
the world according to its own metabolic mutations and limitations. It also however rec­
ognizes the mutually-limiting interdependence of all systems and the impossibility in the 
end of absolute non-intervention. Sovereignty within multiplicity is something to be 
striven for, but obviously all entities and their subjectivities are interwoven at certain 
points. Sovereignty within complex ecology - or general economy - is an uncertain 
process in itself - a pragmatics maintaining awareness of the relations between order and 
chaos.
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Transdisciplinary transformative practices surpass the role of specific indoctrinations in 
teaching, healing, and sacred experience by offering the very tools for reconstructing and 
reorganizing meaning and reality. The construction of subjectivities takes place among a 
multiplicity of possibilities drawn from other space-time configurations in history, 
mythology, and ethnography, while initiating the invention of new as-yet-inconceived 
forms. By gathering as many examples of subjectivity as possible, we can avoid the 
impasse of unity which denies difference. Concrescences emerge, live, and die, but their 
events can be recuperated in new combinations. Despite the hierarchy of stability, vulner­
ability, and functional optimization, each form is in itself incomparable - irreducible to 
any general equivalent. Respect for subjectivity can extract the sovereign essence from 
each event regardless of its objective limitations in the complex web of nested hierar­
chies.
The sovereignty of any subjective concrescence denies the larger systems within which it 
is embedded by seizing its jouissance at the expense of others, yet the broader complexity 
of structually coupled systems denies sovereignty through the continual movement of 
chaosmosis. Thus sovereign subjectivity limits ecosophic objectivity just as objective 
ecosophy limits subjective sovereignty in a circular refrain which mutates eternally while 
remaining constant in a process which - like imaginary topological forms - cannot be 
measured or grasped by classical models but nevertheless can be understood by the com­
plex psyche.
Throughout human history individual and collective subjectivities have organized their 
experience in disparate ways. It is only recently that human science has come to recog­
nize these experiences within their subjectivity rather than evaluating them as if they 
were objective. Through quantum physics, the most “objective” of sciences have come to 
recognize the subjective limitations of all objective measurement in which the absolute 
predictability and determinacy of classical science is only a probability which appears for 
our practical purposes to be a certainty.
The next step in the recognition of the subjective “state-dependent” knowledge of quan­
tum physics, psychoanalysis, hypnosis, ethnography, ethology, spiritual science, and
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bioenergetic medicine is the reintegration of transdisciplinary subjective “state-specific” 
sciences including the science of subjectivity itself in which the complementary objective 
and subjective poles will become part of a self-reflexive and self-conscious lucidity (Tart 
1975, Rossi 1993, Gerber 1996).
3. New Maps of the Psyche - Psychoanalysis and Science
The human psyche is a complex system which has barely begun to be modeled by the 
many maps of it which currently exist. Scientific knowledge usually has ignored the 
dynamic temporal nature of systems. Even the human sciences - in which the subjectivity 
of the observer is paramount in affecting the mapping of knowledge - have focussed pri­
marily on devising static maps of human experience. While psychoanalysis has differed 
from this by orienting its research and theory on the empirical clinical observation and 
analysis gained from processes, the subjective differences of human experience are often 
confined to atemporal categories. The increased understanding of complexity and com­
plementarity within the natural sciences should aid in modeling the dynamic nature of 
psyche and subjectivity in full recognition of the process-oriented nature of human 
events.
A time-space oriented “field” theory of the psyche can help us understand human experi­
ence more fully - including the many integrated levels of our subjectivity which can be 
tapped into as well as the symptoms they might give rise to if such psychic systems 
become paralyzed in a particular area. At the core of subjectivity is an experience of 
fusion and original unity which evokes and perhaps precedes the biological event of 
being in the womb, and which can be evoked in religious and group-trance experiences 
of an “oceanic” type. Becoming “hung up” at this level can result in extremely isolated 
autism or in various types of narcissism.
Evolving out of this phase and building on it, human subjectivity develops its primary 
individuation from fusion through splitting, projection, introjection, and other pre-signi- 
fying object relations. With any human being, this level of subjectivity continues to oper-
198
ate and form the basis for cathexes with friends, partners, and loved ones as well as for 
judgments and values. What is termed a paranoid-schizoid phase or position by Klein 
only demonstrates the degree to which these immediate relations and connections - with­
out the benefit of stable structures of distance and mediation which come from rituals, 
rules, language, and the symbolic - are experienced with feelings of fear and danger. 
Paranoia is often described as heightened awareness and indeed the consciousness of 
multiple connections which plunge one into oceanic unity accompanies reports of both 
schizophrenic and religious experience. Even at the physical level, those who take large 
amounts of stimulants to heighten awareness often suffer from “chemically-induced 
schizophrenia” (Snyder 1996). Psychological or physical traumas can induce a schizo­
phrenic breakdown in those who were seemingly stable before, and subjectivity can 
become stuck at this level irreversibly.
The depressive position which resolves the primitive schizoid splitting of human subjec­
tivity depends on integrating contradiction and embracing ambivalence. This may be the 
highest achievement of the human psyche, and it may be that few are able to resolve this 
ambivalence before entering into the symbolic realm of weaning. Lacking certain rites of 
passage to adulthood found in communities of the past, the individual of modernity has 
relied on identification and competition within the family to develop a “normal” or “neu­
rotic” relation to others. But the breakdown of the nuclear family and other social institu­
tions and the increase of communication through the growth of technology and the media 
has left the symbolic realm as an increasingly uncertain and chaotic experience which is 
currently in the process of fundamentally altering human subjectivity and its symptoms.
Freud’s “neuroses” were somewhat stable character types, but the symptomatology of 
today reveals an increase in borderline states of derealization, depression, and delusion. 
Traditional therapeutic methods are increasingly abandoned as ineffectual in comparison 
to pharmacology. Yet the current state of the individual and collective psyche may be able 
to reveal the truly complex nature of human subjectivity poised vulnerably between order 
and chaos. If we free ourselves from outdated approaches to the psyche, we may be able 
to grasp the complexity of subjectivity and to develop new methods of teaching and heal­
ing which in a generative and preventive mode will decrease the need for ineffectual and
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time-consuming methods of treating symptoms which are only the outward manifestation 
of a deeper imbalance.
4. Thinking and Feeling - Abstract Expressionism
The link between emotional and cognitive processes has not been adequately mapped 
out. Questions of desire, love, and affect are dealt with by psychoanalysts, but they usual­
ly steer clear of cognitive concerns. Those who study thought, cognition, and conscious­
ness usually ignore the affective element of such functioning. The separations between 
emotional and cognitive realms is taken for granted, yet human subjectivity is a complex 
system in which no fine line can be drawn.
We could consider human subjectivity to be a form of abstract expressionism. All art and 
language is a re-presentation - an abstraction from immediate action or instinct. But 
abstraction can reach a level in which the element of desire or affect is no longer embod­
ied. That does not mean that it is not there, and it is this emotional plague or unrecog­
nized unconscious desire which accounts for much confusion in human relationships. 
Many psychotherapeutic approaches aim to bring to consciousness the unconscious affec­
tive or emotional forces which operate in determining human experience. They seek to 
integrate emotional and cognitive experience - desire and thought - in the way that 
abstract expressionist art seeks to integrate the immediate drive to act and to create with 
the abstract conceptual forms which will express, embody, and contain these drives.
Contemporary neuroscientists describe the relationship between emotion and cognition as 
the juxtaposition and linking of our of perceptual mapping of the world with the somatic 
states that accompany it. The satisfaction of need and drive which requires cognitive 
mapping, discrimination, and memory brings about somatic sensorial attraction and 
repulsion through pleasure and pain which are stored, linked, and recalled through further 
cognitive reorganization. This is the foundation of conditioned learning. Higher-level 
learning and consciousness - self-consciousness - in human beings is the result of the 
robust complexity of its ability to map and reorganize perception/action in the world.
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Rather than concentrating on the neurological foundations of emotional-cognitive experi­
ence, psychoanalysts have focused on the affective and un-conscious aspects of our sub­
jectivity which elude a purely objective rational approach to understanding the psyche. 
The ontogenetic development of the individual is interlinked with his social development 
in the world of meaning and signification. The subject moves through a journey in which 
he comes to translate or abstract his immediate experience through symbolization. Along 
this journey any number of aberrations can occur as a result of either differences in phys­
ical bodily processing or differences in the social construction of one’s subjective experi­
ence of the world. Physical development is somewhat predetermined by genetic codes, 
but even this can be altered by physical and environmental conditions of ontogeny. And 
even given the optimum biological development, the differences in the social construc­
tion of the psyche are profound - especially across different cultures.
The primitive secondary proto-semiotic object relations of “mirroring” or “mimetic 
desire” create an intensely “expressionistic” form of subjectivity which in the contempo­
rary society of rationally mediated behaviour is seen to be aberrant and may or may not 
cause suffering for the subject depending more on his social relations - the way he is per­
ceived and received by others - than on any internal state. On the other hand, what is 
accepted as normal behavior in contemporary society through the development of 
“abstract” tertiary symbol-formation may mask a deeply dissatisfied psyche despite its 
ability to provide optimum functional survival, success, and even pleasure. An introduc­
tion into the symbolic world of others may offer only a false sense of community with no 
emotional intensity. The evocation of core levels of intensity found in the oceanic-autistic 
fusion state of amorous and religious rituals are as necessary as the abstract embodiments 
which we inhabit to function pragmatically. While most civilizations have provided ritu­
als for the integration of emotional-cognitive experience, our society has become so dom­
inated by rationality and abstraction that the emotional core only erupts in the form of 
murder, abuse, and oppression. Without understanding the larger picture of individual and 
collective subjectivities integrated within complex systems, clinical and cultural practice 
cannot hope to transform these processes.
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5. The Social Psyche - Subject, Object, and Other
The distinction between subject and object in Lacanian psychoanalysis parallels the dis­
tinction between subject and substance in Hegelian philosophy as well as evoking the 
quantum self-reflexive approach to scientific measurement. The subject is a part of the 
substance, but in the process of substance removing itself from itself in order to become 
conscious of itself, it changes itself. The scientist who measures the world is a part of that 
world. To map the substance through science, language, or any form of “knowing” is to 
re-present it. Thinking or mapping homogeneous indivisible totality - or substance - 
carves it up and organizes it in a way which alters it. The act of thinking, knowing, and 
mapping is a perception/creation.
Both the Hegelian and the Lacanian notions of the subject are profoundly social in that 
they demonstrate the inseparability of subject, object, and other. Alfred Korzybski’s 
(1921, 1933) rules of distinction between map and territory apply equally well to the 
Hegelian-Lacanian notion of the subject divided from the world and from himself. The 
map is not the territory indicates that the subject is not the substance. Substance is sym­
bolized or expressed by the subject - which is why the subject is always determined by 
the Other. The map is (some but) not all o f the territory expresses the fact that even 
though every map maps some of the territory, the map can never represent all of the terri­
tory. Every subject is a part of the substance, but there will always be some substance left 
over. This leftover is what drives the subject. Subjectivity is radically social. Even if the 
subject can free himself from having his subjectivity constructed by the Other of truth, 
morality, or abstraction - he will never free himself from being determined by the other of 
desire. Finally, the map is self-reflexive indicates that the mapmaker is included in the 
map he is making, and thus there will always be a vanishing point or blind spot which 
cannot be mapped. Similarly the subject will always contain a blind-spot or “uncon­
scious” which cannot be seen by himself - only by another.
Lacan maps out the social construction of the subject by describing how the symbolic 
social world comes to construct the way in which the subject will experience the world
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from the beginning. But Lacan goes even further by considering the recognition of this 
self-reflexive blind spot to be the true nature of the subject. For even when we have freed 
ourselves from the fundamental construction of our subjectivity by the Other, there 
remains the fact that our subjectivity is essentially divided, unfullfilled, and unconscious 
by virtue of the self-reflexive blind spot which only the other can see for us. We need one 
another. This is the radically social and and radically psychoanalytic nature of human 
experience.
Psychoanalysis does not concern itself with cure. To analyze is to untie the knots of an 
autopoetic organism - to listen to that which determines subjectivity. For the analyst, the 
symptom - and the demand for a cure - contains a message which the desire to cure 
would eradicate. Freud built the psychoanalytic approach around the fact that the treat­
ment of the symptom would simply convert it into another symptom - the core process 
would remain out of balance and unconscious. The process of analysis - like various ped­
agogical and mystical practices - is a journey of transformation toward consciousness of 
unconscious processes. It gives the subject the pragmatic tools to organize his own psy­
che and to enjoy his symptoms. The transformative practice of analysis is an art and sci­
ence of life in which the construction and expression of subjectivities serve as an ongoing 
ecology of mind which is in itself a generative and preventive therapy. Pathology is no 
longer judged as lack with respect to a norm - rather difference is celebrated. Desire no 
longer revolves around lack but becomes desiring production - the active creation of 
ways of experiencing life - of subjectivities. This is not to say that the request to relieve 
suffering is ignored. On the contrary, to simply treat a symptom from a predetermined 
diagnostic category would be to ignore the call from the other which is the subject. 
Instead this call initiates a pragmatic process of transformation within a general economy 
of subjectivity composed of biological, social, symbolic, and noetic matrices.
Drawing on the techniques of a variety of analytic practices, we can develop a complex 
ecosophical approach to analysis in which the questions of desire, jouissance, and sover­
eignty are confronted by the structural coupling of autopoetic systems. Within a transfor­
mative practice of analysis, the reconstruction of subjectivity finally leads to the con- 
ciousness of this construction by the Other which has been determining subjectivity all
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along. A full transformative practice consists of several integrated components:
1. The engagement of desire, cathexis, and communication in the transference
2. The dialectical, dialogical, and narrative process of consciousness.
3. The containing-holding environment of transference and community.
4. The interventions of deconstruction, reframing, and transcontextualization.
All therapeutic and pedagogical practices actively engage in some form of containing 
and/or intervention, but few consciously integrate elements of both. However, while all 
such practices serve to transform the psyche in some way, only a full process of con­
sciousness unfolding over time can endow the subject with the ability to practice his own 
analysis. The elucidation of psychoanalysis as such a total transformative practice in line 
with ancient techniques of consciousness and the sacred was the essence of Lacan’s pro­
ject. Bion, Winnicott, and Laing introduced and elucidated the full nature of the holding 
environment through the care of the practitioner within the collective psychotherapeutic 
community as an alternative to unwanted treatment. Finally, the recent approach of 
cybernetic and systems therapists has added a series of interventions and techniques 
which move beyond traditionally stagnant models of therapy and confront the uncon­
scious assumptions implicit in all transformative practices and within therapists them­
selves.
The process of transformative pragmatics sets up a multi-dimensional field or grid by 
which the intersubjective event of intimate dialogical therapy takes place within a com­
plex web of past, present, and future. In this dynamic process, the analyst is a guide with­
in a field of multiple subjectivities balanced tenuously between order and chaos. 
Interventions are employed to break down stagnant routines and rigidities and to return 
them to the state of fluid processes, while holding environments act as a sanctuary or 
shelter within which to engage with such chaos and reorganize new subjectivities.
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We never escape from our symptoms - we only transform them and/or embrace them. At 
the core of our existence is the arbitrary assent upon which all actions, justifications, and 
symptoms are based: “style is the man.” The ethical and symbolic elements of our life are 
based on the the aesthetic element of jouissance. The only true ethic is to act in accor­
dance with this sovereign jouissance in full recognition of its implications with and for 
others. The recognition of consciousness which allows the embracing and enacting of 
desire requires the passage through a void of chaos in which all truths, morals, and forms 
which serve to embody drives and maintain order and stability are dissolved. In Rudolph 
Steiner’s (1911) language, only a passage through the Luciferian realm of ecstasy will 
lead one out of the neurotic control and repression of the Ahrimanian and into the har­
monics of Christ-consciousness through metanoia. In order to pass from breakdown to 
breakthrough and to transform schizophrenic disintegration into the reorganization of 
multiple subjectivities of limited finitude, the subject must forgo the neurotic symptoms 
which provide relative stability and must seize the courage to confront the schizoid core 
of primal splitting as well as the depressive horizon of the real in which the ambivalence 
of life and death marks the limits of human experience.
6. Wild Analysis - The Clinic of Everyday Life
Freud’s new practice of psychoanalysis was invented outside of institutional dogma and 
fueled by a coterie of devoted explorers whom he initiated informally - sometimes in a 
matter of a few visits. The dogmatic institutionalization of psychoanalysis has betrayed 
the open exploration of a truly human science as well as the pragmatics of singular clini­
cal events. Innovations which are at first radically rejected eventually become the very 
rigid norms which rejected such difference in the first place. Lacan’s attempt at experi­
mentation within analysis was met with his excommunication. Through the formation of 
his own school, he extended analysis beyond the scope of a closed circle. He engaged 
poets, artists, philosophers, and scientists and extended the boundaries of analysis and its 
transmission into the culture at large.
Meanwhile the post-war decades saw the initiation of increasing numbers of experimen-
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tal therapeutic communities both inside and outside official institutional frameworks. 
“Antipsychiatric” approaches spread through Europe and America, and teaching and 
healing practices from other civilizations were integrated with modem techniques. While 
these movements have primarily been abandoned in favor of increasingly rational and 
efficient methods of symptom treatment - most often through chemicals - there exist 
more possibilities than ever before for the integration of biological, social, and spiritual 
elements of mind and body in the understanding, healing, and sacred transformation of 
the psyche.
“Wild analysis” originally referred to the practice of analysis outside of conventional 
boundaries - whether it was a case of unwanted application or of open speculation. But to 
engage in analysis outside of the consulting room is to take the fmits of its lessons and 
integrate them into the ecology of everyday life. Guattari’s analytic practices in the 
experimental La Borde clinic included creative, dramatic, political, and material process­
es and an analytic approach to multiple fields of subjectivity which exist and insist them­
selves at every moment. His own political and ecological activism extended the analytic 
enterprise into the cultural, social, and functional subjectivities which are as much a part 
of the psyche as individual forms.
Grasping the nature of the psyche in emotional-cognitive processing, object relations, 
projection, introjection, jouissance, splitting, symmetrizing, translating, containing, and 
other elements of chaosmic dynamism can lead one to approach life in new ways. The rit­
uals and relations of everyday life surround our every move. What is the purpose of 
transformative practices if not to reinvigorate the lived situation and to reinvent new sub­
jective experiences of the sacred by any means possible? Human life is not a process 
solely determined by survival. Life is made up of desire and meaning and the shared 
experience of its communication. The collective communion of a life of meaning within 
consciousness depends on the transformation of the psyche from within the deepest levels 
of the individual, just as the possibility of individual and momentary sovereignty depends 
on the transformation of collective, social, and institutional embodiments of subjectivity.
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Baudrillard’s challenge to subjectivity is that psychoanalysis itself has already passed 
into the cultural psyche. We have already passed the time when the psychoanalytic event 
with its foundations in the separation between real, imaginary, and symbolic can affect 
us. There is no real, for the apparent world of the imaginary-symbolic - of virtual reality - 
has taken over. Baudrillard calls this a return to the primitive form of the sacred - seduc­
tion without the delusion of truth. But a part of the seductive nature of any form is its 
truth - the truth of faith and belief that the one who is seduced experiences.
The return to primitive forms of seduction is not a regression, but Bataille’s “animal 
night” - the point at which absolute rational thought becomes what it always sought - the 
return to immanence of the animal in the world like water in water - yet with lucid self- 
consciousness intact. The practice of “apathy” in Sade is the absolute “objectivity” of the 
one who places himself at the level of the movement of matter and energy - organic and 
inorganic - organizing, individuating, transforming, adapting, evolving, dissolving. By 
this method, the Spinozist sage captures empathic understanding of the complex ecolo­
gies of the universe - a practice which is ultimately futile unless the limits of this objec­
tivity in the subjectivity of singular concrescence are recognized. Sade seeks to free the 
energy of drive itself - before or beyond desire - as it plays through him, but this too is a 
futile goal in that the real is always organized into matter and its expression through 
forms which include the imaginary realm of the human psyche. But as Bataille and 
Blanchot have pointed out, it is only Sade’s plunge into pure jouissance which shows us 
the impasse of unconscious blockage and leads the way to the objective consciousness of 
the movement of matter, energy, and form throughout the universe.
This chaosmosis which describes the interplay of the real and the apparent is ineradica­
ble. The real has not disappeared, but we have reached a state in which human subjectivi­
ty is split between the real and the virtual in a dual fashion - and where the virtual domi­
nates. The imaginary may be perceived as the realm of the sacred in which the inner 
experience of affect and concept deepens the subjectivity of humanity in relation to the 
real. The virtual is not the triumph of the imaginary, but the denial of both imaginary and 
real in favor of a “spectacle” of hypnotic forms which only obliterates self-reflection and 
puts us to sleep rather than increasing subjective-objective consciousness of each event-
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concrescence within a complex ecology.
The symbolic faith or social contract which maintains order among the primal embodi­
ments of sovereign subjectivities reaches an impasse before it is plunged into chaos. We 
seek a final realm beyond indexical, iconic, and symbolic which maintains lucid con­
sciousness and yet approaches the chaosmic flow of the psyche. This would be the realm 
of the trace. Beyond index, icon, and symbol, lies the trace - the form which contains its 
own dissolution. The poetics of the trace constructs a semiotics which immolates itself 
leaving the ashes of memory free to be reconstructed again and again in the refrain. Free 
from the prison of exact repetition, we create and recreate within a tradition. Each mani­
festation will be different - and yet the same. This is Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence in 
which faith and the will to live are not undercut by the lies of truth but enacted through 
the truth of lies. Our energy to live is enacted in the faith of each moment free to be and 
to become in an endless process where the perception/creation/manifestation of each 
moment of individual and collective subjectivity is sovereign.
Mysticism - inner experience - the sacred - was for Bataille the end of life which the 
means served to make possible. For Bataille and Lacan the jouissance which already 
determines our beliefs, words, and actions was but an impoverished mysticism unless it 
could become consciously and fully embraced. We can - with Bataille - claim that each 
subjectivity is capable of experiencing the state of the mystic when jouissance reigns free 
of the calculating mind which fears death and denies immanence. There is in fact no 
other end than the dissolution of thought in the sovereignty of the lived moment. A 
restricted economy of survival, rationality, and efficiency eradicates such sovereign expe­
rience. A general economy recognizes the interplay between productive survival and the 
expenditure of excess. If this general economy is not acknowledged it will operate any­
way leaving physical, social, and psychic symptoms which are misconstrued and treated 
as if they had come from outside. Without returning to the myths and rituals of the past, 
we can seek a communication of sovereignty within a consciousness of general economy 
- a communion and a community bound by mutual recognition and shared sovereignty - 
an inner experience in which what is sacrificed is the very calculating conscious mind 
which submits subjectivity to strategy and production. The experience of the chaosmic
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psyche which is lived to the fullest in the mystic and which awaits each one who 
the moment of sovereign subjectivity is that of living desire at the limits of thought.
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